股权激励外文文献中英对照Word格式.docx
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g.,Bebchuk,FriedandWalker,2002;
CheffinsandThomas,2004;
Zattoni,2007)。
IntheUKand,aboveallintheUS,remunerationencompassesavarietyofcomponents,andshortandlongtermvariablepaycarriesmoreweightthanelsewhere(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Inothercountries,however,fixedwageshavealwaysbeenthemainingredientintopmanagers’payschemes.Overtime,variableshort-termpayhasbecomemoresubstantialandtheimpactoffringebenefitshasgraduallygrown。
Notwithstanding,incentiveslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong—termcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(TowersPerrin,2000).
Inrecentyears,however,paypackagesofmanagershaveundergoneanappreciablechangeasvariablepayhasincreasedconsiderably,evenoutsidetheUSandtheUK。
Inparticular,managersinmostcountrieshaveexperiencedanincreaseinthevariablepayrelatedtolong—termgoals.Withinthecontextofthisgeneraltrendtowardmediumandlong-termincentives,thereisapronouncedtendencytoadoptplansinvolvingstocksorstockoptions(TowersPerrin,2000;
2005).Thedriversofthediffusionoflongtermincentiveplansseemtobesomerecentchangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironmentatthelocalandgloballevels.ParticularlyimportanttriggersoftheconvergencetowardtheUSpayparadigmarebothmarketorienteddrivers,suchastheevolvingshareownershippatternsortheinternationalizationofthelabormarket,andlaw—orienteddrivers,suchascorporateortaxregulation(CheffinsandThomas,2004).Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironment,weobserveaglobaltrendtowardthe“Americanizationofinternationalpaypractices,"
characterizedbyhighincentivesandverylucrativecompensationmechanisms(e。
g.,Cheffins,2003;
CheffinsandThomas,2004).
Ironically,thespreadoftheUSpayparadigmaroundtheworldhappenswhenitishotlydebatedathome.Inparticular,thecriticsareconcernedwithboththelevelofexecutivecompensationpackagesandtheuseofequityincentiveplans(CheffinsandThomas,2004)。
CriticsstressedthatUStopmanagers,andparticularlytheCEOs,receiveverylucrativecompensationpackages。
The’80sand’90ssawanincreasingdisparitybetweenCEO'
spayandthatofrank—and-fileworkers。
Thankstothiseffect,theirdirectcompensationhasbecomeahundredtimesthatofanaverageemployee(HallandLiebman,1998).ThemaindeterminantsoftheincreasinglevelofCEOs’andexecutives'
compensationareannualbonusesand,aboveall,stockoptiongrants(ConyonandMurphy,2000)。
Stockoptionplanshaverecentlybeencriticizedbyscholarsandpublicopinionbecausetheycharacteristicallyaretoogenerousandsymptomaticofamanagerialextractionofthefirm’svalue(Bebchuketal.,2002;
BebchukandFried,2006).
Inlightoftheserecenteventsandoftheincreasedtendencytoadoptequityincentiveplans,thispaperaimsatunderstandingthereasonsbehindthedisseminationofstockoptionandstockgrantingplansoutsidetheUSandtheUK。
ThechoicetoinvestigatethisphenomenoninItalyreliesonthefollowingarguments.First,thelargemajorityofpreviousstudiesanalyzetheevolutionofexecutivecompensationandequityincentiveplansintheUSand,toasmallerextent,intheUK.Second,ownershipstructureandgovernancepracticesincontinentalEuropeancountriesaresubstantiallydifferentfromtheonesinAnglo-Saxoncountries。
Third,continentalEuropeancountries,andItalyinparticular,almostignoredtheuseoftheseinstrumentsuntiltheendofthe’90s。
Ourgoalistocomparetheexplanatorypowerofthreecompetingviewsonthediffusionofequityincentiveplans:
1)theoptimalcontractingview,whichstatesthatcompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMurphy,1990);
2)therentextractionview,whichstatesthatpowerfulinsidersmayinfluencethepayprocessfortheirownbenefit(Bebchuketal.,2002);
and3)theperceived—costview(HallandMurphy,2003),whichstatesthatcompaniesmayfavorsomecompensationschemesfortheir(supposedorreal)costadvantages.
Tothispurpose,weconductedanempiricalstudyonthereasonswhyItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanssincetheendofthe’90s.Togainadeepunderstandingofthephenomenon,wecollecteddataandinformationbothontheevolutionofthenationalinstitutionalenvironmentinthelastdecadeandonthediffusionandthecharacteristics(i。
e。
,technicalaspectsandobjectives)ofequityincentiveplansadoptedbyItalianlistedcompaniesin1999and2005.Weusedbothlogitmodelsanddifference-of—meansstatisticaltechniquestoanalyzedata。
Ourresultsshowthat:
1)firmsize,andnotitsownershipstructure,isadeterminantoftheadoptionoftheseinstruments;
2)theseplansarenotextensivelyusedtoextractcompanyvalue,althoughafewcasessuggestthispossibility;
and3)plans’characteristicsareconsistentwiththeonesdefinedbytaxlawtoreceivespecialfiscaltreatment.
Ourfindingscontributetothedevelopmentoftheliteratureonboththerationalesbehindthespreadingofequityincentiveschemesandthediffusionofnewgovernancepractices。
Theyshow,infact,thatequityincentiveplanshavebeenprimarilyadoptedtotakeadvantageoflargetaxbenefits,andthatinsomeoccasionstheymayhavebeenusedbycontrollingshareholderstoextractcompanyvalueattheexpenseofminorityshareholders。
Inotherwords,ourfindingssuggestthatItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanstoperformasubtleformofdecoupling.Ontheonehand,theydeclaredthatplanswereaimedtoalignshareholders’andmanagers’interestsandincentivevaluecreation。
Ontheotherhand,thankstothelackoftransparencyandpreviousknowledgeabouttheseinstruments,companiesusedthesemechanismstotakeadvantageoftaxbenefitsandsometimesalsotodistributealargeamountofvaluetosomepowerfulindividuals.Theseresultssupportasymbolicperspectiveoncorporategovernance,accordingtowhichtheintroductionofequityincentiveplanspleasestakeholders–fortheirimplicitalignmentofinterestsandincentivetovaluecreation–withoutimplyingasubstantiveimprovementofgovernancepractices.
2.CorporateGovernanceinItalianListedCompanies
Italiancompaniesaretraditionallycontrolledbyalargeblockholder(Zattoni,1999).Banksandotherfinancialinstitutionsdonotownlargeshareholdingsanddonotexertasignificantinfluenceongovernanceoflargecompanies,atleastasfarastheyareabletorepaytheirfinancialdebt(Bianchi,BiancoandEnriques,2001).Institutionalinvestorsusuallyplayamarginalrolebecauseoftheirlimitedshareholding,theirstrictconnectionswithItalianbanks,andaregulatoryenvironmentthatdoesnotofferincentivesfortheiractivism.Finally,thestockmarketisrelativelysmallandundeveloped,andthemarketforcorporatecontrolisalmostabsent(Bianco,2001)。
Inshort,theItaliangovernancesystemcanbedescribedasasystemof“weakmanagers,strongblockholders,andunprotectedminorityshareholders”(Melis,2000:
354).
Theboardofdirectorsistraditionallyonetier,butashareholders’generalmeetingmustappointalsoaboardofstatutoryauditorsaswellwhosemaintaskistomonitorthedirectors’performance(Melis,2000)。
Further,somestudiespublishedinthe'
90sshowedthattheboardofdirectorswasundertherelevantinfluenceoflargeblockholders.Bothinsideandoutsidedirectorswereinfactrelatedtocontrollingshareholdersbyfamilyorbusinessties(Melis,1999;
2000;
Molteni,1997).
Consistentwiththispicture,fixedwageshavebeenthemainingredientoftopmanagers’remuneration,andincentiveschemeslinkedtoreachingmediumtolongtermcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(Melis,1999)。
EquityincentiveschemesadoptedbyItaliancompaniesissuestockstoallemployeesunconditionallyforthepurposeofimprovingthecompanyatmosphereandstabilizingthesharevalueontheStockExchange。
Onlyveryfewcanbecomparedwithstockoptionplansinthetruesenseoftheterm。
Eveninthiscase,however,directorsandtopmanagerswererarelyevaluatedthroughstockreturns,becauseofthesupposedlimitedabilityoftheItalianstockmarkettomeasurefirm’sperformance(Melis,1999).
3.TheEvolutionofItalianInstitutionalContext
TheinstitutionalcontextinItalyhasevolvedradicallyinthelastdecade,creatingthepossibilityforthedisseminationofequityincentiveplans。
Themainchangesregardedthedevelopmentofcommerciallaw,theintroductionandupdatingofthecodeofgoodgovernance,theissueofsomereportsencouragingtheuseofequityincentiveplans,andtheevolutionofthetaxlaw(Zattoni,2006)。
Concerningthenationallawandregulations,somereformsinthecommerciallaw(1998,2003,and2005)andtheintroduction(1999)andupdate(2002)ofthenationalcodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofthecorporategovernanceoflistedcompanies(Zattoni,2006)。
FinancialmarketsandcorporatelawreformsimprovedtheefficiencyoftheStockExchangeandcreatedaninstitutionalenvironmentmorefavorabletoinstitutionalinvestors’activism(BianchiandEnriques,2005)。
Atthesametimetheintroductionandupdateofthecodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofgovernancepracticesattheboardlevel.ThesereformsdidnotproduceanimmediateeffectongovernancepracticesofItalianlistedcompanies,alt