创业融资外文翻译.docx
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创业融资外文翻译
本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
题目大学生创业融资渠道研究
专业财务管理
EntrepreneurialFinancing
Thefinancingofstartupsentailspotentiallyextremeadverseselectioncostsgiventheabsenttrackrecordofthefirmsseekingcapital,andgiventheriskynatureoftheindustriesinwhichmanyofthemoperate.Exacerbatingtheproblem,thisscenarioofteninvolvesaninnovatorwhohasextensivetechnicalknowledgebuthasneithertheaccumulatedreputationnorthebondablewealthnecessarytoconveythisinformationcredibly.
Barrycharacterizesventurecapitalashavingevolvedpreciselytofillthisstartupfinancingniche:
Atthelevelofsmall,riskyventures,accesstocapitalmarketsisrestricted.Notallentrepreneurscanself-financetheirprojects,andnotallcanfindbankersorangelswhowillcarrytheshortfall.Venturecapitalistsofferthemasourceoffundsthatisspecificallydesignedforuseinriskysettings.Theventurecapitaliststhemselvesperformduediligencepriortoinvesting,andinformationgleanedinthatprocesscangreatlyreducetheadverseselectionproblem..
Thisoutlookraisesseveralquestions.Whyisitassumedthatbankscannot(orchoosenotto)performthesamelevelofduediligenceasventurecapitalists(VCs)?
Inwhatsenseisventurecapital“designed”forriskysettings?
ThepuzzledeepenswhenonenotesthatstraightdebtistypicallyadvocatedasasolutiontotheadverseselectionproblemwhereasinpracticeVCsoftenholdconvertiblepreferredequity.Indeed,adefiningcharacteristicoftheventurecapitalmarketisthatcontractsarefairlyhigh-poweredinthesensethatexpectedpayoffscomedisproportionatelyfromtheequitycomponentor“upside”.
ThesequestionscanbeaddressedbyreflectinguponthecostlyduediligencetowhichBarryrefers.Bydirectlyrevealingtheproject’squality,duediligencereducesinformationasymmetrybetweenentrepreneursandtheVC.Bycontrast,ifqualityweresignaled—thetraditionalsolutiontotheadverseselectionproblem—costlyduediligencewouldbeunnecessarysincetherewouldbenomoreinformationtoconvey.Inotherwise,eithersignalingorcostlyduediligencecansolvetheadverseselectionproblem.Thetwomechanismsaresubstitutes;thequestionthenbecomeswhichismorecost-effective.
Thefirstcontributionofthepaperistoshowthatsignalingcanbeprohibitivelyexpensiveinentrepreneurialfinancingmarkets,andsocostlyduediligencedominates.The“cost”ofsignalingisdrivenbytheincentivesofbadfirmstopool.Yet,forstartups,iffundingisnotobtainedthenthefirmmayhavealmostnovalue.Withsuchlowreservationvalues,badentrepreneursattempttopoolatnearlyanycost.Astheanalysisshows,securitiesisunattractiveenoughtodriveoutbadentrepreneurs—andthustoserveasacrediblesignal—tendtobeunattractivetogoodentrepreneursaswell.Costlyduediligenceemergesasthepreferredsolution.
Astestamenttotheempiricalimportanceofduediligencecostsinventurecapitalmarkets,FriedandHanscharacterizetheVCfundingprocessascomposedofsixdistinct,progressivelyrigorousstagesofscreening.Thisduediligencetakesanaverageof97daystocompleteevenbeforethefirstroundoffundingisinitiated.Themajorityoffundingproposalsdonotsuccessfullypassthroughthefirstscreen,letalonesubsequentscreens,andthefullprocessisdescribedas“muchmoreinvolvedinbankloanreviews.
Thesecondcontributionofthepaperistoillustratealinkbetweencostlyduediligenceandhigh-powered(orequity-like)financialcontracts.Theintuitionbehindthislinkissimple.Bydefinition,low-poweredcontractsaresafe;i.e.,expectedpayoffsvarylittleacrossfirms.High-poweredcontractsmagnifythedifferentialinpayoffbetweenfundinggoodandbadprojects,andhencemagnifytheincentivestoscreenoutbadprojects.Ineffect,high-poweredcontractsmaketheVCbearthecostofchoosingentrepreneursunwisely.Thereforehigh-poweredcontractsencourageduediligence.
Tosummarize,thismodelisdesignedtomakethreesimplepoints:
(1)upsidesharingistobeexpectedgivencostlyevaluation,
(2)suchcostlyevaluationsserveasasubstitutetraditionalsolutionstotheadverseselectionproblem,and(3)traditionalsolutionsaredominatedforparameterizationsofthemodelthatcorrespondtoventurecapitalmarkets.
Followingthepath-breakingempiricalworkofSaar,atheoreticalliteratureonVCcontractdesignemerged.Onecommonfeatureofthesepapersisthattheyrationalizetheoptimalityofconvertiblesecurities.Asecondcommonfeatureofthesemodelsistheadmissionofagencycosts.Forexample,VCsandentrepreneursmayhavedifferentpreferencesregardingprojectriskorexitstrategy.
Inpart,theliterature’srelianceonagencycostsowestoawidespreadbeliefintheirempiricalrelevance.Itisalsopresumablyrelatedtotheaforementionedconsensus:
sincedebtisconsideredtheoptimalresponsetoadverseselection,non-debtsecuritiesmustimplythepresenceofanothermarketfriction.Ontheotherhand,itisclearhowagencycostscouldleadtoequity-likesecurities.Conflicts-of-interestoverfutureactionsaremitigatedbygrantingbothpartiesroughlysymmetricalpayoffs,whichleadstoupside-sharing.Ofcourse,theomissionofagencyproblemsfromthecurrentmodelisnotintendedtosuggestthattheyareunimportantempirically.Rather,thelessonisthatagencycostsarenotanecessaryconditionforequity-likesecurities.
Perhapssurprisingly,thetheoreticalresultsmostcloselyrelatedtothispaperarecontainedinanalysesofpubliclytradedsecurities.Assumingliquidityisexogenousandthatpricesaresetbycompetitivemarketmakers,BootandThakorshowthatsplittingsecuritiesintoaninformation-sensitivepieceandasaferpiecemayeitherincreaseordecreasetraders’incentivestoproduceinformation.FulghieriandLukinstudyasimilarenvironmentbutsplitthefirm’sclaimsintoapiecesoldtooutsideinvestorsandanotherpiecethatisretained,againanalyzingtheinteractionbetweensecuritydesignandinformationacquisition.
Twoimportantdistinctionssetmyresultsapartfromthesemodelsofpublictrading.First,theirmodelsexogenouslyruleoutsignaling,soitnotpossibletoexaminewhethertraditionalsolutionstoadverseselectionaredominatedand,ifso,underwhatconditions.Second,itisnotclearhowtheresultsofthesepublictradingmodelsmightbeextendedtoentrepreneurialfinancemarketssincetheassumptionthatdrivestheirresults—lossesbyliquiditytraderswithperfectlyinelasticdemand—hasnoobviouscounterpartinanentrepreneurialfinancesetting.
TheeconomyconsistsofentrepreneurswithprojectsrequiringcapitalinvestmentK.Thevalueoffundedprojectsis1withprobabilityπτ,whereτ∈{G,B}isanindicatorofprojectquality,andλ<1otherwise.
FundedprojectshaveexpectedvalueVi=πτ1+(1−πτ)λ.ItisassumedthatλEntrepreneurshavereservationvalueV;thatis,contractsareacceptableonlyiftheresidualclaimhasexpectedvalueVorhigher.Inamodelofmaturefirmfinancing,Vismostclearlyinterpretedasthevalueofassets-in-place,becausethisisthecontinuationvalueofthefirmintheabsenceofnewinvestment.Suchaninterpretationisvalidinentrepreneurialsettingsaswellbecausewithoutattractingfinancingtheentrepreneurownstheexistingassetsoutright.Thekeydifferenceisoneofmagnitude.Comparedtomodelsofmaturefirms,inentrepreneurialsettingsthevalueofassets-in-placeissmallrelativetootherparameters.
Thenetpresentvalueofprojects,Vτ−V−K,isassumedtosatisfy
EVG−V−K≥0≥EVB−V−K.
(1)
Equation
(1)justifiesthenomenclature“good”and“bad.”Thenetpresentvalueofaprojectispositiveifandonlyiftheprojectisgood.Finally,itisassumedthatnetpresentvaluessatisfy
θ(EG−V−K)+(1−θ)(EB−V−K)≥0,
(2)
whereθistheproportionofgoodprojectsintheeconomy.Becausenetpresentvaluesarepositive(onaverage),themodeladmitspoolingequilibrium.
Onesourceofcapitalisanuninformedinvestorwhoconductsamechanicalcreditevaluationbasedonobservablecharacteristics.Thisinvestormaybethoughtofasaproxyforthecompetitivecommercialbankingmarket.Consistentwiththisinterpretation,itwillbeshownthatthisinvestortakesdebtinequilibrium.Briefly,theintuitionisthatwhenoneisuninformed,onesolvestheadverseselectionprobleminthetraditionalway.Asmentionedintheintroduction,thissolutionisdebt.
Analternativesourceofcapitalisaninvestorendowedwithtechnologythatcanevaluateprojectquality.ThisinvestorisreferredtoasaVC.Consistentwiththisidentification,itwillbeshownthattheVCtakeshigh-poweredcontractsinequilibrium.Likewise,itneedstobeshownthattheVCactuallyemploysthescreeningtechnology.Apriori,thisusageisnotobvious.Inparticular,ifthefinancialcontractisverygenerous(ifitleavestheVCwithalargestake),thenitmaybeprofitabletoforegothecostlyevaluationinfavoroffundingallprojects.Suchanoutcomewouldbenefitbadentrepreneurs,becausetheytoowouldliketoattractfundingprovidedtheycanpoolwithgoodfirmsandtherebyobtainmispricedfinancing.Bylimitingthispooling,costlyduediligenceeffectsatransferfrombadentrepreneurstogoodentrepreneurs,andintheprocess,directsrealinvestmenttowardbetterprojects.
Entrepreneursseekingventurecapitalfinanceforma(randomlyordered)queue,andtheVCsequentiallyevaluatesthem.Foreachentrepreneur,uponpayingacostCtheVCreceivesasignals∈{G,