对于海权的认识英文.docx

对于海权的认识英文.docx

《对于海权的认识英文.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《对于海权的认识英文.docx（34页珍藏版）》请在冰豆网上搜索。

对于海权的认识英文

ONSEAPOWER

ThehistoryofSeaPowerislargely,thoughbynomeanssolely,a

narrativeofcontestsbetweennations,ofmutualrivalries,of

violencefrequentlyculminatinginwar.Theprofoundinfluenceofsea

commerceuponthewealthandstrengthofcountrieswasclearlyseen

longbeforethetrueprincipleswhichgoverneditsgrowthand

prosperityweredetected.Tosecuretoone'sownpeoplea

disproportionateshareofsuchbenefits,everyeffortwasmadeto

excludeothers,eitherbythepeacefullegislativemethodsofmonopoly

orprohibitoryregulations,or,whenthesefailed,bydirectviolence.

Theclashofinterests,theangryfeelingsrousedbyconflicting

attemptsthustoappropriatethelargershare,ifnotthewhole,of

theadvantagesofcommerce,andofdistantunsettledcommercial

regions,ledtowars.Ontheotherhand,warsarisingfromother

causeshavebeengreatlymodifiedintheirconductandissuebythe

controlofthesea.Thereforethehistoryofseapower,while

embracinginitsbroadsweepallthattendstomakeapeoplegreat

upontheseaorbythesea,islargelyamilitaryhistory;anditis

inthisaspectthatitwillbemainly,thoughnotexclusively,

regardedinthefollowingpages.

Astudyofthemilitaryhistoryofthepast,suchasthis,isenjoined

bygreatmilitaryleadersasessentialtocorrectideasandtothe

skilfulconductofwarinthefuture.Napoleonnamesamongthe

campaignstobestudiedbytheaspiringsoldier,thoseofAlexander,

Hannibal,andCaesar,towhomgunpowderwasunknown;andthereisa

substantialagreementamongprofessionalwritersthat,whilemanyof

theconditionsofwarvaryfromagetoagewiththeprogressof

weapons,therearecertainteachingsintheschoolofhistorywhich

remainconstant,andbeing,therefore,ofuniversalapplication,can

beelevatedtotherankofgeneralprinciples.Forthesamereasonthe

studyoftheseahistoryofthepastwillbefoundinstructive,byits

illustrationofthegeneralprinciplesofmaritimewar,

notwithstandingthegreatchangesthathavebeenbroughtaboutin

navalweaponsbythescientificadvancesofthepasthalfcentury,and

bytheintroductionofsteamasthemotivepower.

Itisdoublynecessarythustostudycriticallythehistoryand

experienceofnavalwarfareinthedaysofsailing-ships,because

whilethesewillbefoundtoaffordlessonsofpresentapplicationand

value,steamnavieshaveasyetmadenohistorywhichcanbequotedas

decisiveinitsteaching.Oftheonewehavemuchexperimental

knowledge;oftheother,practicallynone.Hencetheoriesaboutthe

navalwarfareofthefuturearealmostwhollypresumptive;and

althoughtheattempthasbeenmadetogivethemamoresolidbasisby

dwellingupontheresemblancebetweenfleetsofsteamshipsandfleets

ofgalleysmovedbyoars,whichhavealongandwell-knownhistory,it

willbewellnottobecarriedawaybythisanalogyuntilithasbeen

thoroughlytested.Theresemblanceisindeedfarfromsuperficial.The

featurewhichthesteamerandthegalleyhaveincommonistheability

tomoveinanydirectionindependentofthewind.Suchapowermakesa

radicaldistinctionbetweenthoseclassesofvesselsandthe

sailing-ship;forthelattercanfollowonlyalimitednumberof

courseswhenthewindblows,andmustremainmotionlesswhenitfails.

Butwhileitiswisetoobservethingsthatarealike,itisalsowise

tolookforthingsthatdiffer;forwhentheimaginationiscarried

awaybythedetectionofpointsofresemblance,--oneofthemost

pleasingofmentalpursuits,--itisapttobeimpatientofany

divergenceinitsnew-foundparallels,andsomayoverlookorrefuse

torecognizesuch.Thusthegalleyandthesteamshiphaveincommon,

thoughunequallydeveloped,theimportantcharacteristicmentioned,

butinatleasttwopointstheydiffer;andinanappealtothe

historyofthegalleyforlessonsastofightingsteamships,the

differencesaswellasthelikenessmustbekeptsteadilyinview,or

falsedeductionsmaybemade.Themotivepowerofthegalleywhenin

usenecessarilyandrapidlydeclined,becausehumanstrengthcouldnot

longmaintainsuchexhaustingefforts,andconsequentlytactical

movementscouldcontinuebutforalimitedtime

（1）;andagain,during

thegalleyperiodoffensiveweaponswerenotonlyofshortrange,but

werealmostwhollyconfinedtohand-to-handencounter.Thesetwo

conditionsledalmostnecessarilytoarushuponeachother,not,

however,withoutsomedexterousattemptstoturnordoubleonthe

enemy,followedbyahand-to-handmelee.Insucharushandsucha

meleeagreatconsensusofrespectable,eveneminent,navalopinionof

thepresentdayfindsthenecessaryoutcomeofmodernnavalweapons,--

akindofDonnybrookFair,inwhich,asthehistoryofmeleesshows,

itwillbehardtoknowfriendfromfoe.Whatevermayprovetobethe

worthofthisopinion,itcannotclaimanhistoricalbasisinthesole

factthatgalleyandsteamshipcanmoveatanymomentdirectlyupon

theenemy,andcarryabeakupontheirprow,regardlessofthepoints

inwhichgalleyandsteamshipdiffer.Asyetthisopinionisonlya

presumption,uponwhichfinaljudgmentmaywellbedeferreduntilthe

trialofbattlehasgivenfurtherlight.Untilthattimethereisroom

fortheoppositeview,--thatameleebetweennumericallyequal

fleets,inwhichskillisreducedtoaminimum,isnotthebestthat

canbedonewiththeelaborateandmightyweaponsofthisage.The

surerofhimselfanadmiralis,thefinerthetacticaldevelopmentof

hisfleet,thebetterhiscaptains,themorereluctantmusthe

necessarilybetoenterintoameleewithequalforces,inwhichall

theseadvantageswillbethrownaway,chancereignsupreme,andhis

fleetheplacedontermsofequalitywithanassemblageofshipswhich

haveneverbeforeactedtogether.

（2）Historyhaslessonsastowhen

meleesare,orarenot,inorder.

Thegalley,then,hasonestrikingresemblancetothesteamer,but

differsinotherimportantfeatureswhicharenotsoimmediately

apparentandarethereforelessaccountedof.Inthesailing-ship,on

thecontrary,thestrikingfeatureisthedifferencebetweenitand

themoremodernvessel;thepointsofresemblance,thoughexistingand

easytofind,arenotsoobvious,andthereforearelessheeded.This

impressionisenhancedbythesenseofutterweaknessinthe

sailing-shipascomparedwiththesteamer,owingtoitsdependence

uponthewind;forgettingthat,astheformerfoughtwithitsequals,

thetacticallessonsarevalid.Thegalleywasneverreducedto

impotencebyacalm,andhencereceivesmorerespectinourdaythan

thesailing-ship;yetthelatterdisplaceditandremainedsupreme

untiltheutilizationofsteam.Thepowerstoinjureanenemyfroma

greatdistance,tomanoeuvreforanunlimitedlengthoftimewithout

wearingoutthemen,todevotethegreaterpartofthecrewtothe

offensiveweaponsinsteadoftotheoar,arecommontothesailing

vesselandthesteamer,andareatleastasimportant,tactically

considered,asthepowerofthegalleytomoveinacalmoragainst

thewind.

-----

1.ThusHermocratesofSyracuse,advocatingthepolicyofthwarting

theAthenianexpeditionagainsthiscity（B.C.413）bygoingboldlyto

meetit,andkeepingontheflankofitslineofadvance,said:

"As

theiradvancemustbeslow,weshallhaveathousandopportunitiesto

attackthem;butiftheycleartheirshipsforactionandinabody

beardownexpeditiouslyuponus,theymustplyhardattheiroars,and

whenspentwithtoilwecanfalluponthem."

2.Thewritermustguardhimselffromappearingtoadvocateelaborate

tacticalmovementsissuinginbarrendemonstrations.Hebelievesthat

afleetseekingadecisiveresultmustclosewithitsenemy,butnot

untilsomeadvantagehasbeenobtainedforthecollision,whichwill

usuallybegainedbymanoeuvring,andwillfalltothebestdrilled

andmanagedfleet.Intruth,barrenresultshaveasoftenfollowed

uponheadlong,closeencountersasuponthemosttimidtactical

trifling.

-----

Intracingresemblancesthereisatendencynotonlytooverlook

pointsofdifference,buttoexaggeratepointsoflikeness,--tobe

fanciful.Itmaybesoconsideredtopointoutthatasthe

sailing-shiphadgunsoflongrange,withcomparativelygreat

penetrativepower,andcarronades,whichwereofshorterrangebut

greatsmashingeffect,sothemodernsteamerhasitsbatteriesof

long-rangegunsandoftorpedoes,thelatterbeingeffectiveonly

withinalimiteddistanceandtheninjuringbysmashing,whilethe

gun,asofold,aimsatpenetration.Yetthesearedistinctlytactical

considerationswhichmustaffecttheplansofadmiralsandcaptains;

andtheanalogyisreal,notforced.Soalsoboththesailing-shipand

thesteamercontemplatedirectcontactwithanenemy'svessel,--the

formertocarryherbyboarding,thelattertosinkherbyramming;

andtoboththisisthemostdifficultoftheirtasks,fortoeffect

ittheshipmustbecarriedtoasinglepointofthefieldofaction,

whereasprojectileweaponsmaybeusedfrommanypointsofawide

area.

Therelativepositionsoftwosailing-ships,orfleets,withreference

tothedirectionofthewindinvolvedmostimportanttactical

questions,andwereperhapsthechiefcareoftheseamenofthatage.

Toasuperficialglanceitmayappearthatsincethishasbecomea

matterofsuchindifferencetothesteamer,noanalogiestoitareto

befoundinpresentconditions,andthelessonsofhistoryinthis

respectarevalueless.Amorecarefulconsiderationofthe

distinguishingcharacteristicsoftheleeandtheweather"gage,"（3）

directedtotheiressentialfeatur