公共选择理论的集体决策观分析Analysis of collective decision making theory of public choice theory.docx

公共选择理论的集体决策观分析Analysis of collective decision making theory of public choice theory.docx

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公共选择理论的集体决策观分析Analysisofcollectivedecisionmakingtheoryofpublicchoicetheory

公共选择理论的集体决策观分析（Analysisofcollectivedecisionmakingtheoryofpublicchoicetheory）

Analysisofcollectivedecisionmakingtheoryofpublicchoicetheory

Analysisofcollectivedecisiontheoryofpublicchoicetheory2008-12-2015:

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Abstract:

publicchoicetheoryfrom"economicman"asaresearchparadigm,throughthecollectivedecisionrulesthattheagreedrulesandtheconsentofmorethanhalfofruleanalysis,thatnonDemocraticmajorityrulemaycausecollectivedecision-makinginpractice.Thetheoryofcollectivedecision-makingdemocracyhasanewangleofviewforfurtherstudy.

Publicchoicetheory;collectivedecisionrule;consensusrule;majorityagreementrule;nondemocracy

David,Britishpoliticalscientist.Herderin1990willbedividedintotheclassicalmodelandmoderndemocracymode,thatdemocracymeansthatcitizenscancontrolpublicpolicymakers,andthepublicdecision-makingitselfinacertainrangealsorepresenttheirconstituents,namelytheinterestsofthepeople.Herderclaimstohaverepresentationinwesternpoliticalcircles,thatdemocracyishowtoensurethatthegovernmentcanrepresenttheinterestsofthepeople,inthisregard,themajorityprincipleisconsideredtobeanimportantdecisioninthecollectiveembodimentofdemocraticprocess.ButtheriseinmidtwentiethCenturytoBuchananastherepresentativeofthepublicchoicetheory,startingfromtheparadigmofeconomicresearch,throughtheanalysisofthecollectivedecision-makingrules,thatimplementthecollectiveprincipleofmajoritydecisionisnotnecessarilydemocracy,thecauseofthisresultisduetotheantiDemocraticmajorityrulebythecollectivedecision.

I.rulesofcollectivedecisionmaking

Thecollectivedecisionisapoliticaldecision,itreflectsthepublicdemandforpublicgoods,determinesthesupplyofpublicgoods,isapreferenceforallmembersofsocietytotalprocess,thatisindividualchoiceintoaprocessormechanismofcollectivechoice,mainlyagreeandconsentofmorethanhalf.

（I）unanimousconsent--themostideal.Consensusrulesmeanthatcollectivedecisionscanbemadeonlywhenallpartiesagreeoratleastonepersonopposes,andeachparticipanthasavetoovercollectivedecision-making.Therefore,theconsensusruleisthemostidealcollectivedecision-makingmethodandtheonlywaytorealizetheParetooptimality.Anycollectivedecisionmaybringbenefitsorlossestotheparticipants,soeachparticipanttakesthecollectivedecisionseriously,measurestheprosandcons,anddeliversopinionsofsupportorrejection.Therefore,inaccordancewiththeunanimousconsentrule,thedecisioncanbenefiteverypartywithoutdamagetothe"Paretooptimal"conditionthatdoesnotharmanyoneandbenefitatleastoneperson.Moreover,fromthefreelevel,unanimousconsentcanalsogivefullassurancetoindividualfreedom.Sinceeveryonehastherighttoveto,noonecanimposehiswillonothers,soeveryoneisequalandtheinterestsareguaranteed.Atthesametime,theconsensusrulealsoguaranteesthatanybillwithatotalincomeexceedingthetotalcostcanpass,sothateachmember'searningsexceedthecostandhelpthecollectivetocooperateinternally.

Inprinciple,agreedtorulethemostideal,thestartingpointistheprotectionofminorityrights,protectionofminoritiestoprotectthemajorityofpoliticalscience,"iftheminoritywasnotprotected,itwillnotbepossibletofindanewviewinfavorofthemajority,becausethoseviewsfromthemajoritytoafewpeoplewillimmediatelyentertocommenttheranks".[1]（p36）butinreality,theconsensusrulehaslimitedscopeofapplication.First,itexcludesindividualstrategicbehavior.Theconsensusruleassumesthateachparticipantwillvotehonestly.Infact,theremaybeaparticipantwhoconcealshispreferenceforaparticularpurpose,makingtheoutcomeofthedecisionnotoptimal."Thisdecisionrulesrequiredmoreclosetounanimous,individualnegotiatorspowerisgreater,butthepossibilityis:

atleasttherewillbesomepeoplewilltrytomaximizetheirbargainingposition."[2]（p63）Secondly,itisagreedthatthecostofimplementationistoohigh,andintheend,thecostsofcollectivedecision-makingmayexceedthebenefitsofitsimplementation.Ittakesalongtimeforallmembersofthecollectivetoagree,andittakestimeandeffort,andthereisapossibilitythattheplanwillbevoteddownbyonevote.Third,theresultofadheringtotherulesofconsensusislikelytofailtoachievecollectivedecision-making.Whenthecollectivemembersofmany,theirpreferencesaredifferent,becauseeveryonehasaveto,collectivedecision-makingcannotbemade,itmayultimately,agreedthevotingsystemwillleadtobargaining,extortionanddelay,sothatnosubstantiveresolution,even"agreedparadox":

consistentagreewiththerulesinlogictoencouragesmalluniformlocalconsentbody,becausetherewerefewer,moreeasytoreachanagreement,thesmalllocalconsistentresultsagreedtobodymore,

Theharderitistoachievetheconsensusofsocietyasawhole.Ontheotherhand,inordertoenablethepartiestoagreeontheirown,onepartymayusesomeunfairmeanstopullvotes,theformationofmutualinterestredistributionthroughbothvotetradinginachievingtheiraimsattheexpenseoftheinterestsofthirdparties,theviolationofthevotingintentionofwiththeagreedrules--politicalequalitycontradiction.

（two）majorityconsentrule-themostcommon.Mostofthemajorityoftheconsentisreferredtoasamajority,alsoknownasasimplemajority,andacollectivechoicecanonlybeadoptedwhenmorethanhalfofthevotesareapproved.Morethanhalfoftherulescansavedecision-makingcosts.Decisionmakingcostsincludedecisioncostsandexternalcosts.Thecostofdecisionmakingincreaseswiththenumberofpeoplerequiredtopasstheresolution,andtheexternalcostdecreasesasthenumberofparticipantsincreases.Sothenumberofthetotalcostinsizeandiscloselyrelatedtothepersonaldictatorship,butatthecostoftheminimumcostmaximumdecision;implementationofagreedrules,thedecisionistheminimumcostmaximumexternalcosts;andthemajorityruleinfavourasthenumberofmorethanhalf,sodecision-makingcostsandexternalcostsarenottoohigh.Anotheradvantageofthemajorityruleisthehighefficiencyofdecisionmaking.Accordingtothemajorityrule,aslongasthevotingpartyisnoteven,ifonlyonemotionistobedecided,itwillcertainlybeabletoproduceresults.Itisthechoiceofanumberofmotions,thoughitmayresultinmorevotes,butitwilleventuallyleadtoresults.Inthecaseofmultipleelections,theoutcomemaynotbeunique,dependingonwhetherthepreferencesofallmembersareunimodal,Shuangfengormultimodal.CitizenswithShuangfengormultimodalpreferenceswillscattertheirvotesandmaynotbeabletoformamajorityofabill.Thus,thepublicchoicetheoryputforward"themedianvotertheorem:

iftheturnoutisodd,eachvoterpreferencesareunimodal,theremustbeaperson,themostpreferredsolutioninthemiddleofallschemes,theoptimalamountofpublicgoodsthatisthechoiceofamiddlenumber,justhalfthevoterschoosemorethanthenumberofthefirstandtheotherhalfislessthanthenumberofvoters,sothetimeiscalledthemedianvoter.Theexistenceofthemiddlevotersuggeststhatcollectivedecisionswillresultinvotingandwillnotfallintothevotingcycle".Thebestnumberofpreferenceelectionacollectivedecisionisalsoreflectedinthemedianvoter,namelypublicgoodsamountofthemedianvoterpreferencewaseventuallypassed,becauseanysolutionschemewilldeviatefromthemiddletothedamageandsomeothers,nothalfofthevote.SoBuchananthoughtthroughthevalueorientationofmajorityvoteoftheresultsdoesnotrepresenttheoverall,doesnotmean"societyvalue"or"socialinterest",justbecauseitisproducedinthedecisionrule,itsfunctionliesintheindividualchoiceintothecollective.Inalargenumberofvoters,accordingtothemajorityormorethanhalfofthevotingrules,thecollectiveorpoliticalconsequencesproducedbyindividualactionsarespontaneous.Inasense,itissimilarinnaturetothose'economic'resultsproducedbyindividualactionsinthemarketeconomythatareprotectedbypropertyrights."[3]（p236）anindividualisnotsurewhenheisvoting,hiswillwillbecomeacollectivedecision.Asaresultofcompetition,theresultisfair.

Morethanhalfoftherulesarepractical,butnotlogicalenough.Firstofall,themedianvoterisnotnecessarilyequaltotheaverageofallvoters,whichcanleadtononoptimalresults.AccordingtoSartori,anAmericanpoliticalscientist,"themajorityprincipleisbasedonthenumberofheads,soitequalstheintensityofinequality."."[1]（P253）therefore,themajorityruledoesnotmaketheoutcomeofvotingnotoptimal."Itisnecessarytoconsiderwhetherthedecisionmadebyasimplemajorityvotingsystemimprovessocialwelfare.""[4]（p115）Secondly,amajorityruleisdifficulttoavoidtheemergenceofcircularvoting.WhensomeofthemembersoftheShuangfengisthetimepreferenceormultimodaldistribution,thedecisiondidnotproduceonlytheAmericaneconomistHarothat"Haroimpossibilitytheorem",thatwhenallmembersofthecommunity'spreferenceisknown,notthroughasocialpreferenceorderbasedonpersonalpreferenceorder,itisimpossibletofindamethodofvotingtoensureefficiency,respecttheindividualpreference,anddonotdependonthemajorityruleprogram.5（p235）