ImageVerifierCode 换一换
格式:DOCX , 页数:14 ,大小:27.35KB ,
资源ID:11990716      下载积分:3 金币
快捷下载
登录下载
邮箱/手机:
温馨提示:
快捷下载时,用户名和密码都是您填写的邮箱或者手机号,方便查询和重复下载(系统自动生成)。 如填写123,账号就是123,密码也是123。
特别说明:
请自助下载,系统不会自动发送文件的哦; 如果您已付费,想二次下载,请登录后访问:我的下载记录
支付方式: 支付宝    微信支付   
验证码:   换一换

加入VIP,免费下载
 

温馨提示:由于个人手机设置不同,如果发现不能下载,请复制以下地址【https://www.bdocx.com/down/11990716.html】到电脑端继续下载(重复下载不扣费)。

已注册用户请登录:
账号:
密码:
验证码:   换一换
  忘记密码?
三方登录: 微信登录   QQ登录  

下载须知

1: 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。
2: 试题试卷类文档,如果标题没有明确说明有答案则都视为没有答案,请知晓。
3: 文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
5. 本站仅提供交流平台,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

版权提示 | 免责声明

本文(营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献.docx)为本站会员(b****5)主动上传,冰豆网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对上载内容本身不做任何修改或编辑。 若此文所含内容侵犯了您的版权或隐私,请立即通知冰豆网(发送邮件至service@bdocx.com或直接QQ联系客服),我们立即给予删除!

营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献.docx

1、营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献营业税改征增值税外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)外文:Comparing the Value-Added Tax to the Retail Sales TaxFor Richard F. Dye , Therese J. McGuire Journal of Public EconomicsApril 2011 Overview of VAT More than 130 countries use VAT as a key source of government revenue. VAT is a general, broad-based consump

2、tion tax assessed on the value added to goods and services. VAT is generally levied on value added at every stage of production, with a mechanism allowing the sellers a credit for the tax they have paid on their own purchases of goods and services (input tax) against the taxes collected on their sal

3、es of goods and service (output tax). Generally, VAT is: A general tax that applies to all commercial activities involving the production and distribution of goods and the provision of services; A consumption tax ultimately borne by the consumer; An indirect tax levied on the consumer as part of the

4、 price of goods or services; A multistage tax visible at each stage of the production and distribution chain; and A fractionally collected tax that uses a system of partial payments whereby a seller charges VAT on all of its sales with a corresponding claim of credit for VAT that it has been charged

5、 on all of its purchases. There are three methods of calculating VAT liability: the credit-invoice method, the subtraction method, and the addition method. This column deals with only the credit-invoice method, which is the most widely used. The credit-invoice method highlights the VAT defining feat

6、ure: the use of output tax (tax collected on sales) and input tax (tax paid on purchases). A taxpayer generally computes its VAT liability as the difference between the VAT charged on taxable sales and the VAT paid on taxable purchases. This method requires the use of an invoice that separately list

7、s the VAT component of all taxable sales. The sales invoice for the seller becomes the purchase invoice of the buyer. The sales invoice shows the output tax collected and the purchase invoice shows the input tax paid. To summarize, taxpayers use the credit-invoice method to calculate the amount of V

8、AT to be remitted to the taxing authorities in the following manner: Aggregate the VAT shown in the sales invoices (output tax); Aggregate the VAT shown in the purchase invoices (input tax); Subtract the input tax from the output tax and remit any balance to the government; and In the event the inpu

9、t tax is greater than the output tax. The United States is the only member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development that does not levy a VAT on a national level; however, VAT has become widely recognized as an important option in federal tax reform debates. Indirect taxes such as

10、value added taxes (VAT) generate a substantial part of tax revenue in many countries. In fact, VAT systems generate a quarter of the worlds tax revenue. Nearly 130 countries now have a VAT system (with over 70 countries having adopted the system during the last 10 years) (Keen and Mintz 2004). More

11、focus on internationally mobile tax bases has drawn attention to directing more of the tax burden to indirect taxes such as consumption taxes or VAT systems, and less to income taxes, especially capital income (Gordon and Nielsen 1997). During the harmonization of EU taxes, indirect taxes, and VAT s

12、ystems received much attention (Fehr etal. 1995). A general VAT law covering all private goods and services characterizes the current EU system, but there are still many exemptions from this general instruction.Such a VAT system also exists in Norway as a consequence of the Norwegian VAT reform in 2

13、001. The reform introduced a general VAT law on services, but many exemptions are still specied.There are several arguments in favor of a general and uniform VAT system, compared with imperfect, nonuniform (and nongeneral) systems. Such a system may improve economic efciency and reduce administratio

14、n costs, rent-seeking and fraud activities by industries that lobby for lower rates and zero ratings (Keen and Smith 2006). A general and uniform VAT system equals a uniform consumer tax on all goods and services. Such a system also implies that the producers net VAT rate on material inputs equals z

15、ero, irrespective of the rate structure. This is optimal according to the production efciency theorem (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971a, 1971b).A VAT system with exemptions violates the production efciency theorem becausetaxation of intermediates will differ between industries. On the other hand, industri

16、es that are covered by the VAT system but have lower rates or zero ratings on their sales are favored because they can withdraw expenditures to VAT on intermediates at full rates and only levy reduced or zero rates on their sales.A general and uniform VAT system may also have positive effects on the

17、 distribution of welfare among households. If the initial situation is characterized by a VAT on most goods but only on a few services, the introduction of a uniform rate on all goods and services may improve the distribution of welfare because services share of consumption increases with income.Kee

18、n (2007) points to the lack of interest in value added taxation from the theoretical second-best literature in spite of the VATs popularity in practical tax policy. As mentioned above, VAT systems are in general not uniform. Theoretical analyses demand relatively simple models and simple tax structu

19、res to be analytically tractable.In practical policies, the structures of the economy and the tax systems are quite complex, and there is a need for detailed numerical models in order to analyze the effects of different VAT systems. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the welfare e

20、ffects of an imperfect extension of a nonuniform VAT system, and comparing different imperfect, nonuniform VAT systems with a uniform and generalVAT system within an empirically based dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for a small open economy. This model mirrors a real economy, Norw

21、ay, and differs in many respects from the more simple theoretical models that fulll the assumptions of normative tax theory and recommend uniform commodity taxes, combined with no input taxation.In our analyses, we ask the following questions. Can the introduction of a nonuniform VAT system includin

22、g only some services make the economy worse off than having a VAT system only covering goods and in that case, why? Such reforms characterize both the Norwegian VAT reform of 2001 and the EU VAT reform from the late 1990-ties. Will an additional extension to a uniform and general VAT system be welfa

23、re superior to the nonuniform (and nongeneral) VAT systems and what are important preconditions? As will be explained below, one cannot on purely theoretical grounds establish the welfare rankings of such VAT systems when there are preexisting distortions as tax wedges and market power in the econom

24、y. The baseline VAT system is a nonuniform VAT system mainly covering goods. This baseline VAT system is then compared with (1) the extended nonuniform Norwegian VAT reform of 2001, and (2) a general VAT system characterized by a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services, including public goods and

25、 services. The Norwegian VAT reform of 2001 was a step in the direction of a general VAT system by including many services, but there are still many exemptions, zero ratings and lower rates. In particular, the VAT rate on food and nonalcoholic beverages is half the general VAT rate. The policy refor

26、ms are made public revenue neutral, and changes in lump sum transfers as well as in the system specic VAT rate are studied. With a revenue-neutral change inthe system-specic VAT rate, the VAT systems can be ranked with respect to welfareeffects. Ballard et al. (1987) and Gottfried and Wiegard (1991)

27、 analyze the welfare effects of different VAT systems including tax exemptions and zero ratings in static CGE models. The separability and homogeneity assumptions in their consumer demand models favor a uniform VAT system, which is supported in their policy simulations. In contrast, our model is an

28、intertemporal CGE model for a small open economy without strict homogeneity assumptions in consumer demand. Our model is well designed for analyzing VAT reforms because it distinguishes between many industries, input factors and consumer goods and services. The modeling and parameters in the consume

29、r demand system and the production technology are all the results of comprehensive micro- and macroeconometric analyses of Norwegian data. The model has a detailed description of the Norwegian system of direct and indirect taxes. Specically, net VAT rates on the input factors and gross VAT rates on

30、the consumer goods and services are included in the model. We disregard the effects on costs of administration, rent-seeking and distribution of welfare among households. The model emphasizes the small open economy characteristics by using given world market prices and interest rates. Imperfect comp

31、etition is present in the domestic markets. A uniform and general VAT system is not a priori the most efcient in our model.When comparing the two different nonuniform VAT systems, our analysis shows that an imperfect extension of the VAT system to cover more services is welfare inferior to the basel

32、ine nonuniform VAT system only covering goods. Obtaining efciency in production is empirically important for the welfare effects of the different VAT systems. An imperfect extension of the VAT system reduces efciency in production because intermediates will be taxed differently for different industr

33、ies. Consumer efciency is also reduced due to lower VAT on inelastic goods and higher VAT on elastic services. Introducing a general and uniform VAT system is not obviously welfare superior in a distorted economy, but we nd that such a system improveswelfare compared to the other imperfect regimes. A signicant empirical advant

copyright@ 2008-2022 冰豆网网站版权所有

经营许可证编号:鄂ICP备2022015515号-1