P2P 网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融.docx
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P2P网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融
本份文档包含:
关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述
一、外文文献
标题:
EmergenceofFinancialIntermediariesinElectronicMarkets:
TheCaseofOnlineP2PLending
作者:
Berger,SvenC;Gleisner,Fabian
期刊:
BusinessResearch;卷:
2;期:
1;页:
39-65;出版年份:
2009
EmergenceofFinancialIntermediariesinElectronicMarkets:
TheCaseofOnlineP2PLending
Abstract
Weanalyzetheroleofintermediariesinelectronicmarketsusingdetaileddataofmorethan14,000originatedloansonanelectronicP2P(peer-to-peer)lendingplatform.Insuchanelectroniccreditmarket,lendersbidtosupplyaprivateloan.Screeningofpotentialborrowersandthemonitoringofloanrepaymentcanbedelegatedtodesignatedgroupleaders.Wefindthatthesemarketparticipantsactasfinancialintermediariesandsignificantlyimproveborrowers'creditconditionsbyreducinginformationasymmetries,predominantlyforborrowerswithlessattractiveriskcharacteristics.Ourfindingsmaybesurprisinggiventhereplacementofabankbyanelectronicmarketplace.
Keywords:
Asymmetricinformation,intermediation,sociallending,electronicmarkets
1Introduction
Theevolutionofinformationtechnologyinrecentyearshasledtothedevelopmentofelectronicmarketplaceswheretraditionalintermediariesmaybelessimportantorevenredundantfortheeconomicinteractionofmarketparticipants(BenjaminandWigand1995,EvansandWurster1997,Malone,Yates,andBenjamin1987).Withinthefinancialservicesindustry,thedebateaboutdisintermediationandthefuturerelevanceoffinancialintermediaries(AllenandSantomero2001,Nellis,McCaffery,andHutchinson2000,Schmidt,Hackethal,andTyrell1999)isfueledbytheincreasingroleofelectroniclendingmarkets(P2PLendingorSocialLending)whereanelectronicmarketplacereplacesabankasthetraditionalintermediaryandenablesthebrokerageofconsumerloansdirectlybetweenborrowersandlenders(HulmeandWright2006,Meyer2007).Arecentstudypredictsthatwithinthenextfewyearssuchsocialbankingplatformsmayhaveamarketshareoftenpercentoftheworldwidemarketforretaillendingandfinancialplanning(GartnerInc.2008).FortheUS,theP2PlendingmarketisestimatedtogrowtoavolumeofuptotenbillionUSDwithinthenext10years(Bruene2007).Weexaminemorethan14,000credittransactionsontheAmericanelectronicP2PlendingplatformP,coveringalltransactionsthattookplaceinthemarketbetween2005-11and2007-09.OuranalysisoftheP2Pcreditmarketstartswiththeobservationthat,despitethedirectmediationofloansinthemarketplace,newtypesofintermediariesemergeasmarketparticipantsprovidepaidintermediaryservices.Inthepaperwethenfocusonthefollowingquestions:
(1)Fromatheoreticalpointofview,howcantheseintermediariescreatevalueintheinteractionbetweenborrowersandlenders?
(2)Shouldallborrowersmakeuseofanintermediary,andcanitmakesensetopayforintermediaryservices?
(3)Fromtheborrowers'perspective,whatistheeconomicimpactofintermediationintheelectroniclendingmarketplace?
Ourempiricalanalysisisconfirmatoryinnature.Itisbasedontheliteratureonfinancialintermediation(e.g.,Diamond1984,LelandandPyle1976)fromwhichwederivehypothesesontheroleofintermediariesinelectronicmarketplaces.
2Intermediariesinelectroniccreditmarketplaces
2.1Electronicmarketplacesanddisintermediation
Marketsareessentialforeconomicactivityinmediatingthedemandforandsupplyofgoodsandservices.Intermediarieshelptofacilitatetransactionsbetweenbuyersandsellersby
(1)providingtransactionprocessingcapabilities,
(2)bringingenhancedlevelsofknowledgeandexpertise,and(3)addingtothetransactabilityofagivengoodorservice(ChircuandKauffman2000).
Theinternethasmadee-commercepossiblewhereelectronicmarketsarebecomingmoreimportantincoordinatingsupplyanddemand(Grieger2003,Segev,Gebauer,andFarber1999).Electronicmarketscanfacilitateeconomicactivityevenundercomplexandinsecureconditions(Cordella2006),significantlyreduceinformationandtransactioncosts,andmayinthiswaydisplacetraditionalintermediaries(Malone,Yates,andBenjamin1987).Manyauthorsarguethatonceelectronicmarketsemerge,traditionalintermediariesmaybethreatenedbyanelectronicbrokerageeffectalsocalleddisintermediation(foraliteratureoverviewseeChircuandKauffman2000).Insharpcontrasttothat,thetheoreticalcontributionsonelectronicmarketsanddisintermediationhavenotyetbeensupportedbyconvincingempiricalevidence(ChircuandKauffman2000,SenandKing2003).Moreover,thedisplacementoftraditionalintermediariesmayneveroccur.AuthorslikeSarkar,Butler,andSteinfield(1998)orHagelandSinger(1999)arguethatelectronicmarketsmayleadtonewformsofintermediation.
2.2Electroniclendingplatforms
Electroniclendingplatformsareelectronicmarketsthatmediatebetweenborrowersandlendersofloans.Wefocushereonconsumerloansbetweenindividualborrowersandlendersandexcludeplatformsforbondsorsyndicatedloans(Steelmann2006).TheelectroniccreditmarketplaceasawebsiteintheWorldWideWebconstitutesthegeneralconditionsforpeer-to-peerlendingandprovidestheadministrationofcurrentloans.Electroniclendingplatformsdifferinthewayloansareoriginated:
Someprovidersmediatebetweenborrowersandlendersthemselves,whereasotherprovidersmatchborrowers'creditlistingsandlenders'bidswithanauctionmechanism(Meyer2007).
Thelionshareofparticipantsinthemarketplaceareprivateindividuals,althoughthereareinstitutionallendersinvestinginsome,too.Therearenumerousprovidersthatoperatenationallyduetodifferingregulatoryframeworks.Table1providesanoverviewofthethreemajorAnglo-AmericanandGermanprovidersandtheirbusinessmodels.ArecentdevelopmentofthebusinessmodelofP2Plendingmarketplacesisthatlendersmaytradeloanspriortomaturity,increasingtheliquidityofP2Ploans.AsofFebruary2009,Prosperisstillintheprocess,whereasLendingClubhasalreadysuccessfullyregisteredwiththeSECtocreateasecondaryloanmarket.Despitedifferingbusinessmodels,thereisonedistinctivefeaturethatthesemarketplaceshaveincommon:
Transactionsinelectroniccreditmarketplacesoccuranonymouslybetweenfictitious"screennames".Therefore,informationisasymmetricallydistributedbetweenborrowersandlenders.Loansarenotcollateralizedandlendersfacetheinherentriskofdefault(Steelmann2006).
Despiteanonymousinteractions,loanlistingscontainadditionalinformationonpotentialborrowers.Lenderscanevaluateindividualcreditworthinessthroughquantitativeaswellasqualitativefigures.P,America'slargestpeer-topeerlendingmarketplace,providesanindividualratingandanindicatorofindebtednessincooperationwiththecreditreportingagencyExperianasthetwomainquantitativefigures.Theinformationalvalueofthesefiguresshouldbeconsideredhigh,althoughthedegreetowhichconsumercreditreportsareaccurate,completeorconsistentisindispute(Avery,Calem,Canner,andBostic2003).Mostplatformsgivemarketparticipantstheopportunitytoprovideadditionalpersonalinformationabouttheirbackground,theirfinancialstandingandthepurposeoftheloan.Thisqualitative,"soft"informationismandatoryanditsvalidityisapriorinotcontrolled.Borrowerstherebymighthaveanincentivetooveremphasizetheir"quality"(thepresentvalueoftheprospectiveprojects,theirfinancialstandingorpaymentbehavior)intheirpersonaldescriptions(moralhazard).
2.3GroupsonP
Inadditiontopersonalprofiles,borrowersandlenderscanformgroups.Thesesmallercommunitieswithinthemarketplacereviewandassessthecreditworthinessofindividualmembers.Groupsarepotentiallybeneficialformarketparticipantsbyprovidingandverifyinginformationorobtainingadditionalinformationaboutborrowersthatisnotpubliclyavailable.Groupslackdistinctownershipandgovernancefeaturesastheytypicallyexistincreditcooperatives(Davis2001,Taylor1971).Thereisnoownershipofthegroups,andthereisnocollectivedecisionmechanismonacceptinggroupmembersorgrantingloans.Furthermore,groupsdonotexclusivelydealwiththeirmembers.Atanytime,lendersfromoutsidethegroupmayinvestinagroupmember'sloanlisting.Thisimpliesthatthereisnorotationofmoneywithinthegroup,andnospecificallocationprocess.TherearetwopapersthatspecificallyexaminetheroleofgroupsontheP2PlendingwebsiteP:
FreedmanandJin(2008)usetransactiondatafrom200601-06until2008-07-31coveringaround290,000loanlistingsand25,000fundedloans.Theyfindevidencefortheideathatthemonitoringwithinsocialnetworksprovidesastrongerincentivetopayoffloansex-post:
Loanswithfriendendorsementsandfriendbidshavefewermissedpaymentsandyieldsignificantlyhigherratesofreturnthanotherloans.Everett(2008)looksattheinfluenceofgroupmembershiponloandefaultwithin13,486Prosperloans.Thedatasetcoversfundedloansfrom2006-05-31until2007-11-06andincorporatesexpostloanperformanceinformationuntil2008-05-07.Hefindsthatmembershipinagroupsignificantlydecreasesloandefaultriskifthegroupenforcesreal-lifepersonalconnectionslike,e.g.,employeesofthesamecompanyoralumniofacertainuniversity.Bothstudiespresentedabovelookatsocialnetworksinthecreditmarketbutdonotspecificallytakethegroupleaderintoaccount.Itis,however,notthegroupasaninstitutionperse,butthegroupleaderwhodecidesaboutmembership