金融专业外文翻译资本结构的影响因素.docx

金融专业外文翻译资本结构的影响因素.docx

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金融专业外文翻译资本结构的影响因素

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

原文：

TheDeterminantsofCapitalStructureChoice

I.DeterminantsofCapitalStructure

Inthissection,wepresentabriefdiscussionoftheattributesthatdifferenttheoriesofcapitalstructuresuggestmayaffectthefirm'sdebt-equitychoice.Theseattributesaredenotedassetstructure,non-debttaxshields,growth,uniqueness,industryclassification,size,earningsvolatility,andprofitability.Theattributes,theirrelationtotheoptimalcapitalstructurechoice,andtheirobservableindicatorsarediscussedbelow.

A.CollateralValueofAssets

Mostcapitalstructuretheoriesarguethatthetypeofassetsownedbyafirminsomewayaffectsitscapitalstructurechoice.Scottsuggeststhat,bysellingsecureddebt,firmsincreasethevalueoftheirequitybyexpropriatingwealthfromtheirexistingunsecuredcreditors.ArgumentsputforthbyMyersandMajlufalsosuggestthatfirmsmayfinditadvantageoustosellsecureddebt.Theirmodeldemonstratesthattheremaybecostsassociatedwithissuingsecuritiesaboutwhichthefirm'smanagershavebetterinformationthanoutsideshareholders.Issuingdebtsecuredbypropertywithknownvaluesavoidsthesecosts.Forthisreason,firmswithassetsthatcanbeusedascollateralmaybeexpectedtoissuemoredebttotakeadvantageofthisopportunity.

WorkbyGalaiandMasulis,JensenandMeckling,andMyerssuggeststhatstockholdersofleveragedfirmshaveanincentivetoinvestyettoexpropriatewealthfromthefirm'sbondholders.Thisincentivemayalsoinduceapositiverelationbetweendebtratiosandthecapacityoffirmstocollateralizetheirdebt.Ifthedebtcanbecollateralized,theborrowerisrestrictedtousethefundsforaspecifiedproject.Sincenosuchguaranteecanbeusedforprojectsthatcannotbecollateralized,creditorsmayrequiremorefavorableterms,whichinturnmayleadsuchfirmstouseequityratherthandebtfinancing.

Thetendencyofmanagerstoconsumemorethantheoptimallevelofperquisitesmayproducetheoppositerelationbetweencollateralizedcapitalanddebtlevels.GrossmanandHartsuggestthathigherdebtlevelsdiminishthistendencybecauseoftheincreasedthreatofbankruptcy.Managersofhighlyleveredfirmswillalsobelessabletoconsumeexcessiveperquisitessincebondholders（orbankers）areinclinedtocloselymonitorsuchfirms.Thecostsassociatedwiththisagencyrelationmaybehigherforfirmswithassetsthatarelesscollateralizedsincemonitoringthecapitaloutlaysofsuchfirmsisprobablymoredifficult.Forthisreason,firmswithlesscollateralizedassetsmaychoosehigherdebtlevelstolimittheirmanagers'consumptionofperquisites.

Theestimatedmodelincorporatestwoindicatorsforthecollateralvalueattribute.Theyincludetheratioofintangibleassetstototalassets（INT/TA）andtheratioofinventoryplusgrossplantandequipmenttototalassets（IGP/TA）.Thefirstindicatorisnegativelyrelatedtothecollateralvalueattribute,whilethesecondispositivelyrelatedtocollateralvalue.

B.Non-DebtTaxShields

DeAngeloandMasulispresentamodelofoptimalcapitalstructurethatincorporatestheimpactofcorporatetaxes,personaltaxes,andnon-debt-relatedcorporatetaxshields.Theyarguethattaxdeductionsfordepreciationandinvestmenttaxcreditsaresubstitutesforthetaxbenefitsofdebtfinancing.Asaresult,firmswithlargenon-debttaxshieldsrelativetotheirexpectedcashflowincludelessdebtintheircapitalstructures.

Indicatorsofnon-debttaxshieldsincludetheratiosofinvestmenttaxcreditsovertotalassets（ITC/TA）,depreciationovertotalassets（DITA）,andadirectestimateofnon-debttaxshieldsovertotalassets（NDT/TA）.Thelattermeasureiscalculatedfromobservedfederalincometaxpayments（T）,operatingincome（OI）,interestpayments（i）,andthecorporatetaxrateduringoursampleperiod（48%）,usingthefollowingequation:

NDT=OI-i-T/0.48

whichfollowsfromtheequality

T=0.48（0I-i-NDT）

Theseindicatorsmeasurethecurrenttaxdeductionsassociatedwithcapitalequipmentand,hence,onlypartiallycapturethenon-debttaxshieldvariablesuggestedbyDeAngeloandMasulis.First,thisattributeexcludestaxdeductionsthatarenotassociatedwithcapitalequipment,suchasresearchanddevelopmentandsellingexpenses.（Thesevariables,usedasindicatorsofanotherattribute,arediscussedlater.）Moreimportant,ournon-debttaxshieldattributerepresentstaxdeductionsratherthantaxdeductionsnetoftrueeconomicdepreciationandexpenses,whichistheeconomicattributesuggestedbytheory.Unfortunately,thispreferableattributewouldbeverydifficulttomeasure.

C.Growth

Aswementionedpreviously,equity-controlledfirmshaveatendencytoinvestsuboptimallytoexpropriatewealthfromthefirm'sbondholders.Thecostassociatedwiththisagencyrelationshipislikelytobehigherforfirmsingrowingindustries,whichhavemoreflexibilityintheirchoiceoffutureinvestments.Expectedfuturegrowthshouldthusbenegativelyrelatedtolong-termdebtlevels.Myers,however,notedthatthisagencyproblemismitigatedifthefirmissuesshort-termratherthanlong-termdebt.Thissuggeststhatshort-termdebtratiosmightactuallybepositivelyrelatedtogrowthratesifgrowingfirmssubstituteshort-termfinancingforlong-termfinancing.JensenandMeckling,SmithandWarner,andGreenarguedthattheagencycostswillbereducediffirmsissueconvertibledebt.Thissuggeststhatconvertibledebtratiosmaybepositivelyrelatedtogrowthopportunities.

Itshouldalsobenotedthatgrowthopportunitiesarecapitalassetsthataddvaluetoafirmbutcannotbecollateralizedanddonotgeneratecurrenttaxableincome.Forthisreason,theargumentsputforthintheprevioussubsectionsalsosuggestanegativerelationbetweendebtandgrowthopportunities.

Indicatorsofgrowthincludecapitalexpendituresovertotalassets（CE/TA）andthegrowthoftotalassetsmeasuredbythepercentagechangeintotalassets（GTA）.Sincefirmsgenerallyengageinresearchanddevelopmenttogeneratefutureinvestments,researchanddevelopmentoversales（RD/S）alsoservesasanindicatorofthegrowthattribute.

D.Uniqueness

Titmanpresentsamodelinwhichafirm'sliquidationdecisioniscausallylinkedtoitsbankruptcystatus.Asaresult,thecoststhatfirmscanpotentiallyimposeontheircustomers,suppliers,andworkersbyliquidatingarerelevanttotheircapitalstructuredecisions.Customers,workers,andsuppliersoffirmsthatproduceuniqueorspecializedproductsprobablysufferrelativelyhighcostsintheeventthattheyliquidate.Theirworkersandsuppliersprobablyhavejobspecificskillsandcapital,andtheircustomersmayfinditdifficulttofindalternativeservicingfortheirrelativelyuniqueproducts.Forthesereasons,uniquenessisexpectedtobenegativelyrelatedtodebtratios.

Indictorsofuniquenessincludeexpendituresonresearchanddevelopmentoversales（RD/S）,sellingexpensesoversales（SEIS）,andquitrates（QR）,thepercentageoftheindustry'stotalworkforcethatvoluntarilylefttheirjobsinthesampleyears.ItispostulatedthatRD/Smeasuresuniquenessbecausefirmsthatsellproductswithclosesubstitutesar'elikelytodolessresearchanddevelopmentsincetheirinnovationscanbemoreeasilyduplicated.Inaddition,successfulresearchanddevelopmentprojectsleadtonewproductsthatdifferfromthoseexistinginthemarket.Firmswithrelativelyuniqueproductsareexpectedtoadvertisemoreand,ingeneral,spendmoreinpromotingandsellingtheirproducts.Hence,SE/Sisexpectedtobepositivelyrelatedtouniqueness.However,itisexpectedthatfirmsinindustrieswithhighquitratesareprobablyrelativelylessuniquesincefirmsthatproducerelativelyuniqueproductstendtoemployworkerswithhighlevelsofjob-specifichumancapitalwhowillthusfinditcostlytoleavetheirjobs.

Itisapparentfromtwooftheindicatorsofuniqueness,RD/SandSEIS,thatthisattributemayalsoberelatedtonon-debttaxshieldsandcollateralvalue.Researchanddevelopmentandsomesellingexpenses（suchasadvertising）canbeconsideredcapitalgoodsthatareimmediatelyexpensedandcannotbeusedascollateral.Giventhatourestimationtechniquecanonlyimperfectlycontrolfortheseotherattributes,theuniquenessattributemaybenegativelyrelatedtotheobserveddebtratiobecauseofitspositivecorrelationwithnon-debttaxshieldsanditsnegativecorrelationwithcollateralvalue.

E.IndustryClassification

Titmansuggeststhatfirmsthatmakeproductsrequiringtheavailabilityofspecializedservicingandsparepartswillfindliquidationespeciallycostly.Thisindicatesthatfirmsmanufacturingmachinesandequipmentshouldbefinancedwithrelativelylessdebt.Tomeasurethis,weincludeadummyvariableequaltooneforfirmswithSICcodesbetween3400and4000（firmsproducingmachinesandequipment）andzerootherwiseasaseparateattributeaffectingthedebtratios.

F.Size

Anumberofauthorshavesuggestedthatleverageratiosmayberelatedtofirmsize.WarnerandAng,Chua,andMcConnellprovideevidencethatsuggeststhatdirectbankruptcycostsappeartoconstitutealargerproportionofafirm'svalueasthatvaluedecreases.Itisalsothecasethatrelativelylargefirmstendtobemorediversifiedandlesspronetobankruptcy.Theseargumentssuggestthatlargefirmsshouldbemorehighlyleveraged.

Thecostofissuingdebtandequitysecuritiesisalsorelatedtofirmsize.Inparticular,smallfirmspaymuchmorethanlargefirmstoissuenewequity（seeSmith）andalsosomewhatmoretoissuelong-termdebt.Thissuggeststhatsmallfi