金融学外文翻译一个国际历史性的比较美国次贷金融危机是否不同.docx

1、金融学外文翻译一个国际历史性的比较美国次贷金融危机是否不同中文3660字外文原文Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical ComparisonCarmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland and the NBER and Kenneth S. Rogoff Harvard University and the NBERThe first major financial crisis of the 21st century inv

2、olves esoteric instruments, unaware regulators, and skittish investors. It also follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of sub-prime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number of

3、major crisis indicators from the standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing prices, which Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart (1999) find to the be best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows

4、, closely tracks the average of the nineteen major post World War II banking crises in industrial countries. So, too, is the inverted v-shape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis. Despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the early 2000s tax cuts, the run-up in U.S.

5、 public debt is actually somewhat below the average of other crisis episodes. In contrast, the pattern of United States current account deficits is markedly worse. The book is still open on the how the current dislocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the af

6、termath of other bank-centered financial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs

7、 in isolation. The average drop in (real per capita) output growth is over two percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden), the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough

8、 is over five percent, and growth remained well below pre-crisis trend even after three years. It is, of course, the more catastrophic casesthat policymakers particularly want to steer clear of.1. Post War Bank-Centered Financial Crises: The DataOur main purpose here is to make simple and straightfo

9、rward comparisons of theUnited States 2007 crisis with other post-war crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008.) The extended data set catalogues banking and financial crises around the entire world

10、dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In order to focus here on data most relevant to present U.S. situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises, nor industrialized country financial crises from the Great Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, it is striking how much th

11、e “this time is different” syndrome has already been repeated.First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge run-upin U.S. housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified by financial innovation (including to sub-prime mortgages, as well as by the steady infl

12、ow of capital from Asia and petroleum exporters. The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in U.S. productivity growth a fall in risk that accompanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary string of outsized U.S.

13、current account deficits, which now soak up roughly two-thirds of all the worlds current account surpluses, many analysts argued that these, too, could be justified by new elements of the global economy. Thanks to a combination of a flexible economy and the innovation of the tech boom, the United St

14、ates could be expected to enjoy superior productivity growth for decades, while superior American know-how meant higher returns on physical and financial investment than foreigners could expect in the United States.Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a striking contractionin w

15、ealth, increases in risk spreads, and deterioration in market functioning. The 2007United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling U.S. housing prices,which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthyborrowers. The impact of these defaults on th

16、e financial sector has been greatly magnified due to complex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices.As a benchmark for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, we draw on data from nineteen bank-centered financial crises from the post-War period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or s