外文翻译税收筹划.docx

外文翻译税收筹划.docx

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外文翻译税收筹划

外文文献翻译

2011届

译文一：

企业税收筹划的有效性：

基于对报酬的激励作用（上）

译文二：

企业税收筹划的有效性：

基于对报酬的激励作用（下）

学生姓名周伟

学号07062136

院系经济与管理学院

专业会计

指导教师许庆高

完成日期2010年12月2日

CorporateTax-PlanningEffectiveness:

TheRoleofCompensation-BasedIncentives（Ⅰ）

JohnD.PhillipsUniversityofConnecticut

ABSTRACT

Thisstudyinvestigateswhethercompensatingchiefexecutiveofficersandbusiness-unitmanagersusingafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresleadstolowereffectivetaxrates,theempiricalsurrogateusedfortax-planningeffectiveness.Utilizingproprietarycompensationdataobtainedinasurveyofcorporateexecutives,therelationbetweeneffectivetaxratesandafter-taxperformancemeasuresismodeledandestimatedusingatwo-stepapproachthatcorrectsfortheendogeneitybiasassociatedwithfirms'decisionstocompensatemanagersonapre-versusafter-taxbasis.Theresultsareconsistentwiththehypothesisthatcompensatingbusiness-unitmanagers,butnotchiefexecutiveofficers,onanafter-taxbasisleadstolowereffectivetaxrates.

KEYWORDStaxplanning;performancemeasures;endogenoustreatmenteffects.

I.INTRODUCTION

Effectivetaxplanning,definedbyScholesetal.（2002）astaxplanningthatmaximizesthefirm'sexpecteddiscountedafter-taxcashflows,requiresmanagerstoconsidertheirdecisions'after-taxconsequences.Inthispaper,Iinvestigatewhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresleadtolowereffectivetaxrates（ETR）,myempiricalsurrogatefortaxplanningeffectiveness.1TheETR,anincome-statement-basedoutcomemeasurecalculatedastheratiooftotalincometaxexpensetopre-taxincome,generallymeasurestheeffectivenessoftaxreductionstrategiesthatleadtohigherafter-taxincome.AlowerETR,however,canonlyproxyfortaxsavingsanddoesnotalwaysimplythatafter-taxincomeand/orcashflowshavebeenmaximized.2Despitethislimitation,theETRhasbeenusedtomeasuretheeffectivenessofspendingonthetaxfunction（Millsetal.1998）andcorporatetaxdepartmentperformance（Douglasetal.1996）.Also,loweringtheETRisfrequentlycitedasawaytoincreaseearnings（e.g.,Ziegler1997）andincreaseshareprice（e.g.,Mintz1999;Swenson1999）.

Accountingresearchhasaddressedtherelationbetweenaccounting-basedcompensationandmanagers'actions（e.g.,Larcker1983;Healy1985;Wallace1997）.Thispaperisthefirsttoaddresswhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresmotivatemanagerstotakeactionsthathelplowertheirfirms'ETRanddoessoatboththechiefexecutiveofficer（CEO）andbusiness-unit（SBU）managerlevels.Priorafter-taxperformancemeasureresearchhasfocusedonlyonthedeterminantsofcompensationCEOsusingpre-versusafter-taxearnings（e.g.,Newman1989;CarnesandGuffey2000;Atwoodetal.1998;Dhaliwaletal.2000）andprovidesnoevidenceconcerningafter-taxcompensation'seffectivenessinloweringafirm'staxliability.ExtendingthisinvestigationtotheSBUlevelismotivatedoutoftheapparentconflictbetweenargumentsthattaxesshouldbeallocatedtoSBUforincentivecompensationpurposes（e.g.,McLemore1997）withempiricalobservationsthatamajorityoffirmsdonotdoso（e.g.,Douglasetal.1996）.4ThecurrentinvestigationprovidesevidenceconcerningtheincrementaleffectivenessofexplicitlymotivatingCEOsandSBUmanagerstoincorporatetaxconsequencesintotheiroperatingandinvestmentdecisions.

Acommonissueincross-sectionalstudiesthatattempttolinkaparticularmanagementaccountingchoicetoanoutcomemeasureisthatallsamplefirmsmaybeoptimizingwithrespecttothechoicebeinginvestigated（IttnerandLarcker2001）.Withoutaddressingtheendogeneityofafirm'schoice,itisdifficulttoprovideevidenceconsistentwiththischoiceleadingtoanimprovedoutcome.Toaddressthisissue,therelationbetweenETRandCEOandSBU-managerafter-taxperformancemeasuresisestimatedusingatwo-stepapproachthathelpscorrectforthepotentialendogeneitybiasassociatedwiththesetwochoicevariables.Asafirststepinimplementingthisapproach,theAntleandDemski（1988）controllabilityprincipleisusedtomodelafirm'sdecisionstoadoptafter-taxCEOandSBU-managerperformancemeasures.Toincludeaparticularmeasureinamanager'scompensationcontract,thisprinciplerequiresthattheexpectedbenefitsfromholdingamanagerresponsibleforameasuremustbegreaterthantheadditionalwagethatmustbepaidtocompensatethemanagerfortheresultingadditionalriskandeffort.Accordingly,anafter-taxperformancemeasureshouldbeusedasacontractingvariableinamanager'sincentivecompensationcontractonlyifthemanager'sinvolvementintax-planningeffortsleadstoadifferencebetweenpre-taxandafter-taxaccountingresults,whichisgenerallyreflectedintheETR.Consistentwithpriorresearch,thepre-versusafter-taxCEOandSBU-managerselectionmodelsincludevariablesthatcontrolforafirm'stax-planningopportunitiesbecausethepresenceofsuchopportunitiesreflecttheextenttowhichamanager'sactionscanbeexpectedtolowertheETR.

Evenifamanager'seffortsareexpectedtoleadtoalowerETR,afirmwilluseanafter-taxperformancemeasureonlyiftheexpectedbenefitsexceedtheexpectedcostsofdoingso.Anafter-taxperformancemeasureisexpectedtoleadtoalowerETRbecauseitmotivatesthemanager'sincreasedcooperationwithtaxprofessionalstohelpidentify,develop,andexecutetax-planningstrategies.McLemore（1997,1）citesHewlettPackard'staxdirectortosupporttheneedforSBU-managerinvolvementintax-planningefforts:

Taxplanningisonlyasgoodasbeinginvolvedintheearlystagesofsuchthingsasbusinessplanning,strategicplanning,andmergerandacquisitionwork....Yourtaxdepartmenthastoberepresentedatthetablewhenthosedecisionsaremade.Theevolvingmodelforthefutureisthetightintegrationoftaxpeoplewithbusinessunitplanning.

Costsassociatedwithusingafter-taxperformancemeasuresincludetheadditionalwagethatmustbepaidtocompensatethemanagerfortheincreasedriskduetopotentialtaxlawchangesandtheincreasedeffortthatresultsfromincludingincometaxexpenseinthecompensationcontract.Otherpotentialcostsassociatedwithafter-taxcompensationincludetheadministrativecostofallocatingtaxexpensetoafirm'sSBU,increasedtaxexaminationcosts,andincreasedtaxauthorityscrutiny.Contrarytomeasuringafter-taxcompensation'sbenefitsviaobservedETR,therearenoclearempiricalsurrogatesforafter-taxperformancemeasures'costs.Thisstudythusfocusesontherealizedbenefitsofcompensatingmanagersonanafter-taxbasisbutdoesnotprovideevidenceoftheassociatedcosts'magnitude.

Proprietarydataobtainedinasurveyofcorporateexecutivesareusedtoconstructcertaintestvariables,includingthoseindicatingwhetherCEOsandSBUmanagersarecompensatedusingafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasures.PubliclyavailabledataareusedtoconstructETRandothertestvariables.TheresultsareconsistentwiththehypothesisthatcompensatingSBUmanagers,butnotCEOs,onanafter-taxbasisleadstolowerETR,resultinginanestimatedmediantaxsavingsof$13.3millionannually.SensitivitytestsperformedonasubsampleoffirmswithhighsimulatedMTR（Graham1996）providefurtherevidencethatlow-MTRfirms'potentialETR-loweringactionsthatcouldhaveambiguouseffectsoncashflowsandafter-taxprofitsarenotdrivingthisresult.Furthersensitivitytestshelpruleouttheproportionoftaxfunctionoutsourcingasanalternativeexplanationforthestatisticallyandeconomicallysignificantnegativerelationbetweenafter-taxSBU-managercompensationandETR.

Theresultscontributetotheaccounting-basedcompensationliteraturebylinkingafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasurestoSBU-managerinvolvementthatisincrementallyeffectiveinloweringfirms'ETR.ConsistentwithGuidryetal.（1999）whodocumentbonus-inducedearningsmanagementattheSBUlevel,thisfindingprovidesadditionalinsightintotheeffectthatSBU-manageraccounting-basedincentiveshaveonmanagers'actions.Also,theestimatedexplicittaxsavingsresultingfromafter-taxperformancemeasuresprovidecorporatedecisionmakerswithinformationrelevanttothedesignofSBU-managerincentivecompensationplans.

Thepaperproceedsasfollows.Thenextsectionsetsforththehypothesestestedinthisstudy.SectionIIIoutlinestheempiricalmodelsandestimationproceduresusedintestingthesehypotheses.SectionIVprovidesadiscussionofthedataandsample,includingabriefoverviewofthesurveyusedtoobtainproprietarycompensationdata.ResultsarepresentedinSectionV.Thefinalsectionprovidestheconclusionandadiscussionofthestudy'slimitations.

II.HYPOTHESISDEVELOPMENT

Newman（1989）,CaresandGuffey（2000）,andAtwoodetal.（1998）investigatefirms'choicesofafter-taxearningsasthecontractingvariableinCEObonusplans.Thesestudieshypothesizethatfirmswithgreatertax-planningopportunities,consistentwiththeAntleandDemski（1988）controllabilityprinciple,aremorelikelytouseafter-taxperformancemeasures.Usingproxiesfortax-planningopportunities,thesestudiescollectivelyfindthatmultinationalstatus,numberofoperatingsegments,firmsize,andcapitalintensityarepositivelyassociatedwithafter-taxCEOcompensation.Atwoodetal.（1998）alsopresentsevidencethatleverageisnegativelyassociatedwiththischoice.

企业税收筹划的有效性：

基于对报酬的激励作用（上）

约翰D·菲利普斯康涅狄格大学

摘要

本研究探讨首席执行官是否修正主管和业务部门经理利用税后会计为基础的绩效措施，导致较低的实际税率，以报酬激励用于税收筹划的有效性。

企业的主管由于被激励获得的专有报酬的数据，运用建模和估计这两个步骤来研究有效