P2P 网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融.docx

P2P 网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融.docx

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P2P网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融

本份文档包含：

关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述

一、外文文献

标题:

EmergenceofFinancialIntermediariesinElectronicMarkets:

TheCaseofOnlineP2PLending

作者:

Berger,SvenC;Gleisner,Fabian

期刊:

BusinessResearch；卷:

2；期:

1；页:

39-65；出版年份:

2009

EmergenceofFinancialIntermediariesinElectronicMarkets:

TheCaseofOnlineP2PLending

Abstract

Weanalyzetheroleofintermediariesinelectronicmarketsusingdetaileddataofmorethan14,000originatedloansonanelectronicP2P（peer-to-peer）lendingplatform.Insuchanelectroniccreditmarket,lendersbidtosupplyaprivateloan.Screeningofpotentialborrowersandthemonitoringofloanrepaymentcanbedelegatedtodesignatedgroupleaders.Wefindthatthesemarketparticipantsactasfinancialintermediariesandsignificantlyimproveborrowers'creditconditionsbyreducinginformationasymmetries,predominantlyforborrowerswithlessattractiveriskcharacteristics.Ourfindingsmaybesurprisinggiventhereplacementofabankbyanelectronicmarketplace.

Keywords:

Asymmetricinformation,intermediation,sociallending,electronicmarkets

1Introduction

Theevolutionofinformationtechnologyinrecentyearshasledtothedevelopmentofelectronicmarketplaceswheretraditionalintermediariesmaybelessimportantorevenredundantfortheeconomicinteractionofmarketparticipants（BenjaminandWigand1995,EvansandWurster1997,Malone,Yates,andBenjamin1987）.Withinthefinancialservicesindustry,thedebateaboutdisintermediationandthefuturerelevanceoffinancialintermediaries（AllenandSantomero2001,Nellis,McCaffery,andHutchinson2000,Schmidt,Hackethal,andTyrell1999）isfueledbytheincreasingroleofelectroniclendingmarkets（P2PLendingorSocialLending）whereanelectronicmarketplacereplacesabankasthetraditionalintermediaryandenablesthebrokerageofconsumerloansdirectlybetweenborrowersandlenders（HulmeandWright2006,Meyer2007）.Arecentstudypredictsthatwithinthenextfewyearssuchsocialbankingplatformsmayhaveamarketshareoftenpercentoftheworldwidemarketforretaillendingandfinancialplanning（GartnerInc.2008）.FortheUS,theP2PlendingmarketisestimatedtogrowtoavolumeofuptotenbillionUSDwithinthenext10years（Bruene2007）.Weexaminemorethan14,000credittransactionsontheAmericanelectronicP2PlendingplatformP,coveringalltransactionsthattookplaceinthemarketbetween2005-11and2007-09.OuranalysisoftheP2Pcreditmarketstartswiththeobservationthat,despitethedirectmediationofloansinthemarketplace,newtypesofintermediariesemergeasmarketparticipantsprovidepaidintermediaryservices.Inthepaperwethenfocusonthefollowingquestions:

（1）Fromatheoreticalpointofview,howcantheseintermediariescreatevalueintheinteractionbetweenborrowersandlenders?

（2）Shouldallborrowersmakeuseofanintermediary,andcanitmakesensetopayforintermediaryservices?

（3）Fromtheborrowers'perspective,whatistheeconomicimpactofintermediationintheelectroniclendingmarketplace?

Ourempiricalanalysisisconfirmatoryinnature.Itisbasedontheliteratureonfinancialintermediation（e.g.,Diamond1984,LelandandPyle1976）fromwhichwederivehypothesesontheroleofintermediariesinelectronicmarketplaces.

2Intermediariesinelectroniccreditmarketplaces

2.1Electronicmarketplacesanddisintermediation

Marketsareessentialforeconomicactivityinmediatingthedemandforandsupplyofgoodsandservices.Intermediarieshelptofacilitatetransactionsbetweenbuyersandsellersby

（1）providingtransactionprocessingcapabilities,

（2）bringingenhancedlevelsofknowledgeandexpertise,and（3）addingtothetransactabilityofagivengoodorservice（ChircuandKauffman2000）.

Theinternethasmadee-commercepossiblewhereelectronicmarketsarebecomingmoreimportantincoordinatingsupplyanddemand（Grieger2003,Segev,Gebauer,andFarber1999）.Electronicmarketscanfacilitateeconomicactivityevenundercomplexandinsecureconditions（Cordella2006）,significantlyreduceinformationandtransactioncosts,andmayinthiswaydisplacetraditionalintermediaries（Malone,Yates,andBenjamin1987）.Manyauthorsarguethatonceelectronicmarketsemerge,traditionalintermediariesmaybethreatenedbyanelectronicbrokerageeffectalsocalleddisintermediation（foraliteratureoverviewseeChircuandKauffman2000）.Insharpcontrasttothat,thetheoreticalcontributionsonelectronicmarketsanddisintermediationhavenotyetbeensupportedbyconvincingempiricalevidence（ChircuandKauffman2000,SenandKing2003）.Moreover,thedisplacementoftraditionalintermediariesmayneveroccur.AuthorslikeSarkar,Butler,andSteinfield（1998）orHagelandSinger（1999）arguethatelectronicmarketsmayleadtonewformsofintermediation.

2.2Electroniclendingplatforms

Electroniclendingplatformsareelectronicmarketsthatmediatebetweenborrowersandlendersofloans.Wefocushereonconsumerloansbetweenindividualborrowersandlendersandexcludeplatformsforbondsorsyndicatedloans（Steelmann2006）.TheelectroniccreditmarketplaceasawebsiteintheWorldWideWebconstitutesthegeneralconditionsforpeer-to-peerlendingandprovidestheadministrationofcurrentloans.Electroniclendingplatformsdifferinthewayloansareoriginated:

Someprovidersmediatebetweenborrowersandlendersthemselves,whereasotherprovidersmatchborrowers'creditlistingsandlenders'bidswithanauctionmechanism（Meyer2007）.

Thelionshareofparticipantsinthemarketplaceareprivateindividuals,althoughthereareinstitutionallendersinvestinginsome,too.Therearenumerousprovidersthatoperatenationallyduetodifferingregulatoryframeworks.Table1providesanoverviewofthethreemajorAnglo-AmericanandGermanprovidersandtheirbusinessmodels.ArecentdevelopmentofthebusinessmodelofP2Plendingmarketplacesisthatlendersmaytradeloanspriortomaturity,increasingtheliquidityofP2Ploans.AsofFebruary2009,Prosperisstillintheprocess,whereasLendingClubhasalreadysuccessfullyregisteredwiththeSECtocreateasecondaryloanmarket.Despitedifferingbusinessmodels,thereisonedistinctivefeaturethatthesemarketplaceshaveincommon:

Transactionsinelectroniccreditmarketplacesoccuranonymouslybetweenfictitious"screennames".Therefore,informationisasymmetricallydistributedbetweenborrowersandlenders.Loansarenotcollateralizedandlendersfacetheinherentriskofdefault（Steelmann2006）.

Despiteanonymousinteractions,loanlistingscontainadditionalinformationonpotentialborrowers.Lenderscanevaluateindividualcreditworthinessthroughquantitativeaswellasqualitativefigures.P,America'slargestpeer-topeerlendingmarketplace,providesanindividualratingandanindicatorofindebtednessincooperationwiththecreditreportingagencyExperianasthetwomainquantitativefigures.Theinformationalvalueofthesefiguresshouldbeconsideredhigh,althoughthedegreetowhichconsumercreditreportsareaccurate,completeorconsistentisindispute（Avery,Calem,Canner,andBostic2003）.Mostplatformsgivemarketparticipantstheopportunitytoprovideadditionalpersonalinformationabouttheirbackground,theirfinancialstandingandthepurposeoftheloan.Thisqualitative,"soft"informationismandatoryanditsvalidityisapriorinotcontrolled.Borrowerstherebymighthaveanincentivetooveremphasizetheir"quality"（thepresentvalueoftheprospectiveprojects,theirfinancialstandingorpaymentbehavior）intheirpersonaldescriptions（moralhazard）.

2.3GroupsonP

Inadditiontopersonalprofiles,borrowersandlenderscanformgroups.Thesesmallercommunitieswithinthemarketplacereviewandassessthecreditworthinessofindividualmembers.Groupsarepotentiallybeneficialformarketparticipantsbyprovidingandverifyinginformationorobtainingadditionalinformationaboutborrowersthatisnotpubliclyavailable.Groupslackdistinctownershipandgovernancefeaturesastheytypicallyexistincreditcooperatives（Davis2001,Taylor1971）.Thereisnoownershipofthegroups,andthereisnocollectivedecisionmechanismonacceptinggroupmembersorgrantingloans.Furthermore,groupsdonotexclusivelydealwiththeirmembers.Atanytime,lendersfromoutsidethegroupmayinvestinagroupmember'sloanlisting.Thisimpliesthatthereisnorotationofmoneywithinthegroup,andnospecificallocationprocess.TherearetwopapersthatspecificallyexaminetheroleofgroupsontheP2PlendingwebsiteP:

FreedmanandJin（2008）usetransactiondatafrom200601-06until2008-07-31coveringaround290,000loanlistingsand25,000fundedloans.Theyfindevidencefortheideathatthemonitoringwithinsocialnetworksprovidesastrongerincentivetopayoffloansex-post:

Loanswithfriendendorsementsandfriendbidshavefewermissedpaymentsandyieldsignificantlyhigherratesofreturnthanotherloans.Everett（2008）looksattheinfluenceofgroupmembershiponloandefaultwithin13,486Prosperloans.Thedatasetcoversfundedloansfrom2006-05-31until2007-11-06andincorporatesexpostloanperformanceinformationuntil2008-05-07.Hefindsthatmembershipinagroupsignificantlydecreasesloandefaultriskifthegroupenforcesreal-lifepersonalconnectionslike,e.g.,employeesofthesamecompanyoralumniofacertainuniversity.Bothstudiespresentedabovelookatsocialnetworksinthecreditmarketbutdonotspecificallytakethegroupleaderintoaccount.Itis,however,notthegroupasaninstitutionperse,butthegroupleaderwhodecidesaboutmembership