金融学专业外文翻译国际货币和金融安排现状与未来.docx

1、金融学专业外文翻译国际货币和金融安排现状与未来中文3950字外文原文International Monetary and Financial Arrangements: Present and Future3. National economic policies under the present international monetary systemIn this part, we examine central bank independence and monetary and fiscal policies under the present international mone

2、tary system. We also examine global financial integration and the effectiveness of monetary policy.3.1. Central bank independenceIn recent years, many nations have passed laws removing government control on their central bank (i.e., making their central bank more independent) in order to overcome th

3、e inflationary bias that was otherwise believed to exist in the conduct of monetary policy. The central banks of some nations, such as Switzerland and Germany, have enjoyed a high degree of independence during most of the postwar period. Recently, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand enacted legislation t

4、o make their central banks more independent. In May 1997, England also did so. A common ingredient of economic reforms in Latin America and in the ex-communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe has been the creation of independent central banksat least legallyif not yet in their actual day-to-da

5、y operation. The Maastricht Treaty prohibits central banks from taking instructions from the government, as one of the requirements for monetary union in Europe. To ensure central bank independence, the Treaty also requires that central bank governors be appointed for a term of at least five years.

6、More importantly, the Treaty forbids central banks from purchasing debt instruments directly from the government and from providing credit facilities to the government. This is done in the belief that a central bank that is free from political pressure would achieve a lower inflation rate. But what

7、is meant by central bank independence? Fisher (1995) introduced the distinction between goal independence and instrument independence. A central bank has goal independence if it can set its own goals, such as the rate of inflation that the nation should aim for. Instrument independence means that th

8、e central bank has control over the levers of monetary policy. That is, it has no obligation to finance government deficits, directly or indirectly, and that it has the power to set interest rates. Of course, a central bank that has goal and instrument independence can set its own monetary goals and

9、 is free to use the instruments at its disposal to achieve those goals. Even in nations with the most independent central banks, however, the government rather than the central bank usually has a final say on the type of exchange rate arrangement for the nation to have, and on changing the exchange

10、rates in a fixed exchange rate system, or on foreign exchange market interventions to affect the level of exchange rates if the nation chooses to have a flexible exchange rate system (Capie, 1998). Theoretically, there are two different approaches to central bank independence. One is the conservativ

11、e-banker approach of Rogoff (1985) and the other is the principal-agent approach of Walsh (1995). In the conservative-banker approach, the central bank has both goal and instrument independence. Presumably, the conservative banker will weigh deviations of both inflation and output from target levels

12、 in setting monetary policy, but with a bias in favor of lower inflation, even if this comes at the expense of lower growth. In the principal-agent approach, on the other hand, the central banker has instrument independence, but not goal independence. That is, the government sets the monetary goal,

13、such as the rate of inflation for the nation, and then the central bank is free to employ whatever monetary instruments it has at its disposal in trying to meet the monetary goal. The principal-agent goal is most explicit in the case of New Zealand, where the governor of the central bank formally ag

14、rees to meet the inflation target set by the government, with his job on the line if he fails to meet the target. In Canada and England, it is the reputation of the central bank that is on the line if the inflation target is exceeded.Today, there is general agreement that a central bank should have

15、instrument, but not goal independence. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the monetary goal of the nation should reflect the social welfare function of the nation and not just the preferences of the central bank governor. The second is that there is the need to coordinate monetary and

16、 fiscal policies to avoid their operating at cross purposes of each other. Central bank accountability, however, is needed to ensure that the monetary goals of the nation are, in fact, pursued by the nations central bank. In the case of New Zealand the governor of the central bank is accountable to

17、the finance minister. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank or the Fed (the US central bank) is generally accountable to Congress, which must ratify the choice of the chairman of the Fed and can summon him to explain his policies. In Germany, the Bundesbank is accountable to the public at l

18、arge for its policies in defense of the currency.In recent years, a growing number of countries are following the lead of New Zealand in setting explicit inflation targets for the central bank. This provides transparency and accountability, which are very important in establishing credibility for th

19、e governments monetary policy. The more credible a central bank is, the more it will be able to cut interest rates in a slowdown without triggering higher inflationary expectations and hence higher long-term interest rates, or raising interest rates to curb emerging inflationary pressures without th

20、e fear of triggering a recession. It is to increase transparency and accountability, and hence its credibility and effectiveness, that the central bank of several countries, including the United States, have recently started to explain their decision-making process (including the lagged publication

21、of the minutes of their meetings by the US Fed) and operating procedure in their conduct of monetary policy. The fact, however, that the US Fed, as opposed to most other central banks, is constitutionally required to pursue both price stability and full employment, reduces its effectiveness as an in

22、flation fighter when a conflict arises between its two goals (Salvatore, 1998d).3.2. Central bank independence and inflationAs expected, a number of empirical studies have shown an inverse relationship between central bank independence and the rate of inflation in industrial countries. That is, the

23、more independent the central bank of an industrial country is, the lower the rate of inflation in the nation. One of the most comprehensive of these studies is the one by Alesina and Summers (1993). The authors included the following 16 industrial countries in the study: Australia, Belgium, Canada,

24、Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.The sample period was from 1955 to 1988. As in previous studies, the authors found a negative correlation between the level of central bank independence

25、 and the rate of inflation. They also found that the more independent a central bank was, the smaller was the variability of the inflation rate (because of the positive correlation between the level and variability of inflation).As it is well known, however, correlation does not establish causality.

26、 That is, the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation found in empirical studies does not imply that the former causes the latter. It may very well be that countries with a stronger aversion to inflation are more likely to give more independence to their central banks. T

27、hus, it is the inflation aversion in the nation that gives rise both to lower inflation and to a more independent central bank in the nation, rather than a more independent central bank being responsible (i.e., causing) lower inflation. Unless, however, we believe that laws and institutions are enti

28、rely irrelevant and have no effect whatsoever on economic performance (here the rate of inflation) we must conclude that a more independent central bank is more likely, other things equal, to lead to lower inflation than a less independent central bank.As support for central bank independence has in

29、creased around the world, so has the tendency to entrust to central banks the sole function of achieving a given inflation target or range. This, however, raises the question of whether it would be more appropriate to entrust the central bank with a target that is more directly controllable by the c

30、entral bank, such as the growth of a narrow money aggregate, rather than a specific inflation target. Setting an inflation target, however, seems more appropriate today in view of the collapse of the relationship between money growth and inflation in one country after another. As a result, it is bet

31、ter to assign an explicit inflation target to the central bank and provide it with instrument independence to pursue the inflation target. As to why the central bank should be given a specific inflation target rather than a growth-of-real-GDP or rate-of-unemployment target, the answer is that inflat

32、ion is a monetary phenomenon while the rate of growth of real GDP and the rate of unemployment are real phenomena. Real phenomena are, of course, affected by monetary phenomena, but here the chain of causality depends on policies and institutions that are not under the direct control of the central

33、bank. In giving a specific inflation target to the central bank, it is important to point out that fixed exchange rates are less inflationary than flexible exchange rates.Thus, a country that is trying to move from a high to a low inflation environment would do well to adopt a fixed rather than a variable exchange rate system as a means of anchoring monetary p