盈利质量和盈余管理英文版Document 19页.docx
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盈利质量和盈余管理英文版Document19页
EarningsManagementandEarningsQuality
1.WhatisEarningsManagement?
(BryanHall’sWebpage)
Earningsmanagementisdefinedbyaccountingliteratureas “distortingtheapplicationofgenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples.” ArthurLevitt,theoldSECChairman,definedearningsmanagementas“practicesbywhichearningsreportsreflectthedesiresofmanagementratherthantheunderlyingfinancialperformanceofthecompany.”
Earningsmanagementisoftendefinedastheplannedtimingofrevenues,expenses,gainsandlossestosmoothoutbumpsinearnings.Inmostcases,earningsmanagementisusedtoincreaseincomeinthecurrentyearattheexpenseofincomeinfutureyears.Forexample,companiesprematurelyrecognizesalesbeforetheyarecompleteinordertoboostearnings.Earningsmanagementcanalsobeusedtodecreasecurrentearningsinordertoincreaseincomeinthefuture.Theclassiccaseistheuseof"cookiejar"reserves,whichareestablished,byusingunrealisticassumptionstoestimateliabilitiesforsuchitemsassalesreturns,loanlosses,andwarrantyreturns.
Managersengageinincomesmoothingactivitiesbecausetheyknowthatvolatileearningsstreamstypicallyleadtolowermarketvaluations.Manysuccessfulmanagementteamsbelievethatthestrategictimingofinvestments,sales,expenditures,andfinancingdecisionsisanimportantandnecessarystrategyformanagerscommittedtomaximizingshareholdervalue.
Investorsaredissatisfiedwiththemanagementofearnings;however,investorsbecomeenragedwhenquarterlyorannualearningsforecastarenotmetbyfirms. Therefore,investorsandthepublicviewminorearningsmanagementasacceptableandaneverydaybusinesspractice. Inresponsetopubliccomplaintsandconcernforearningsmanagement,theSEChasissuedbulletinstohelppreventearningsmanagement.
2.ThePublicPerceptionofEarningsManagement
Earningsmanagementhasanegativeeffectonthequalityofearningsifitdistortstheinformationinawaythatitlessusefulforpredictingfuturecashflows.WithintheConceptualFramework,usefulinformationisbothrelevantandreliable.However,earningsmanagementreducesthereliabilityofincome,becausetheincomemeasureisbiased(upordown)and/orthereportedincomethatisnotrepresentationallyfaithfultothatwhichitissupposedtoreport(e.g.,volatileearningsaremadetolookmoresmooth).
Thetermqualityofearningsreferstothecredibilityoftheearningsnumberreported.Companiesthatuseliberalaccountingpoliciesreporthigherincomenumbersintheshort-run.Insuchcases,wesaythatthequalityofearningsislow.Similarlyifanonrecurringgainincreasesincome,butthegainisobviouslynotsustainable,thenthequalityofearningsisconsideredlow.
Forthemarketstoworkefficiently,itisvitalthatinvestorsbeabletotrusttheearningsnumbersofthecompaniesinwhichtheyhavechosentoinvesttheircapital. Recentstudieshaveshownthattheinvestingpublicbelievesthattheoccurrenceofearningsmanagementisbothwidespreadandpervasiveinthefinancialstatementsofcorporationsworldwide. However,itisinterestingtonotethattheinvestingpublicdoesnotnecessarilyviewminorearningsmanagementasunethical,butinfactasacommonandnecessarypracticeintheeverydaybusinessworld. Itisonlywhentheimpactofearningsmanagementisgreatenoughtoaffecttheinvestors’portfoliothattheyfeelfraudhasbeencommitted.
3.TheImpactofEarningsManagement
Publicperceptionaboutthewidespreadoccurrenceofearningsmanagementisaffectingthepublic’sconfidenceinexternalfinancialreporting.Thepracticeof earningsmanagementdamagestheperceivedqualityofreportedearningsovertheentiremarket,resultinginthebeliefthatreportedearningsdonotreflecteconomicreality.Investorsrelyonfinancialinformationprovidedbythecompanytomaketheirinvestmentdecisions,andwheninvestorsbelievetheyarebeinggivenmeaninglessinformationtheybecomewaryoftrustingthecompaniestheyhaveinvestedin. Investors’apprehensionwilleventuallyleadtounnecessarystockpricefluctuation.Asinvestorslosefaithinreportedearnings,theyareforcedintoaguessinggameconcerningtheactualfinancialpositionofacompany. Thisuncertaintyultimatelyhasthepotentialtounderminetheefficientflowofcapitaltherebydamagingthemarketsasawhole.
4.IncentivestoManageEarning
A.EXTERNALFORCES
•AnalystForecasts-Companiesareunderextremepressuretomeetanalysts’earningsestimatesinordertopreventlargedropsintheirstockprice.
•Debtmarketsandcontractualobligations-Companiesdependonachievingcertainearningsfigurestoobtainaccesstodebtmarkets,oreventomeettheircurrentdebtcovenantsandothercontractualobligations.
•Competition-Thereispressureinhighlycompetitiveindustriestostayatthetopoftheindustryintermsofrevenueormarketshare. Companiesmaywanttomanagethesefigurestostayabovecompetitors.
B.INTERNALFACTORS
•Potentialmergers-Ifthecompanyishopingtoenteramerge,astrongfinancialpositionwillmakeitlookmuchmoreattractivetoothercompanies.
•ManagementCompensation-Stockoptionandbonusprogramsthataretiedtoearningsperformancewillprovideincentiveformanagerstomanipulateearningsnumberstoboosttheirowncompensation.
•Planningandbudgets-Sometimescompanieswillestablishunrealisticplansandbudgetstopushmanagerstooverachieve. Thiscanprovidepressureformanagementtoboostearningstomeetthecompany’sownexpectations.
•Unlawfultransactions-Somecompaniesevenuseearningsmanagementtocoveruptheirownunlawfultransactionssuchasembezzlement,fraud,misappropriation,andbribery.
C.PERSONALFACTORS
•Personalbonuses-Somecompensationpoliciesareheavilyweightedtowardsincentives,andindividualshopetoreceiveabonusbasedontheirgoodperformance.
•Promotionsandjobretention-Fudgingnumberstomakeperformancelookbettermayleadtopersonalpromotions,orevenhelptoretainanemployee’scurrentjob.
5.SECResponsetoEarningsManagement
Recently,severalstaffaccountingbulletinsconcerningearningsmanagementwerereleasedbytheSECandmanymoresuchregulationshavebeenpromisedinthefuture. ThesebulletinsandpromisesofmoretocomearepartlytheresultofformerSECchairmanArthurLevitt’scrusadetoeradicatetheproblemofearningsmanagementinUnitedStatescompanies. Recentpublicityofhighprofileearningsmanagementfromsomeofthenation’smostelitecompanies,combinedwithasaggingeconomyhaveheightenedinvestor’sfearsabouttheoccurrenceofearningsmanagement. Throughoutthelastfewyearsofthechairman’stermMr.Levittwidelypublicizedhisbeliefsaboutthepervasivenessofearningsmanagementandhisintentiontoaddresstheseissues.
ThiscrusaderesultedinatorrentofstaffaccountingbulletinsbeginningwiththeissuanceofSAB99regardingMaterialityinAugustof1999. Thisbulletinattemptstoclarifyanauditor’sappropriatescopeofmaterialitywhileconductinganaudit. Sinceafavoritepracticeofcorruptmanagementistojustifyearningsmanagementbyclaimingitisimmaterial,thisstatementisparticularlyhelpfultocurrentandfutureauditors. SAB100wasreleasedinNovemberof1999inanattempttoeradicatethecommonearningsmanagementpracticeoftakinga“bigbath”throughtheuseofrestructuringandimpairmentcharges. AnotherfavoritecomponentofearningsmanagementwasaddressedinMarchof2000whenSAB101AconcerningRevenueRecognitionwasreleased. Themostcommonformofearningsmanagementistheintentionalmanipulationofrevenuerecognition,thereforethisstatementanditslatercounterpartSAB101Barealsoveryhelpfultoanauditorattemptingtosnuffoutearningsmanagement. Finally,Julyof2001sawtheissuanceofSAB102concerningLoanLossAllowances,anotherpreferredtoolofearningsmanagement.
Thesebulletinswillnotcompletelypreventearningsmanagement,andthereforetheywillnotbethelastoftheirkind. Earningsmanagementwillremainanimportantproblemfacingthemarketsaslongasthereispressureoncompaniesandindividualmanagerstoperform.However,carefulauditingproceduresandcontinuingattentivenessbytheSECandotherregulatorybodieswillhelpreducetheoccurrenceofearningsmanagementintothefuture.
6.TypesofEarningsManagementandManipulation(byScottMcGregor)
a."Cookie-jar"Reserves
Theaccrualofexpensesistoreflecttheperiodinwhichtheexpensewasincurred.Forexample,ifafirmhiresaconsultanttoperformaparticularactivity,itshouldreflecttheexpenserelatedtothatactivityintheperiodinwhichitisincurred,notwhenthebillispaidorinvoicereceived.Inmanycases,theaccrualofexpenses,orreservesinparticularindustriessuchasinsuranceandbanking,arebasedonestimates.Assuch,theestimateshavevaryingdegreesofaccuracy.Duringtimesofstrongearnings,thefirmestablishesadditionalexpenseaccrualsandsubsequentlyreducestheliabilitytogenerateearningswhenneededinthefuture-pullinga"cookiefromthejar".
b.Capitalizationpractices-Intangibleassets,softwarecapitalization,researchanddevelopment.
In1997,companieswereallowedtocapitalizethecostsofinternallydevelopedsoftwareandamortizeitovertheusefullife,generallythreetofiveyears.Capitalizationistorepresentthedevelopmentcosts.Thecapitalizationprocessofcompanieshasthepotentialformanipulationbecausetheseassetsareoftenintangibleandbasedonjudgment.Afirmmayallocatemoreexpensestoaprojectthatcanbecap