列维奇 商务谈判第8版英文教师手册IMChap18Lewicki8e.docx

列维奇 商务谈判第8版英文教师手册IMChap18Lewicki8e.docx

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列维奇商务谈判第8版英文教师手册IMChap18Lewicki8e

Chapter18

ManagingDifficultNegotiations

ChapterOverview

Inthischapter,weturntosituationswherepartiesareusingdifferentmodelstoguidetheirnegotiationbecausetheyhavediagnosedthesituationdifferently,possessdifferentlevelsofnegotiationsophistication,orsimplyfromhabit.

∙Theauthorsbelievethatmanynegotiatorsarelessfamiliarwithcollaborativenegotiationanduseitlessfrequentlythantheyshould.

∙Onegoalofnegotiatorsshouldbetoensurethebroaderapplicationofintegrativenegotiatingunderappropriatecircumstancesinordertoproducebetteragreements.

∙Theauthorswilldirectthediscussionandadvicetonegotiatorswhowishtonegotiatecollaborativelybutfindtheymustdealwithotherswhoarereluctanttodoso—whowish,intend,orareactivelytryingtobedistributive.Theycallthem“difficult”people.

Thebehaviorofdifficultnegotiatorsmaybeintentional,theresultofaclearstrategic,behavioral,orphilosophicalchoicebytheotherparty,oritmayalsobeduetoinadequateskill.

∙Inthischapter,weaddressmethodsnegotiatorscanusewhendealingwithanintentionallydifficultpartyandexplaintheskillsandbehaviorsneededtodefendagainstsuchpartiesand/ortoconvertthemtouseamoreproductivenegotiationprocess.

∙Webeginbydiscussinghowtomanagetheshadownegotiationandsocialcontract.

∙Next,weturntoadiscussionofhowtorespondtotheotherparty’sharddistributivetactics

∙Followedbyadiscussionoftheoptionsavailabletonegotiatorsfacedwithanotherpartywhoisirrationalorhasmorepower

∙Wethenexaminehowtorespondtoultimatumsanddiscusspossibletacticstousewhendealingwithangryandgenerallydifficultnegotiators.

∙Next,wediscusshowtomanagedifficultconversations.

∙Weclosethechapterwithadiscussionof“duplicitousnegotiations,”situationsinwhichtheotherpartyappearstobenegotiatingbut,infact,hasnodesiretoreachanagreement.

LearningObjectives

1.Understandhowtomanagethesocialcontract.

2.Considerhowtorespondwhentheotherpartyrespondsdistributively,hasmorepower,orpresentsyouwithanultimatum.

3.Learndifferentapproachesanegotiatorcanusewhendealingwithdifficultpeople.

ChapterOutline

I.ManagingtheShadowNegotiationandSocialContract

A.PowerMoves

B.ProcessMoves

C.AppreciativeMoves

II.RespondingtotheOtherSide’sHardDistributiveTactics

A.CallThemonIt

B.IgnoreThem

C.RespondinKind

D.OffertoChangetoMoreProductiveMethods

III.RespondingtoIrrationality

IV.RespondingWhentheOtherSideHasMorePower

V.TheSpecialProblemofHandlingUltimatums

VI.RespondingtoAnger

VII.RespondingWhentheOtherSideIsBeingDifficult

A.Ury’sBreakthroughApproach

B.RespondingtoDifficultPeople

C.HavingConversationswithDifficultPeople

VIII.DuplicitousNegotiations

IX.ChapterSummary

I.ManagingtheShadowNegotiationandSocialContract

∙Managingtheshadownegotiationandsocialcontractisfundamentallyconcernedwithdeterminingwhatgroundthenegotiationisgoingtocoverandhowthenegotiatorsaregoingtoworktogether.

oTheshadownegotiationoccursinparallelwiththesubstantivenegotiationandisconcernedwithhowthenegotiationwillproceed.

oTheresultofthisongoingshadownegotiationisasocialcontractregardinghowthenegotiationwillproceed,whohasinfluenceandpower,andwhattheboundariesofthenegotiationare.

∙Thesocialcontractandshadownegotiationareconcernedwithwhatthenegotiationisaboutandhowdecisionsaremade.

oNegotiatorsneedtodiscussthisandworktocreatealignmentinthesocialcontract.

oAlignmentcanoccurbyconvincingtheotherpartytoagreetoyourview,changingyourexpectationtomatchtheirs,orreachingagreementabouttheparametersofthesocialcontract.

oThesocialcontractshouldbediscussedandnegotiated,notassumed.

∙Negotiatorsshouldconsidertheshadownegotiationcarefullybeforemeetingwiththeotherpartysotheyareclearintheirownmindsthescopeofthenegotiationandhowtheywouldideallyliketoworkwiththeotherparty.

oNegotiatorsignoreshadownegotiationsattheirperilasunaddressedissuesmayleadtoimpasse.

oThreestrategiclevershelppeoplenavigatetheshadownegotiation:

powermoves,processmoves,andappreciativemoves–seeBox18.1foranexample.

A.PowerMoves

∙Powermovesaredesignedtobringreluctantbargainersbacktothetable.

oTherearethreekindsofpowermoves:

▪Incentivesdrawtheattentionoftheotherpartytotheimportanceofthenegotiationandhelpthemrecognizetheywillbenefitfromnegotiation.

▪Pressuretacticsforcetheotherpartytorealizethatthestatusquoisunacceptableandmakethecostsofnotnegotiatingveryexplicit.

▪Finally,enlistingthesupportofalliescanhelptheotherpartyseetheadvantageofnegotiating.

B.ProcessMoves

∙Processmovesaredesignedtoalterthenegotiationprocessitselfthroughadjustmentstotheagenda,sequencing,decisionrules,andthelike.

oForexample,acompetitivemindsetmayfavorthosewhospeakloudestorlongest,orwholikebluffingandgamesmanship.

oAnegotiatoruncomfortablewiththisdynamiccantrytoreframetheprocess,forexample,byredefiningsomethingthatwasacompetitionoverresourcesintoacollaborativegroupallocationdecisionbasedonneed.

C.AppreciativeMoves

∙Appreciativemovesaredesignedtobreakcyclesofcontentiousnessthatmayhaveledtodeterioratingcommunication,acrimony,orevensilence.

oExamplesaretacticsthat

▪helptheotherpartysavefaceinanargument

▪maintaindialogueandinformationexchangeinthefaceofpressuretodisengage

▪invitenewperspectivesintothediscussiontotrytobreakalogjamorreverseaskidtowardstalemate

D.SectionSummary

∙Theconceptsoftheshadownegotiationandsocialcontractarecompellingwaystothinkabouttheoftenhiddenyetcrucialprocessesthatoccurinnegotiationalongsidehagglingoverpositionsandarrivingatagreements.

∙Negotiatorswhowanttoshifttoamorecollaborativeprocessshouldactivelymanagetheshadownegotiationandsocialcontract.

I.RespondingtotheOtherSide’sHardDistributiveTactics

∙Byhardtactics,wemeanthedistributivetacticsthattheotherpartyusesinanegotiationtoputpressureonnegotiatorstodosomethingthatisnotintheirbestinterest.

oAsapartymanaginganegotiationmismatch,youcanrespondtothesetacticsinthefollowingways:

callthemonit,ignorethem,respondinkind,oroffertochangetomoreproductivemethods.

A.CallThemonIt

∙Negotiatorsshouldtelltheotherpartytheyareawareofwhattheyaredoingbyidentifyingthetacticandraisingittothelevelofopendiscussion.

oShouldbedonetactfullybutfirmly.

oDiscussingthetacticisagoodfirststeptoconvertingnegotiatorstomorewin-winnegotiating.

B.IgnoreThem

∙Atacticignoredisessentiallyatacticdefeated.

oUnfortunately,somebargainerscontinueevenafteryouignoretheirtactics,itmaynotbeenoughtogivethemthemessageamorecollaborativeapproachispossible.

oBox18.2presentsseveralresponsesfromahardbargainingsalescontextthatignorebuyers’aggressivebargainingtacticswhilerefocusingthenegotiationonthesellers’valueproposition.

C.RespondinKind

∙Whileappropriatesometimes,respondinginkindescalatestheconflictandisnotconsistentwiththegoalofconvertingtheothertoamorecollaborativeapproach.

D.OffertoChangetoMoreProductiveMethods

∙Oneresearchstudyofferstheadviceofrecognizingthetactic,explicitlyraisingtheissue,andquestioningthetactic’slegitimacyanddesirability–negotiateoverit.

oThelogicofthisadviceliesintheassumptionthatoncetheaggressivenegotiatorunderstandsthat

▪theirbehaviorisunderstood,and

▪continuingthisbehaviorwillentailcertaincoststheywill（hopefully）respondtoasuggestionforamoreintegrativeexchange.

D.SectionSummary

∙Theauthorsrecommendthatnegotiatorswhoaretryingtoconverttheotherpartyfromusingharddistributivetacticstoamorecollaborativeapproachshouldrespondbycallingtheotheronthetacticsandofferingtochangetomoreproductivemethodsifthedistributivebargainerpersists.

∙Ignoringthetacticsmayworkforawhile,butrespondinginkindisnotlikelytobehelpfulinthissituation.

III.RespondingtoIrrationality

∙Oneofthemorechallengingnegotiationsituationsoccurswhentheotherpartyappearstobecompletelyirrational.

oThekeytomanagingthissituationistounderstandwhy.

oNegotiatorsmayactirrationallyasahardbargainingtactic,butthereareotherreasonstheymayappearirrational.

oOnestudysuggeststhreereasonsthatnegotiatorsmayseemirrational.

▪Theyareuninformed.

▪Theyhavehiddenconstraints.

▪Theyhavehiddeninterests.

∙Researchersfromthesamestudycautionagainstlabelingnegotiatorsasirrationalbecausetypicallytheyarenotandthelabeldoesnothelpthenegotiationprocess.

oWhentheytrulyareirrational,seriouslyconsiderusingyourBATNA,imposingasolutionifyouhavethepower,orseekingassistanceofathirdparty.

IV.RespondingWhentheOtherSideHasMorePower

∙Powerimbalancesinnegotiationcanrepresentcleardangerstothesatisfactionofthebothpartiesandtothecollaborativeprocess.

oFirst,high-powerpartiestendtopaylittleheedtotheneedsoflow-powerparties,whoeitherdon’tgettheirneedsmetorusedisruptive,attention-gettingtacticsthatmakecollaborationverydifficult.

oSecond,low-powerpartiesarenotusuallyinapositiontotriggerandadvanceanintegrativeprocessastheyhavelesstogive.

∙Negotiatorsshouldconsider