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平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)17优质PPT.ppt

1、Markets withAsymmetricInformation17C H A P T E RCopyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Information2 of 28Copyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,

2、7e.CHAPTER 17 OUTLINE17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons17.2 Market Signaling17.3 Moral Hazard17.4 The PrincipalAgent Problem17.5 Managerial Incentives in an Integrated Firm17.6 Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets:Efficiency Wage TheoryChapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Informatio

3、n3 of 28Copyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS17.1 asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess different information about a transaction.The Market for Used CarsThe

4、Market for Used CarsFigure 17.1When sellers of products have better information about product quality than buyers,a“lemons problem”may arise in which low-quality goods drive out high quality goods.In(a)the demand curve for high-quality cars is DH.However,as buyers lower their expectations about the

5、average quality of cars on the market,their perceived demand shifts to DM.Chapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Information4 of 28Copyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS17.1The Market for Used Car

6、sThe Market for Used Cars(continued)Figure 17.1Likewise,in(b)the perceived demand curve for low-quality cars shifts from DL to DM.As a result,the quantity of high-quality cars sold falls from 50,000 to 25,000,and the quantity of low-quality cars sold increases from 50,000 to 75,000.Eventually,only l

7、ow quality cars are sold.asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and a seller possess different information about a transaction.Chapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Information5 of 28Copyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITY

8、UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS17.1The Market for Used CarsThe lemons problem:With asymmetric information,low-quality goods can drive high-quality goods out of the market.Implications of Asymmetric InformationAdverse Selection adverse selection Form of market failure resulting when products of

9、 different qualities are sold at a single price because of asymmetric information,so that too much of the low-quality product and too little of the high-quality product are sold.Chapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Information6 of 28Copyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Micr

10、oeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS17.1Implications of Asymmetric InformationThe Market for InsuranceThe Market for CreditPeople who buy insurance know much more about their general health than any insurance company can hope to know,even if it insists on a m

11、edical examination.As a result,adverse selection arises,much as it does in the market for used cars.Credit card companies and banks can,to some extent,use computerized credit histories,which they often share with one another,to distinguish low-quality from high-quality borrowers.Many people,however,

12、think that computerized credit histories invade their privacy.Chapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Information7 of 28Copyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS17.1The Importance of Reputation and St

13、andardizationAsymmetric information is also present in many other markets.Here are just a few examples:Retail stores:Will the store repair or allow you to return a defective product?Dealers of rare stamps,coins,books,and paintings:Are the items real or counterfeit?Roofers,plumbers,and electricians:W

14、hen a roofer repairs or renovates the roof of your house,do you climb up to check the quality of the work?Restaurants:How often do you go into the kitchen to check if the chef is using fresh ingredients and obeying health laws?Chapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Information8 of 28Copyright 2009 Pears

15、on Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR LEMONS17.1Asymmetric information is prominent in the free-agent market.One potential purchaser,the players original team,has better information about theplayers abilities than othe

16、r teams have.Chapter 17:Markets with Asymmetric Information9 of 28Copyright 2009 Pearson Education,Inc.Publishing as Prentice Hall Microeconomics Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKET SIGNALING17.2 market signaling Process by which sellers send signals to buyers conveying information about product quality.To be strong,a signal must be easier for high-productivity people to give than for low-productivity people to give,so that high-productivity people are more likely to gi

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