金融学外文翻译一个国际历史性的比较美国次贷金融危机是否不同.docx

金融学外文翻译一个国际历史性的比较美国次贷金融危机是否不同.docx

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金融学外文翻译一个国际历史性的比较美国次贷金融危机是否不同

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外文原文

Isthe2007U.S.Sub-PrimeFinancialCrisisSoDifferent?

AnInternationalHistoricalComparison

CarmenM.ReinhartUniversityofMarylandandtheNBERandKennethS.RogoffHarvardUniversityandtheNBER

Thefirstmajorfinancialcrisisofthe21stcenturyinvolvesesotericinstruments,unawareregulators,andskittishinvestors.Italsofollowsawell-troddenpathlaiddownbycenturiesoffinancialfolly.Thistimeisaproblemofsub-primemortgages,butthistimeisnotdifferent.Infact,therearestunningquantitativeparallelsacrossanumberofmajorcrisisindicatorsfromthestandardliteratureoninternationalfinancialcrises.Forexample,therun-upinU.S.equityandhousingprices,whichGracielaL.KaminskyandCarmenM.Reinhart（1999）findtothebebestleadingindicatorsofcrisisincountriesexperiencinglargecapitalinflows,closelytrackstheaverageofthenineteenmajorpostWorldWarIIbankingcrisesinindustrialcountries.So,too,istheinvertedv-shapeofrealgrowthintheyearspriortothecrisis.Despitewidespreadconcernabouttheeffectsonnationaldebtoftheearly2000staxcuts,therun-upinU.S.publicdebtisactuallysomewhatbelowtheaverageofothercrisisepisodes.Incontrast,thepatternofUnitedStatescurrentaccountdeficitsismarkedlyworse.

ThebookisstillopenonthehowthecurrentdislocationsintheUnitedStateswillplayout,butsomeprecedentcanbefoundintheaftermathofotherbank-centeredfinancialcrisesinindustrialeconomies.Dependingonthedegreeoftraumatothebankingsystem,theycanbequitesevere.Aseverebankingcrisistypicallyhasafardeeperandmoreprotractedeffectongrowththandoesaseverecurrencycrisis,ifthelatteroccursinisolation.Theaveragedropin（realpercapita）outputgrowthisovertwopercent,andittypicallytakestwoyearstoreturntotrend.Forthefivemostcatastrophiccases（whichincludeepisodesinFinland,Japan,Norway,SpainandSweden）,thedropinannualoutputgrowthfrompeaktotroughisoverfivepercent,andgrowthremainedwellbelowpre-crisistrendevenafterthreeyears.Itis,ofcourse,themorecatastrophiccasesthatpolicymakersparticularlywanttosteerclearof.

1.PostWarBank-CenteredFinancialCrises:

TheData

Ourmainpurposehereistomakesimpleandstraightforwardcomparisonsofthe

UnitedStates2007crisiswithotherpost-warcrises,employingasmallpieceofamuchlargerandlongerhistoricaldatasetwehaveconstructed（seeReinhartandKennethS.Rogoff,2008.）Theextendeddatasetcataloguesbankingandfinancialcrisesaroundtheentireworlddatingbackto1800（insomecasesearlier）.InordertofocushereondatamostrelevanttopresentU.S.situation,wedonotconsidertheplethoraofemergingmarketcrises,norindustrializedcountryfinancialcrisesfromtheGreatDepressionorthe1800s.Nevertheless,itisstrikinghowmuchthe“thistimeisdifferent”syndromehasalreadybeenrepeated.

Firstcametherationalizations.Thistime,manyanalystsargued,thehugerun-upinU.S.housingpriceswasnotatallabubble,butratherjustifiedbyfinancialinnovation（includingtosub-primemortgages,aswellasbythesteadyinflowofcapitalfromAsiaandpetroleumexporters.Thehugerun-upinequitypriceswassimilarlyarguedtobesustainablethankstoasurgeinU.S.productivitygrowthafallinriskthataccompaniedthe“GreatModeration”inmacroeconomicvolatility.AsfortheextraordinarystringofoutsizedU.S.currentaccountdeficits,whichnowsoakuproughlytwo-thirdsofalltheworld’scurrentaccountsurpluses,manyanalystsarguedthatthese,too,couldbejustifiedbynewelementsoftheglobaleconomy.Thankstoacombinationofaflexibleeconomyandtheinnovationofthetechboom,theUnitedStatescouldbeexpectedtoenjoysuperiorproductivitygrowthfordecades,whilesuperiorAmericanknow-howmeanthigherreturnsonphysicalandfinancialinvestmentthanforeignerscouldexpectintheUnitedStates.

Nextcamethereality.Inthepastfewmonth,wehaveseenastrikingcontractioninwealth,increasesinriskspreads,anddeteriorationinmarketfunctioning.The2007

UnitedStatessub-primecrisis,ofcourse,hasitrootsinfallingU.S.housingprices,

whichhaveinturnledtohigherdefaultlevelsparticularlyamonglesscreditworthy

borrowers.Theimpactofthesedefaultsonthefinancialsectorhasbeengreatlymagnifiedduetocomplexbundlingtechniquesthatwerethoughttospreadriskefficiently,butinfacthavemadetheresultinginstrumentsextremelynontransparentandilliquidinthefaceoffallinghouseprices.

Asabenchmarkforthe2007U.S.sub-primecrisis,wedrawondatafromnineteenbank-centeredfinancialcrisesfromthepost-Warperiod.Wehaveincludedpostwarepisodesinwhichanimportantfinancialinstitutionors