shared auditors in mergers and acquisitions.docx

shared auditors in mergers and acquisitions.docx

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Sharedauditorsinmergersandacquisitions

Sharedauditorsinmergersandacquisitions$DanS.Dhaliwala,b,n,PhillipT.Lamoreauxc,LubomirP.Litovd,JordanB.Neylande,faUniversityofArizona,UnitedStatesbKoreaUniversityBusinessSchool,KoreacArizonaStateUniversity,UnitedStatesdUniversityofOklahoma,UnitedStateseUniversityofMelbourne,AustraliafFinancialResearchNetwork（FIRN）,AustralianrticleinfoArticlehistory:

Received19April2013Receivedinrevisedform22January2015Accepted26January2015JELclassifications:

G34M41M49Keywords:

AuditorsSharedauditorsMergersandacquisitionslnformationasymmetryabstractWeexaminetheimpactofsharedauditors,definedasauditfirmsthatprovideauditservicestoatargetanditsacquirerfirmpriortoanacquisition,ontransactionoutcomes.Wefindsharedauditorsareobservedinnearlyaquarterofallpublicacquisitionsandtargetsaremorelikelytoreceiveabidfromafirmthathasthesameauditor.Moreover,thesesharedauditordealsareassociatedwithsignificantlylowerdealpremiums,lowertargeteventreturns,higherbiddereventreturns,andhigherdealcompletionrates.Theseresultsaredrivenbybidsinwhichtargetsandacquirerssharethesamepracticeofficeofanauditfirmandinwhichthetargetissmall.Overall,ourevidencesuggeststhatbiddersbenefitfromsharinganauditorwiththetarget.Ourresultsarerobusttocontrolsforalternativeexplanationsandforselectionbiasintheshared-auditoreffect.&2015ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.1.IntroductionWeexamineacquisitionoutcomeswhenthesameauditorauditsthefinancialstatementsofbothabidderandatargetfirmpriortoanacquisition.Wehypothesizethatsharedauditorsfacilitatetheflowofinformationbetweenbiddersandtargets,andthatthebenefitsofsuchmitigatedinformationasymmetryaccrueprimarilytotheacquiringfirm.Externalauditorshaveuniqueaccesstoseniorexecutives,participateinauditcommitteemeetings,andhaveaccesstoboardmeetingminutesandgeneralinformationaboutafirmintheconductoftheiraudits.Thisaccesstoseniorexecutivescombinedwithinformationgatheredduringanauditprovidesauditorswithanopportunitytodiscussstrategicinitiativeswiththeirclientsincluding,amongothers,theacquisitionordispositionofassets.Communicationaboutsuchinitiativesmaybeintheformof"softtalk".Becauseauditorscontractwithavarietyofcompanies,auditorshavethepotentialtoContentslistsavailableatScienceDirectjournalhomepage:

www.elsevier.com/locate/jaejournalofAccountingandEconomicshttp:

//dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.01.0050165-4101/&2015ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.thankAnupAgrawal,GennaroBernile,RobertBruner,MattEge,D.J.Fairhurst,KathleenKahle,HaydenKane,SandyKlasa,ChrisLamoureux,HennockLouis,?

yvindNorli,MattSerfling,RichardSias,JaredStanfield,MarkTrombley,andworkshopparticipantsattheUniversityofMelbourneforhelpfulthoughtsandcomments.WeareespeciallythankfultoJohnCore（theEditor）andMarkDeFond（theReviewer）fortheirinsightfulcommentsthathelpedusgreatlyimprovethepaper.Lastly,wethankMikeMowchanforhisresearchassistance,andourrespectiveuniversitiesforresearchfunding.nCorrespondingauthor.Tel.:

tl5206212146.E-mailaddresses:

dhaliwal@email.arizona.edu（D.S.Dhaliwal）,Phillip.Lamoreaux@asu.edu（P.T.Lamoreaux）,

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lubomir.p.litov-l@ou.edu（L.P.Litov）,jordan.neyland@unimelb.edu.au（J.B.Neyland）.JournalofAccountingandEconomics]（]]]]）]]]-]]]Pleasecitethisarticleas:

Dhaliwal,D.S.,etal.,Sharedauditorsinmergersandacquisitions.JournalofAccountingandEconomics（2015）,http:

//dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.01.005i

becomeinformationintermediariesbetweenprospectivetargetsandacquirers,whetherintentionalorotherwise.Assharedauditorsareincentivizedtoalignwiththeinterestsoflargerclients,weanticipateapotentialbiasinfavorofacquisitiveclientsovertargetclients.Hence,biddersthatshareanauditfirmwithapotentialtargetcouldhaveaninformationadvantagerelativetoothersintheprocessofbidding,andweanticipatethatthisadvantagewillmanifestitselfinanincreasedlikelihoodofsubmittingabidforatarget.Theimpactofsharedauditorslikelyextendsbeyondthepointofbiddingandtargetselection.Ifshared-auditorbiddershaveaninformationaladvantagerelativetocompetingbidders,bidderswithsharedauditorscanleveragethisadvantageintoabetterbargainingpositionwiththetarget.Asotherbiddershavelessinformation,theyhavelessincentivetobid,thusreducingbidcompetition.Withlowerbidcompetition,anacquirerwithas