金融学专业外文翻译国际货币和金融安排现状与未来.docx

金融学专业外文翻译国际货币和金融安排现状与未来.docx

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金融学专业外文翻译国际货币和金融安排现状与未来

中文3950字

外文原文

InternationalMonetaryandFinancialArrangements:

PresentandFuture

3.Nationaleconomicpoliciesunderthepresentinternationalmonetarysystem

Inthispart,weexaminecentralbankindependenceandmonetaryandfiscalpoliciesunderthepresentinternationalmonetarysystem.Wealsoexamineglobalfinancialintegrationandtheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy.

3.1.Centralbankindependence

Inrecentyears,manynationshavepassedlawsremovinggovernmentcontrolontheircentralbank（i.e.,makingtheircentralbankmoreindependent）inordertoovercometheinflationarybiasthatwasotherwisebelievedtoexistintheconductofmonetarypolicy.Thecentralbanksofsomenations,suchasSwitzerlandandGermany,haveenjoyedahighdegreeofindependenceduringmostofthepostwarperiod.Recently,Canada,Chile,andNewZealandenactedlegislationtomaketheircentralbanksmoreindependent.InMay1997,Englandalsodidso.AcommoningredientofeconomicreformsinLatinAmericaandintheex-communistnationsofCentralandEasternEuropehasbeenthecreationofindependentcentralbanks—atleastlegally—ifnotyetintheiractualday-to-dayoperation.TheMaastrichtTreatyprohibitscentralbanksfromtakinginstructionsfromthegovernment,asoneoftherequirementsformonetaryunioninEurope.Toensurecentralbankindependence,theTreatyalsorequiresthatcentralbankgovernorsbeappointedforatermofatleastfiveyears.Moreimportantly,theTreatyforbidscentralbanksfrompurchasingdebtinstrumentsdirectlyfromthegovernmentandfromprovidingcreditfacilitiestothegovernment.Thisisdoneinthebeliefthatacentralbankthatisfreefrompoliticalpressurewouldachievealowerinflationrate.

Butwhatismeantbycentralbankindependence?

Fisher（1995）introducedthedistinctionbetweengoalindependenceandinstrumentindependence.Acentralbankhasgoalindependenceifitcansetitsowngoals,suchastherateofinflationthatthenationshouldaimfor.Instrumentindependencemeansthatthecentralbankhascontrolovertheleversofmonetarypolicy.Thatis,ithasnoobligationtofinancegovernmentdeficits,directlyorindirectly,andthatithasthepowertosetinterestrates.Ofcourse,acentralbankthathasgoalandinstrumentindependencecansetitsownmonetarygoalsandisfreetousetheinstrumentsatitsdisposaltoachievethosegoals.Eveninnationswiththemostindependentcentralbanks,however,thegovernmentratherthanthecentralbankusuallyhasafinalsayonthetypeofexchangeratearrangementforthenationtohave,andonchangingtheexchangeratesinafixedexchangeratesystem,oronforeignexchangemarketinterventionstoaffectthelevelofexchangeratesifthenationchoosestohaveaflexibleexchangeratesystem（Capie,1998）.

Theoretically,therearetwodifferentapproachestocentralbankindependence.Oneistheconservative-bankerapproachofRogoff（1985）andtheotheristheprincipal-agentapproachofWalsh（1995）.Intheconservative-bankerapproach,thecentralbankhasbothgoalandinstrumentindependence.Presumably,theconservativebankerwillweighdeviationsofbothinflationandoutputfromtargetlevelsinsettingmonetarypolicy,butwithabiasinfavoroflowerinflation,evenifthiscomesattheexpenseoflowergrowth.Intheprincipal-agentapproach,ontheotherhand,thecentralbankerhasinstrumentindependence,butnotgoalindependence.Thatis,thegovernmentsetsthemonetarygoal,suchastherateofinflationforthenation,andthenthecentralbankisfreetoemploywhatevermonetaryinstrumentsithasatitsdisposalintryingtomeetthemonetarygoal.Theprincipal-agentgoalismostexplicitinthecaseofNewZealand,wherethegovernorofthecentralbankformallyagreestomeettheinflationtargetsetbythegovernment,withhisjobonthelineifhefailstomeetthetarget.InCanadaandEngland,itisthereputationofthecentralbankthatisonthelineiftheinflationtargetisexceeded.

Today,thereisgeneralagreementthatacentralbankshouldhaveinstrument,butnotgoalindependence.Therearetworeasonsforthis.Thefirstisthatthemonetarygoalofthenationshouldreflectthesocialwelfarefunctionofthenationandnotjustthepreferencesofthecentralbankgovernor.Thesecondisthatthereistheneedtocoordinatemonetaryandfiscalpoliciestoavoidtheiroperatingatcrosspurposesofeachother.Centralbankaccountability,however,isneededtoensurethatthemonetarygoalsofthenationare,infact,pursuedbythenation’scentralbank.InthecaseofNewZealandthegovernorofthecentralbankisaccountabletothefinanceminister.IntheUnitedStates,theFederalReserveBankortheFed（theUScentralbank）isgenerallyaccountabletoCongress,whichmustratifythechoiceofthechairmanoftheFedandcansummonhimtoexplainhispolicies.InGermany,theBundesbankisaccountabletothepublicatlargeforitspoliciesindefenseofthecurrency.Inrecentyears,agrowingnumberofcountriesarefollowingtheleadofNewZealandinsettingexplicitinflationtargetsforthecentralbank.Thisprovidestransparencyandaccountability,whichareveryimportantinestablishingcredibilityforthegovernment’smonetarypolicy.Themorecredibleacentralbankis,themoreitwillbeabletocutinterestratesinaslowdownwithouttriggeringhigherinflationaryexpectationsandhencehigherlong-terminterestrates,orraisinginterestratestocurbemerginginflationarypressureswithoutthefearoftriggeringarecession.Itistoincreasetransparencyandaccountability,andhenceitscredibilityandeffectiveness,thatthecentralbankofseveralcountries,includingtheUnitedStates,haverecentlystartedtoexplaintheirdecision-makingprocess（includingthelaggedpublicationoftheminutesoftheirmeetingsbytheUSFed）andoperatingprocedureintheirconductofmonetarypolicy.Thefact,however,thattheUSFed,asopposedtomostothercentralbanks,isconstitutionallyrequiredtopursuebothpricestabilityandfullemployment,reducesitseffectivenessasaninflationfighterwhenaconflictarisesbetweenitstwogoals（Salvatore,1998d）.

3.2.Centralbankindependenceandinflation

Asexpected,anumberofempiricalstudieshaveshownaninverserelationshipbetweencentralbankindependenceandtherateofinflationinindustrialcountries.Thatis,themoreindependentthecentralbankofanindustrialcountryis,thelowertherateofinflationinthenation.OneofthemostcomprehensiveofthesestudiesistheonebyAlesinaandSummers（1993）.Theauthorsincludedthefollowing16industrialcountriesinthestudy:

Australia,Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,theNetherlands,NewZealand,Norway,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.

Thesampleperiodwasfrom1955to1988.Asinpreviousstudies,theauthorsfoundanegativecorrelationbetweenthelevelofcentralbankindependenceandtherateofinflation.Theyalsofoundthatthemoreindependentacentralbankwas,thesmallerwasthevariabilityoftheinflationrate（becauseofthepositivecorrelationbetweenthelevelandvariabilityofinflation）.

Asitiswellknown,however,correlationdoesnotestablishcausality.Thatis,thenegativecorrelationbetweencentralbankindependenceandinflationfoundinempiricalstudiesdoesnotimplythattheformercausesthelatter.Itmayverywellbethatcountrieswithastrongeraversiontoinflationaremorelikelytogivemoreindependencetotheircentralbanks.Thus,itistheinflationaversioninthenationthatgivesrisebothtolowerinflationandtoamoreindependentcentralbankinthenation,ratherthanamoreindependentcentralbankbeingresponsible（i.e.,causing）lowerinflation.Unless,however,webelievethatlawsandinstitutionsareentirelyirrelevantandhavenoeffectwhatsoeveroneconomicperformance（heretherateofinflation）wemustconcludethatamoreindependentcentralbankismorelikely,otherthingsequal,toleadtolowerinflationthanalessindependentcentralbank.

Assupportforcentralbankindependencehasincreasedaroundtheworld,sohasthetendencytoentrusttocentralbanksthesolefunctionofachievingagiveninflationtargetorrange.This,however,raisesthequestionofwhetheritwouldbemoreappropriatetoentrustthecentralbankwithatargetthatismoredirectlycontrollablebythecentralbank,suchasthegrowthofanarrowmoneyaggregate,ratherthanaspecificinflationtarget.Settinganinflationtarget,however,seemsmoreappropriatetodayinviewofthecollapseoftherelationshipbetweenmoneygrowthandinflationinonecountryafteranother.

Asaresult,itisbettertoassignanexplicitinflationtargettothecentralbankandprovideitwithinstrumentindependencetopursuetheinflationtarget.Astowhythecentralbankshouldbegivenaspecificinflationtargetratherthanagrowth-of-real-GDPorrate-of-unemploymenttarget,theansweristhatinflationisamonetaryphenomenonwhiletherateofgrowthofrealGDPandtherateofunemploymentarerealphenomena.Realphenomenaare,ofcourse,affectedbymonetaryphenomena,butherethechainofcausalitydependsonpoliciesandinstitutionsthatarenotunderthedirectcontrolofthecentralbank.Ingivingaspecificinflationtargettothecentralbank,itisimportanttopointoutthatfixedexchangeratesarelessinflationarythanflexibleexchangerates.

Thus,acountrythatistryingtomovefromahightoalowinflationenvironmentwoulddowelltoadoptafixedratherthanavariableexchangeratesystemasameansofanchoringmonetaryp