平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)17优质PPT.ppt

平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)17优质PPT.ppt

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MarketswithAsymmetricInformation17CHAPTERCopyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation2of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER17OUTLINE17.1QualityUncertaintyandtheMarketforLemons17.2MarketSignaling17.3MoralHazard17.4ThePrincipalAgentProblem17.5ManagerialIncentivesinanIntegratedFirm17.6AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:

EfficiencyWageTheoryChapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation3of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCarsFigure17.1Whensellersofproductshavebetterinformationaboutproductqualitythanbuyers,a“lemonsproblem”mayariseinwhichlow-qualitygoodsdriveouthighqualitygoods.In（a）thedemandcurveforhigh-qualitycarsisDH.However,asbuyerslowertheirexpectationsabouttheaveragequalityofcarsonthemarket,theirperceiveddemandshiftstoDM.Chapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation4of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCars（continued）Figure17.1Likewise,in（b）theperceiveddemandcurveforlow-qualitycarsshiftsfromDLtoDM.Asaresult,thequantityofhigh-qualitycarssoldfallsfrom50,000to25,000,andthequantityoflow-qualitycarssoldincreasesfrom50,000to75,000.Eventually,onlylowqualitycarsaresold.asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.Chapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation5of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsThelemonsproblem:

Withasymmetricinformation,low-qualitygoodscandrivehigh-qualitygoodsoutofthemarket.ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationAdverseSelectionadverseselectionFormofmarketfailureresultingwhenproductsofdifferentqualitiesaresoldatasinglepricebecauseofasymmetricinformation,sothattoomuchofthelow-qualityproductandtoolittleofthehigh-qualityproductaresold.Chapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation6of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationTheMarketforInsuranceTheMarketforCreditPeoplewhobuyinsuranceknowmuchmoreabouttheirgeneralhealththananyinsurancecompanycanhopetoknow,evenifitinsistsonamedicalexamination.Asaresult,adverseselectionarises,muchasitdoesinthemarketforusedcars.Creditcardcompaniesandbankscan,tosomeextent,usecomputerizedcredithistories,whichtheyoftensharewithoneanother,todistinguishlow-qualityfromhigh-qualityborrowers.Manypeople,however,thinkthatcomputerizedcredithistoriesinvadetheirprivacy.Chapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation7of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheImportanceofReputationandStandardizationAsymmetricinformationisalsopresentinmanyothermarkets.Herearejustafewexamples:

Retailstores:

Willthestorerepairorallowyoutoreturnadefectiveproduct?

Dealersofrarestamps,coins,books,andpaintings:

Aretheitemsrealorcounterfeit?

Roofers,plumbers,andelectricians:

Whenarooferrepairsorrenovatestheroofofyourhouse,doyouclimbuptocheckthequalityofthework?

Restaurants:

Howoftendoyougointothekitchentocheckifthechefisusingfreshingredientsandobeyinghealthlaws?

Chapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation8of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1Asymmetricinformationisprominentinthefree-agentmarket.Onepotentialpurchaser,theplayersoriginalteam,hasbetterinformationabouttheplayersabilitiesthanotherteamshave.Chapter17:

MarketswithAsymmetricInformation9of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2marketsignalingProcessbywhichsellerssendsignalstobuyersconveyinginformationaboutproductquality.Tobestrong,asignalmustbeeasierforhigh-productivitypeopletogivethanforlow-productivitypeopletogive,sothathigh-productivitypeoplearemorelikelytogi