对于海权的认识英文.docx

1、对于海权的认识英文ON SEA POWERThe history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, anarrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, ofviolence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of seacommerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seenlong before the

2、true principles which governed its growth andprosperity were detected. To secure to ones own people adisproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made toexclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopolyor prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct vio

3、lence.The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflictingattempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, ofthe advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercialregions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from othercauses have been greatly modified in

4、 their conduct and issue by thecontrol of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, whileembracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people greatupon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it isin this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively,regarded in

5、the following pages.A study of the military history of the past, such as this, is enjoinedby great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to theskilful conduct of war in the future. Napoleon names among thecampaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of Alexander,Hannibal, and

6、Caesar, to whom gunpowder was unknown; and there is asubstantial agreement among professional writers that, while many ofthe conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress ofweapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history whichremain constant, and being, therefore, of univers

7、al application, canbe elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason thestudy of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by itsillustration of the general principles of maritime war,notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about innaval weapons by the

8、scientific advances of the past half century, andby the introduction of steam as the motive power.It is doubly necessary thus to study critically the history andexperience of naval warfare in the days of sailing-ships, becausewhile these will be found to afford lessons of present application andvalu

9、e, steam navies have as yet made no history which can be quoted asdecisive in its teaching. Of the one we have much experimentalknowledge; of the other, practically none. Hence theories about thenaval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive; andalthough the attempt has been made to give

10、them a more solid basis bydwelling upon the resemblance between fleets of steamships and fleetsof galleys moved by oars, which have a long and well-known history, itwill be well not to be carried away by this analogy until it has beenthoroughly tested. The resemblance is indeed far from superficial.

11、 Thefeature which the steamer and the galley have in common is the abilityto move in any direction independent of the wind. Such a power makes aradical distinction between those classes of vessels and thesailing-ship; for the latter can follow only a limited number ofcourses when the wind blows, and

12、 must remain motionless when it fails.But while it is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wiseto look for things that differ; for when the imagination is carriedaway by the detection of points of resemblance,-one of the mostpleasing of mental pursuits,-it is apt to be impatient of anyd

13、ivergence in its new-found parallels, and so may overlook or refuseto recognize such. Thus the galley and the steamship have in common,though unequally developed, the important characteristic mentioned,but in at least two points they differ; and in an appeal to thehistory of the galley for lessons a

14、s to fighting steamships, thedifferences as well as the likeness must be kept steadily in view, orfalse deductions may be made. The motive power of the galley when inuse necessarily and rapidly declined, because human strength could notlong maintain such exhausting efforts, and consequently tactical

15、movements could continue but for a limited time (1); and again, duringthe galley period offensive weapons were not only of short range, butwere almost wholly confined to hand-to-hand encounter. These twoconditions led almost necessarily to a rush upon each other, not,however, without some dexterous

16、attempts to turn or double on theenemy, followed by a hand-to-hand melee. In such a rush and such amelee a great consensus of respectable, even eminent, naval opinion ofthe present day finds the necessary outcome of modern naval weapons,-a kind of Donnybrook Fair, in which, as the history of melees

17、shows,it will be hard to know friend from foe. Whatever may prove to be theworth of this opinion, it cannot claim an historical basis in the solefact that galley and steamship can move at any moment directly uponthe enemy, and carry a beak upon their prow, regardless of the pointsin which galley and

18、 steamship differ. As yet this opinion is only apresumption, upon which final judgment may well be deferred until thetrial of battle has given further light. Until that time there is roomfor the opposite view,-that a melee between numerically equalfleets, in which skill is reduced to a minimum, is n

19、ot the best thatcan be done with the elaborate and mighty weapons of this age. Thesurer of himself an admiral is, the finer the tactical development ofhis fleet, the better his captains, the more reluctant must henecessarily be to enter into a melee with equal forces, in which allthese advantages wi

20、ll be thrown away, chance reign supreme, and hisfleet he placed on terms of equality with an assemblage of ships whichhave never before acted together.(2) History has lessons as to whenmelees are, or are not, in order.The galley, then, has one striking resemblance to the steamer, butdiffers in other

21、 important features which are not so immediatelyapparent and are therefore less accounted of. In the sailing-ship, onthe contrary, the striking feature is the difference between it andthe more modern vessel; the points of resemblance, though existing andeasy to find, are not so obvious, and therefor

22、e are less heeded. Thisimpression is enhanced by the sense of utter weakness in thesailing-ship as compared with the steamer, owing to its dependenceupon the wind; forgetting that, as the former fought with its equals,the tactical lessons are valid. The galley was never reduced toimpotence by a calm

23、, and hence receives more respect in our day thanthe sailing-ship; yet the latter displaced it and remained supremeuntil the utilization of steam. The powers to injure an enemy from agreat distance, to manoeuvre for an unlimited length of time withoutwearing out the men, to devote the greater part o

24、f the crew to theoffensive weapons instead of to the oar, are common to the sailingvessel and the steamer, and are at least as important, tacticallyconsidered, as the power of the galley to move in a calm or againstthe wind.-1. Thus Hermocrates of Syracuse, advocating the policy of thwartingthe Athe

25、nian expedition against his city (B.C. 413) by going boldly tomeet it, and keeping on the flank of its line of advance, said: Astheir advance must be slow, we shall have a thousand opportunities toattack them; but if they clear their ships for action and in a bodybear down expeditiously upon us, the

26、y must ply hard at their oars, andwhen spent with toil we can fall upon them.2. The writer must guard himself from appearing to advocate elaboratetactical movements issuing in barren demonstrations. He believes thata fleet seeking a decisive result must close with its enemy, but notuntil some advant

27、age has been obtained for the collision, which willusually be gained by manoeuvring, and will fall to the best drilledand managed fleet. In truth, barren results have as often followedupon headlong, close encounters as upon the most timid tacticaltrifling.-In tracing resemblances there is a tendency

28、 not only to overlookpoints of difference, but to exaggerate points of likeness,-to befanciful. It may be so considered to point out that as thesailing-ship had guns of long range, with comparatively greatpenetrative power, and carronades, which were of shorter range butgreat smashing effect, so the

29、 modern steamer has its batteries oflong-range guns and of torpedoes, the latter being effective onlywithin a limited distance and then injuring by smashing, while thegun, as of old, aims at penetration. Yet these are distinctly tacticalconsiderations which must affect the plans of admirals and capt

30、ains;and the analogy is real, not forced. So also both the sailing-ship andthe steamer contemplate direct contact with an enemys vessel,-theformer to carry her by boarding, the latter to sink her by ramming;and to both this is the most difficult of their tasks, for to effectit the ship must be carri

31、ed to a single point of the field of action,whereas projectile weapons may be used from many points of a widearea.The relative positions of two sailing-ships, or fleets, with referenceto the direction of the wind involved most important tacticalquestions, and were perhaps the chief care of the seame

32、n of that age.To a superficial glance it may appear that since this has become amatter of such indifference to the steamer, no analogies to it are tobe found in present conditions, and the lessons of history in thisrespect are valueless. A more careful consideration of thedistinguishing characteristics of the lee and the weather gage, (3)directed to their essential featur