上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效外文文献翻译最新Word格式.docx

上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效外文文献翻译最新Word格式.docx

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原文

ThestudyonthecorrelationofSeniorExecutiveCompensationandcorporateperformanceinlistedcompanies

MehranH

Abstract

Duetoinformationasymmetrybetweenownersandexecutives,ledtothemoralriskandadverseselectionproblems.Howtomaketheexecutiveissatisfyingtheinterestsofthewhitebodyatthesametimemaximizetheenterprisevalueultimatelyachieveawin-winsituation,becomeagreatconcernofmanyscholars.

Thispaperfromtwoaspectsoftheoryandtheliteraturereviewedtheexecutivecompensationandcorporateperformanceoftherelatedcontent.Thentherelationshipbetweenexecutivecompensationandcorporateperformanceempiricalresearch.Thisarticlemainlyfromtwoaspectstoanalyzethecorrelationbetweenexecutivecompensationandcorporateperformance,isalongitudinaldescriptivestatisticalanalysis,samplesaredividedintogeneraldescriptivestatisticalanalysisanddescriptivestatisticalanalysis,thesecondistocollectdata,respectively,theuniversityandmultivariatelinearregressionanalysis,selectionofthetopthreeexecutivepaymeansthenaturallogarithmofexecutivecompensation,returnonequityandearningspersharemeasureofenterpriseperformance,andtojointhecompanysize,financialleverage,ownershipconcentration,executivesshareholding,theproportionofstate-ownedshares,theproportionofindependentdirectors,thechairmanandgeneralmanagerofsituationeightcontrolvariables,thesizeoftheboardofsupervisors.

Keywords:

thelistedcompany,executivecompensationandcorporateperformance

Introduction

Modernenterprisemostlyadoptsshare-holdingsystemoperation,theemergenceofthejoint-stockcompany,ledtotheseparateownershipwiththeagency.Shareholdersastheowneroftheenterprisepropertyeventually,butnottoparticipateinenterprisemanagementanddecision-making,buttheentrustedagentforthemanagementandoperationenterprises,formed"

byaproxy"

relationship.Agentinsteadofshareholdersastheauthorizedagentoftheenterprise,itsstatusorseniormanagementoftheenterprise.Consideringtheagent'

sriskfactor,suchaslevelofmorality,ability,togetherwithinformationasymmetrybetweenshareholdersandexecutives,canproducetheagencycost.

Executivesasthehumancapitalofenterpriseisthemostimportantandscarce,becauseitsmasteryoftheenterprisemanagementdecision-making,theheightoftheenterprisecontrolrightsvirtuallyincreasedthelikelihoodtheyuserighttoviolatetheinterestsoftheshareholders.Inordertosolvethiscontradiction,shareholdersadoptedbothconstraintsandincentivemechanismtobalancetheprincipal-agentrelationship,canexcitetheworkenthusiasmsofexecutivesunceasingly,canmaximumlimittomaximizeshareholderwealth.Whethertostand intheAngleoftheshareholdersorexecutives,thecompany'

sperformanceistheimportantmeasureofexecutivepay.So,studyonexecutivecompensationandcorporateperformancecorrelationforanenterprisetoformulatesalaryincentivemechanismandsolvetheproblemofagencycosts,itisverynecessary.

Literaturereview

Thecorrelationofexecutivecompensationandcorporateperformance

Murphy（1985）1964-1981usingthecompanydata,chosethe73largestmanufacturingenterprisesofthedataof500managersastheresearchsample,usingempiricalmethodtotestthestockyield,therelationshipbetweenexecutivecompensationandcorporateearningsgrowth,theconclusionis:

theelasticityvaluecashincentivesforthevalueofthecompanyisnearto0.11,measuredwithreturnstoshareholdersofcompanyperformancepaywassignificantlypositivelyrelatedtorelationshipwiththemanager.TheconclusionandCoughlanandSchmidt（1985）ofthetwoscholarsresearchconclusion.

CarpenterandSanders（2002）throughthestudyconcludedthat:

theseniormanagementteamandforboardmembersincentivesrelatedrelationship,motivationoftheseniormanagementteamcanmoreeffectivelyimprovethebusinessperformance.

PhillipandCyril（2004）byusinglinearregressionandcurvecorrelationanalysismethodofcombiningthe,generalmanagerofrelationshipbetweenpayandperformanceindicatorsforempiricalresearch,theconclusionis:

thegeneralmanager,generalmanagerofwages,andpaymentofremunerationbonusesbotharepositivelycorrelatedwithcorporateperformance.

Kevin（2011）by2006-2009,280companieslistedonthenosestudydrawsthefollowingconclusions:

executivecompensationandcorporateperformance（measuredbyreturnonequityasindex）wassignificantlypositivecorrelation;

Affecttheexecutivecompensationlevelofthemostsignificantvariableisthesizeofthecomp