营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献.docx

营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献.docx

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营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献

营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献

（文档含英文原文和中文翻译）

外文：

ComparingtheValue-AddedTaxtotheRetailSalesTax

ForRichardF.Dye,ThereseJ.McGuire

JournalofPublicEconomics

April2011

OverviewofVAT

Morethan130countriesuseVATasakeysourceofgovernmentrevenue.VATisageneral,broad-basedconsumptiontaxassessedonthevalueaddedtogoodsandservices.VATisgenerallyleviedonvalueaddedateverystageofproduction,withamechanismallowingthesellersacreditforthetaxtheyhavepaidontheirownpurchasesofgoodsandservices（inputtax）againstthetaxescollectedontheirsalesofgoodsandservice（outputtax）.Generally,VATis:

Ageneraltaxthatappliestoallcommercialactivitiesinvolvingtheproductionanddistributionofgoodsandtheprovisionofservices;Aconsumptiontaxultimatelybornebytheconsumer;Anindirecttaxleviedontheconsumeraspartofthepriceofgoodsorservices;Amultistagetaxvisibleateachstageoftheproductionanddistributionchain;andAfractionallycollectedtaxthatusesasystemofpartialpaymentswherebyasellerchargesVATonallofitssaleswithacorrespondingclaimofcreditforVATthatithasbeenchargedonallofitspurchases.

TherearethreemethodsofcalculatingVATliability:

thecredit-invoicemethod,thesubtractionmethod,andtheadditionmethod.Thiscolumndealswithonlythecredit-invoicemethod,whichisthemostwidelyused.Thecredit-invoicemethodhighlightstheVATdefiningfeature:

theuseofoutputtax（taxcollectedonsales）andinputtax（taxpaidonpurchases）.AtaxpayergenerallycomputesitsVATliabilityasthedifferencebetweentheVATchargedontaxablesalesandtheVATpaidontaxablepurchases.ThismethodrequirestheuseofaninvoicethatseparatelyliststheVATcomponentofalltaxablesales.Thesalesinvoiceforthesellerbecomesthepurchaseinvoiceofthebuyer.Thesalesinvoiceshowstheoutputtaxcollectedandthepurchaseinvoiceshowstheinputtaxpaid.Tosummarize,taxpayersusethecredit-invoicemethodtocalculatetheamountofVATtoberemittedtothetaxingauthoritiesinthefollowingmanner:

AggregatetheVATshowninthesalesinvoices（outputtax）;AggregatetheVATshowninthepurchaseinvoices（inputtax）;Subtracttheinputtaxfromtheoutputtaxandremitanybalancetothegovernment;andIntheeventtheinputtaxisgreaterthantheoutputtax.TheUnitedStatesistheonlymemberoftheOrganizationofEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentthatdoesnotlevyaVATonanationallevel;however,VAThasbecomewidelyrecognizedasanimportantoptioninfederaltaxreformdebates.

Indirecttaxessuchasvalueaddedtaxes（VAT）generateasubstantialpartoftaxrevenueinmanycountries.Infact,VATsystemsgenerateaquarteroftheworld’staxrevenue.Nearly130countriesnowhaveaVATsystem（withover70countrieshavingadoptedthesystemduringthelast10years）（KeenandMintz2004）.MorefocusoninternationallymobiletaxbaseshasdrawnattentiontodirectingmoreofthetaxburdentoindirecttaxessuchasconsumptiontaxesorVATsystems,andlesstoincometaxes,especiallycapitalincome（GordonandNielsen1997）.DuringtheharmonizationofEUtaxes,indirecttaxes,andVATsystemsreceivedmuchattention（Fehret

al.1995）.AgeneralVATlawcoveringallprivategoodsandservicescharacterizesthecurrentEUsystem,buttherearestillmanyexemptionsfromthisgeneralinstruction.SuchaVATsystemalsoexistsinNorwayasaconsequenceoftheNorwegianVATreformin2001.ThereformintroducedageneralVATlawonservices,butmanyexemptionsarestillspecified.

ThereareseveralargumentsinfavorofageneralanduniformVATsystem,comparedwithimperfect,nonuniform（andnongeneral）systems.Suchasystemmayimproveeconomicefficiencyandreduceadministrationcosts,rent-seekingandfraudactivitiesbyindustriesthatlobbyforlowerratesandzeroratings（KeenandSmith2006）.AgeneralanduniformVATsystemequalsauniformconsumertaxonallgoodsandservices.Suchasystemalsoimpliesthattheproducers’netVATrateonmaterialinputsequalszero,irrespectiveoftheratestructure.Thisisoptimalaccordingtotheproductionefficiencytheorem（DiamondandMirrlees1971a,1971b）.AVATsystemwithexemptionsviolatestheproductionefficiencytheorembecause

taxationofintermediateswilldifferbetweenindustries.Ontheotherhand,industriesthatarecoveredbytheVATsystembuthavelowerratesorzeroratingsontheirsalesarefavoredbecausetheycanwithdrawexpenditurestoVATonintermediatesatfullratesandonlylevyreducedorzeroratesontheirsales.

AgeneralanduniformVATsystemmayalsohavepositiveeffectsonthedistributionofwelfareamonghouseholds.IftheinitialsituationischaracterizedbyaVATonmostgoodsbutonlyonafewservices,theintroductionofauniformrateonallgoodsandservicesmayimprovethedistributionofwelfarebecauseservices’shareofconsumptionincreaseswithincome.

Keen（2007）pointstothelackofinterestinvalueaddedtaxationfromthetheoreticalsecond-bestliteratureinspiteoftheVAT’spopularityinpracticaltaxpolicy.Asmentionedabove,VATsystemsareingeneralnotuniform.Theoreticalanalysesdemandrelativelysimplemodelsandsimpletaxstructurestobeanalyticallytractable.Inpracticalpolicies,thestructuresoftheeconomyandthetaxsystemsarequitecomplex,andthereisaneedfordetailednumericalmodelsinordertoanalyzetheeffectsofdifferentVATsystems.ThispapercontributestotheliteraturebyanalyzingthewelfareeffectsofanimperfectextensionofanonuniformVATsystem,andcomparingdifferentimperfect,nonuniformVATsystemswithauniformandgeneral

VATsystemwithinanempiricallybaseddynamiccomputablegeneralequilibrium（CGE）modelforasmallopeneconomy.Thismodelmirrorsarealeconomy,Norway,anddiffersinmanyrespectsfromthemoresimpletheoreticalmodelsthatfulfilltheassumptionsofnormativetaxtheoryandrecommenduniformcommoditytaxes,combinedwithnoinputtaxation.

Inouranalyses,weaskthefollowingquestions.CantheintroductionofanonuniformVATsystemincludingonlysomeservicesmaketheeconomyworseoffthanhavingaVATsystemonlycoveringgoodsandinthatcase,why?

SuchreformscharacterizeboththeNorwegianVATreformof2001andtheEUVATreformfromthelate1990-ties.WillanadditionalextensiontoauniformandgeneralVATsystembewelfaresuperiortothenonuniform（andnongeneral）VATsystemsandwhatareimportantpreconditions?

Aswillbeexplainedbelow,onecannotonpurelytheoreticalgroundsestablishthewelfarerankingsofsuchVATsystemswhentherearepreexistingdistortionsastaxwedgesandmarketpowerintheeconomy.ThebaselineVATsystemisanonuniformVATsystemmainlycoveringgoods.ThisbaselineVATsystemisthencomparedwith

（1）theextendednonuniformNorwegianVATreformof2001,and

（2）ageneralVATsystemcharacterizedbyauniformVATrateonallgoodsandservices,includingpublicgoodsandservices.TheNorwegianVATreformof2001wasastepinthedirectionofageneralVATsystembyincludingmanyservices,buttherearestillmanyexemptions,zeroratingsandlowerrates.Inparticular,theVATrateonfoodandnonalcoholicbeveragesishalfthegeneralVATrate.Thepolicyreformsaremadepublicrevenueneutral,andchangesinlumpsumtransfersaswellasinthesystemspecificVATratearestudied.Witharevenue-neutralchangein

thesystem-specificVATrate,theVATsystemscanberankedwithrespecttowelfare

effects.

Ballardetal.（1987）andGottfriedandWiegard（1991）analyzethewelfareeffectsofdifferentVATsystemsincludingtaxexemptionsandzeroratingsinstaticCGEmodels.TheseparabilityandhomogeneityassumptionsintheirconsumerdemandmodelsfavorauniformVATsystem,whichissupportedintheirpolicysimulations.Incontrast,ourmodelisanintertemporalCGEmodelforasmallopeneconomywithoutstricthomogeneityassumptionsinconsumerdemand.OurmodeliswelldesignedforanalyzingVATreformsbecauseitdistinguishesbetweenmanyindustries,inputfactorsandconsumergoodsandservices.Themodelingandparametersintheconsumerdemandsystemandtheproductiontechnologyarealltheresultsofcomprehensivemicro-andmacroeconometricanalysesofNorwegiandata.ThemodelhasadetaileddescriptionoftheNorwegiansystemofdirectandindirecttaxes.Specifically,netVATratesontheinputfactorsandgrossVATratesontheconsumergoodsandservicesareincludedinthemodel.Wedisregardtheeffectsoncostsofadministration,rent-seekinganddistributionofwelfareamonghouseholds.Themodelemphasizesthesmallopeneconomycharacteristicsbyusinggivenworldmarketpricesandinterestrates.Imperfectcompetitionispresentinthedomesticmarkets.AuniformandgeneralVATsystemisnotapriorithemostefficientinourmodel.

WhencomparingthetwodifferentnonuniformVATsystems,ouranalysisshowsthatanimperfectextensionoftheVATsystemtocovermoreservicesiswelfareinferiortothebaselinenonuniformVATsystemonlycoveringgoods.ObtainingefficiencyinproductionisempiricallyimportantforthewelfareeffectsofthedifferentVATsystems.AnimperfectextensionoftheVATsystemreducesefficiencyinproductionbecauseintermediateswillbetaxeddifferentlyfordifferentindustries.ConsumerefficiencyisalsoreducedduetolowerVAToninelasticgoodsandhigherVATonelasticservices.IntroducingageneralanduniformVATsystemisnotobviouslywelfaresuperiorinadistortedeconomy,butwefindthatsuchasystemimproves

welfarecomparedtotheotherimperfectregimes.Asignificantempiricaladvant