外文翻译转让定价方法的概况和批判性.docx

外文翻译转让定价方法的概况和批判性.docx

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外文翻译转让定价方法的概况和批判性

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

原文：

OverviewandCritiqueofExistingTransferPricingMethods

InthisChapter,weprovideanoverviewofthecurrenttransferpricingregulationspertainingtointra-grouptransfersoftangibleandintangibleproperty,theperformanceofservices,cost-sharingandglobaldealing.Ourdiscussionconsistsof（a）adescriptionofindividualmethodologiesandthecircumstancesinwhichtheyareapplied;（b）areviewoftheeconomicrationaleforeachmethodology;（c）acritiqueofsuchrationale;and（d）anassessmentofpracticalimplications.

TheU.S.andOECDtransferpricingregulationsandguidelinessanctionfivetransferpricingmethodologies:

1.Thecomparableprofitsmethodor“CPM”（referredtointheOECDGuidelinesasthetransactionalnetmarginmethodor“TNMM”）;

2.Theresalepricemethodor“RPM”;

3.Thecostplusmethod;

4.Thecomparableuncontrolledprice（or“CUP”）method;

5.Theprofitsplitmethod.

Taxpayersarealsopermittedtoestablishfeesforintercompanyservicesrenderedtoaffiliatesbasedoncostsalone（withoutaprofitelement）undercertaincircumstances.Affiliatedlendersmaychargeapublishedsafeharborfloatingloanrate（the“ApplicableFederalRate”）,or,alternatively,theymaydeterminetheprevailingmarketloanrategiventhecreditratingoftheborrowerandtheloanterms.

TheU.S.transferpricingregimealsoencompassesintra-firm“cost-sharing”and“globaldealing”asspecialcases,addressedinseparateprovisions.Cost-sharingregulationsgoverncircumstancesinwhichrelatedcompaniesjointlycontributetoresearchanddevelopmentactivities,andareassignedspecific,non-overlappingownershiprightsintheresearchresults.Theterm“globaldealingoperation”referstomultinationalfinancialintermediariesthatbuyandsellfinancialproducts,manageriskandexecutetransactionsonbehalfofcustomers.Theproposedglobaldealingregulationsdonotformallyencompasstheglobaltradingofphysicalcommodities（asdistinctfromfinancialproducts）,although“theIRSsolicitscommentsonwhethertheseregulationsshouldbeextendedtocoverdealersincommodities...”

3.2ResalePriceandCostPlusmethods

Considernexttheresalepriceandcostplusmethods.Botharetransactions-basedmethodsthattheOECDfavorsovertheCPM/TNMM.

3.2.1CircumstanceswhenResalePriceandCostPlusmethodsApply

Theresalepriceandcostplusmethods（and,undertheU.S.TemporaryRegulations,thegrossservicesmarginmethodandthecostofservicesplusmethod）canbeappliedunderthefollowingfactpatterns:

1.Asinglemanufacturersellssimilarproductstobothaffiliatedandunaffiliateddistributors;

2.Asingledistributorsourcessimilarproductsfrombothaffiliatedandunaffiliatedsuppliers;

3.Asingleservicesproviderrenderssimilarliaisonoragencyservices（inthecaseofthegrossservicesmarginmethod）tobothaffiliatedandunaffiliatedcompanies,and,ifrelevant,utilizesthesameintangibleassetsindoingso;

4.Asingleservicesproviderrenderssimilarservices（otherthanliaisonservicesinthecaseofthecostofservicesplusmethod）underthesamecontractualtermstobothaffiliatedandunaffiliatedcompaniesandutilizesthesameintangibleassets,ifany,indoingso;

5.Twoormoremanufacturerssellsimilarproducts,inoneinstancetoaffiliateddistributors,andintheotherinstances,tounaffiliateddistributors;

6.Twoormoredistributorssourcesimilarproducts,inoneinstancefromaffiliatedsuppliersandintheotherinstances,fromunaffiliatedsuppliers;and

7.Agroupmemberperformsroutinemanufacturingordistributionfunctionsandlicensesintellectualpropertyfromanothergroupmember.

Givenoneoftheabovefactpatterns,one’schoicebetweentheresalepriceandcostplusmethodsdependsprincipallyonwhether（a）oneofthegroupmembersengagesininternalarm’slengthtransactions,and（b）theaffiliatedmanufacturerortheaffiliateddistributoristheleastcomplexentity（andtherefore,thedesignatedtestedparty）.Forexample,underthefirstfactpattern,onewouldordinarilyapplythecostplusmethod,andunderthesecond,theresalepricemethod.Asindicatedabove,thegrossservicesmarginmethodgenerallyapplieswhentheservicesatissueareintermediaryinnatureandthecostofservicesplusmethodapplieswhenthetestedpartyrendersthesameservicestobothaffiliatedandindependentcompanies.Underthefifthandsixthfactpatterns,one’schoicebetweentheresalepriceandcostplusmethodswouldbedictatedbyeachgroupmember’sownershipofintellectualpropertyandtherelativevaluesthereof.Underthelastfactpattern,thechoiceofmethodsdependsonwhetherthelicenseeisamanufactureroradistributor.

TheU.S.regulationsimposehigherstandardsofcomparabilityundertheresalepriceandcostplusmethods,ascomparedtotheCPM:

Productsmustbe“ofthesamegeneraltype（e.g.,consumerelectronics）,”11andthepartiesbeingcomparedshouldperformsimilarfunctions,bearsimilarrisksandoperateundersimilarcontractualterms.Aspreviouslynoted,theOECDGuidelinesdonotdifferentiatebetweentransferpricingmethodsinestablishingcomparabilitycriteriatothesamedegreeastheU.S.regulations.Suchcriteriaincludethecharacterofthepropertyorservice,thefunctionsperformedbytheparties,contractualterms,economiccircumstancesandbusinessstrategies.

3.2.2DescriptionofResalePriceandCostplusMethods

Brieflystated,undertheresalepricemethod,onecomparesthecaptivedistributor’sgrossmarginonproductsourcedfromaffiliatedcompanieswithitsgrossmarginonproductsourcedfromunaffiliatedcompanies.Ifthecaptivedistributordoesnotsourcesimilarproductsfrombothaffiliatedandunaffiliatedcompanies,onecancompareitsresalemarginonproductssourcedfromaffiliatedsupplierswiththeresalemarginsreportedbyunaffiliateddistributorsthatsourcesimilarproductsfromindependentsuppliers.Ananalogouscomparisonismadeunderthecostplusmethodandthecostofservicesplusmethod,exceptthattheprofitlevelindicatordiffers.Moreparticularly,underthecostplusandcostofservicesplusmethods,theprofitlevelindicatorisequaltogrossprofitsdividedbycostofgoods（orservices）sold.

3.2.3UnderlyingEconomicRationale

Lessthanoneinterpretation,theresalepricemethod,appliedtointernaltransactions,presupposesthatindividualdistributorswouldpaysimilarpurchasepricestotheirmultiplesuppliersonanarm’slengthbasisandchargetheirunrelatedcustomerssimilarsellingprices.Thissetofassumptions,inturn,impliesthat（a）suppliersoperateinthesamecompetitivemarketorhavenobindingcapacityconstraintsandvaluethesubjectdistributor’sbusinessrelativelyhighly,and（b）thedistributorcannot（andisnotforcedto）differentiateamongitscustomersinestablishingitssellingprices.Iftheresalepricemethoddependsontheseassumptionsforitsvalidity,grossmargincomparisonswouldonlybevalidiftheproductsgeneratingsuchmarginsarequitesimilar,notsimplyofthe“samegeneraltype”.Similarly,thecostplusmethod,appliedtointernaltransactions,maypresupposethatindividualmanufacturersareunabletodifferentiateamongcustomersinestablishingtheirsellingprices,andemploythesameorsimilartechnologiesinproducingproductfordifferentcustomers.Again,underthisrationale,theproductsonwhichmarkupsarebeingcomparedmustbecloselysimilar.Alternatively,theeconomicrationaleforinternalcomparisonsofresalemarginsorcostplusmarkupsmaysimplybethatindividualdistributorsandmanufacturerswouldnecessarilyearnareasonablyuniformgrossmarginormarkupacrosstransactions,consistentwiththereturnthatinvestorswouldrequire.Asappliedtoexternaltransactions,theonlyeconomicrationalefortheresalepriceandcostplusmethodswouldseemtobethatmarketforceswillequalizeresalemarginsandgrossmarkupsacrossfirms.

3.2.4CritiqueofEconomicReasoning

Aspreviouslydiscussed,thereisnoreasontoexpectgrossmarginsorgrossmarkupstobeequalizedacrossfirms,and,therefore,nogoodreasontocompareanaffiliateddistributor’s（ormanufacturer’s）resalemargin（orgrossmarkup）withthecorrespondingresultsreportedbyitsunaffiliatedcounterparts.Therefore,aswiththeCPM,theresalepriceandcostplusmethods,asappliedtoexternaltransactions,arenotfoundedonvalideconomicprinciples.

Absentsuppliers’manufacturingcapacityconstraintsandthepotentialforpricediscrimination,comparisonsofanindividualdistributor’sresalemarginsonproductsourcedfromrelatedandindependentsuppliers,respectively,makesacertainamountofsense.Onanarm’slengthbasis,thedistributorwouldsourceexclusivelyfromthelowestcostsupplierifitssuppliers’sellingpricesdiffered,thusforcingthemtochargethesameprice（orsimilarprices,inthecaseofsimilarproducts）.Therefore,ifthedistributorcannotfreelychoosetopricediscriminate,anditscustomersdonotinsistondifferentprices（where“price”encompassesco-opadvertisingarrangements,volumediscounts,etc.）,itshouldearnsimilarresalemarginsacrosssuppliersonanarm’slengthbasis.Similarly,anindividualmanufacturerproducingsimilarproductsforrelatedandindependentcustomerswillgenerallyusethesamefacilities（and,therefore,thesameorsimilarmanufacturingtechnologiesandprocesses）,absentdedicatedproductionlines.Ifthemanufacturercannotfreelychoosetopricediscriminate,anditscustomerswouldnotinsistondifferentpricesatarm’slength,itshouldearnsimilargrossmarkupsacrosscustomersonanarm’slengthba