公共选择理论的集体决策观分析Analysis of collective decision making theory of public choice theory.docx

1、公共选择理论的集体决策观分析Analysis of collective decision making theory of public choice theory公共选择理论的集体决策观分析（Analysis of collective decision making theory of public choice theory）Analysis of collective decision making theory of public choice theoryAnalysis of collective decision theory of public choice theory

2、2008-12-20 15:15:22Abstract: public choice theory from economic man as a research paradigm, through the collective decision rules that the agreed rules and the consent of more than half of rule analysis, that non Democratic majority rule may cause collective decision-making in practice. The theory o

3、f collective decision-making democracy has a new angle of view for further study.Public choice theory; collective decision rule; consensus rule; majority agreement rule; non democracyDavid, British political scientist. Herder in 1990 will be divided into the classical model and modern democracy mode

4、, that democracy means that citizens can control public policymakers, and the public decision-making itself in a certain range also represent their constituents, namely the interests of the people. Herder claims to have representation in western political circles, that democracy is how to ensure tha

5、t the government can represent the interests of the people, in this regard, the majority principle is considered to be an important decision in the collective embodiment of democratic process. But the rise in mid twentieth Century to Buchanan as the representative of the public choice theory, starti

6、ng from the paradigm of economic research, through the analysis of the collective decision-making rules, that implement the collective principle of majority decision is not necessarily democracy, the cause of this result is due to the anti Democratic majority rule by the collective decision.I. rules

7、 of collective decision makingThe collective decision is a political decision, it reflects the public demand for public goods, determines the supply of public goods, is a preference for all members of society total process, that is individual choice into a process or mechanism of collective choice,

8、mainly agree and consent of more than half.(I) unanimous consent - - the most ideal. Consensus rules mean that collective decisions can be made only when all parties agree or at least one person opposes, and each participant has a veto over collective decision-making. Therefore, the consensus rule i

9、s the most ideal collective decision-making method and the only way to realize the Pareto optimality. Any collective decision may bring benefits or losses to the participants, so each participant takes the collective decision seriously, measures the pros and cons, and delivers opinions of support or

10、 rejection. Therefore, in accordance with the unanimous consent rule, the decision can benefit every party without damage to the Pareto optimal condition that does not harm anyone and benefit at least one person. Moreover, from the free level, unanimous consent can also give full assurance to indivi

11、dual freedom. Since everyone has the right to veto, no one can impose his will on others, so everyone is equal and the interests are guaranteed. At the same time, the consensus rule also guarantees that any bill with a total income exceeding the total cost can pass, so that each members earnings exc

12、eed the cost and help the collective to cooperate internally.In principle, agreed to rule the most ideal, the starting point is the protection of minority rights, protection of minorities to protect the majority of political science, if the minority was not protected, it will not be possible to find

13、 a new view in favor of the majority, because those views from the majority to a few people will immediately enter to comment the ranks. 1 (p36) but in reality, the consensus rule has limited scope of application. First, it excludes individual strategic behavior. The consensus rule assumes that each

14、 participant will vote honestly. In fact, there may be a participant who conceals his preference for a particular purpose, making the outcome of the decision not optimal. This decision rules required more close to unanimous, individual negotiators power is greater, but the possibility is: at least t

15、here will be some people will try to maximize their bargaining position. 2 (p63) Secondly, it is agreed that the cost of implementation is too high, and in the end, the costs of collective decision-making may exceed the benefits of its implementation. It takes a long time for all members of the coll

16、ective to agree, and it takes time and effort, and there is a possibility that the plan will be voted down by one vote. Third, the result of adhering to the rules of consensus is likely to fail to achieve collective decision-making. When the collective members of many, their preferences are differen

17、t, because everyone has a veto, collective decision-making cannot be made, it may ultimately, agreed the voting system will lead to bargaining, extortion and delay, so that no substantive resolution, even agreed paradox: consistent agree with the rules in logic to encourage small uniform local conse

18、nt body, because there were fewer, more easy to reach an agreement, the small local consistent results agreed to body more,The harder it is to achieve the consensus of society as a whole. On the other hand, in order to enable the parties to agree on their own, one party may use some unfair means to

19、pull votes, the formation of mutual interest redistribution through both vote trading in achieving their aims at the expense of the interests of third parties, the violation of the voting intention of with the agreed rules - political equality contradiction.(two) majority consent rule - the most com

20、mon. Most of the majority of the consent is referred to as a majority, also known as a simple majority, and a collective choice can only be adopted when more than half of the votes are approved. More than half of the rules can save decision-making costs. Decision making costs include decision costs

21、and external costs. The cost of decision making increases with the number of people required to pass the resolution, and the external cost decreases as the number of participants increases. So the number of the total cost in size and is closely related to the personal dictatorship, but at the cost o

22、f the minimum cost maximum decision; implementation of agreed rules, the decision is the minimum cost maximum external costs; and the majority rule in favour as the number of more than half, so decision-making costs and external costs are not too high. Another advantage of the majority rule is the h

23、igh efficiency of decision making. According to the majority rule, as long as the voting party is not even, if only one motion is to be decided, it will certainly be able to produce results. It is the choice of a number of motions, though it may result in more votes, but it will eventually lead to r

24、esults. In the case of multiple elections, the outcome may not be unique, depending on whether the preferences of all members are unimodal, Shuangfeng or multimodal. Citizens with Shuangfeng or multimodal preferences will scatter their votes and may not be able to form a majority of a bill. Thus, th

25、e public choice theory put forward the median voter theorem: if the turnout is odd, each voter preferences are unimodal, there must be a person, the most preferred solution in the middle of all schemes, the optimal amount of public goods that is the choice of a middle number, just half the voters ch

26、oose more than the number of the first and the other half is less than the number of voters, so the time is called the median voter. The existence of the middle voter suggests that collective decisions will result in voting and will not fall into the voting cycle. The best number of preference elect

27、ion a collective decision is also reflected in the median voter, namely public goods amount of the median voter preference was eventually passed, because any solution scheme will deviate from the middle to the damage and some others, not half of the vote. So Buchanan thought through the value orient

28、ation of majority vote of the results does not represent the overall, does not mean society value or social interest, just because it is produced in the decision rule, its function lies in the individual choice into the collective. In a large number of voters, according to the majority or more than

29、half of the voting rules, the collective or political consequences produced by individual actions are spontaneous. In a sense, it is similar in nature to those economic results produced by individual actions in the market economy that are protected by property rights. 3 (p236) an individual is not s

30、ure when he is voting, his will will become a collective decision. As a result of competition, the result is fair.More than half of the rules are practical, but not logical enough. First of all, the median voter is not necessarily equal to the average of all voters, which can lead to non optimal res

31、ults. According to Sartori, an American political scientist, the majority principle is based on the number of heads, so it equals the intensity of inequality. 1 (P253) therefore, the majority rule does not make the outcome of voting not optimal. It is necessary to consider whether the decision made

32、by a simple majority voting system improves social welfare. 4 (p115) Secondly, a majority rule is difficult to avoid the emergence of circular voting. When some of the members of the Shuangfeng is the time preference or multimodal distribution, the decision did not produce only the American economis

33、t Haro that Haro impossibility theorem, that when all members of the communitys preference is known, not through a social preference order based on personal preference order, it is impossible to find a method of voting to ensure efficiency, respect the individual preference, and do not depend on the majority rule program. 5 (p235)