外文翻译税收筹划.docx

1、外文翻译税收筹划外文文献翻译2011 届译文一：企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用（上）译文二：企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用（下） 学生姓名 周伟 学 号 07062136 院 系 经济与管理学院 专 业 会计 指导教师 许庆高 完成日期 2010年12月2日 Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives ()John D. Phillips University of ConnecticutABSTRACTThis study investigates wh

2、ether compensating chief executive officers and business-unit managers using after-tax accounting-based performance measures leads to lower effective tax rates, the empirical surrogate used for tax-planning effectiveness. Utilizing proprietary compensation data obtained in a survey of corporate exec

3、utives, the relation between effective tax rates and after-tax performance measures is modeled and estimated using a two-step approach that corrects for the endogeneity bias associated with firms decisions to compensate managers on a pre- versus after-tax basis. The results are consistent with the h

4、ypothesis that compensating business-unit managers, but not chief executive officers, on an after-tax basis leads to lower effective tax rates.KEYWORDS tax planning; performance measures; endogenous treatment effects.I. INTRODUCTIONEffective tax planning, defined by Scholes et al. (2002) as tax plan

5、ning that maximizes the firms expected discounted after-tax cash flows, requires managers to consider their decisions after-tax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax p

6、lanning effectiveness.1 The ETR, an income-statement-based outcome measure calculated as the ratio of total income tax expense to pre-tax income, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher after-tax income. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy for tax saving

7、s and does not always imply that after-tax income and/or cash flows have been maximized.2 Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on the tax function (Mills et al. 1998) and corporate tax department performance (Douglas et al. 1996). Also, lowering the

8、 ETR is frequently cited as a way to increase earnings (e.g., Ziegler 1997) and increase share price (e.g., Mintz 1999; Swenson 1999). Accounting research has addressed the relation between accounting-based compensation and managers actions (e.g., Larcker 1983; Healy 1985; Wallace 1997). This paper

9、is the first to address whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures motivate managers to take actions that help lower their firms ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and business-unit (SBU) manager levels. Prior after-tax performance measure research has focused onl

10、y on the determinants of compensation CEOs using pre- versus after-tax earnings (e.g., Newman 1989; Carnes and Guffey 2000; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2000) and provides no evidence concerning after-tax compensations effectiveness in lowering a firms tax liability. Extending this investigat

11、ion to the SBU level is motivated out of the apparent conflict between arguments that taxes should be allocated to SBU for incentive compensation purposes (e.g., McLemore 1997) with empirical observations that a majority of firms do not do so (e.g., Douglas et al. 1996).4 The current investigation p

12、rovides evidence concerning the incremental effectiveness of explicitly motivating CEOs and SBU managers to incorporate tax consequences into their operating and investment decisions. A common issue in cross-sectional studies that attempt to link a particular management accounting choice to an outco

13、me measure is that all sample firms may be optimizing with respect to the choice being investigated (Ittner and Larcker 2001). Without addressing the endogeneity of a firms choice, it is difficult to provide evidence consistent with this choice leading to an improved outcome. To address this issue,

14、the relation between ETR and CEO and SBU-manager after-tax performance measures is estimated using a two-step approach that helps correct for the potential endogeneity bias associated with these two choice variables. As a first step in implementing this approach, the Antle and Demski (1988) controll

15、ability principle is used to model a firms decisions to adopt after-tax CEO and SBU-manager performance measures. To include a particular measure in a managers compensation contract, this principle requires that the expected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measure must be greater t

16、han the additional wage that must be paid to compensate the manager for the resulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after- tax performance measure should be used as a contracting variable in a managers incentive compensation contract only if the managers involvement in tax-planning eff

17、orts leads to a difference between pre-tax and after-tax accounting results, which is generally reflected in the ETR. Consistent with prior research, the pre- versus after-tax CEO and SBU-manager selection models include variables that control for a firms tax-planning opportunities because the prese

18、nce of such opportunities reflect the extent to which a managers actions can be expected to lower the ETR. Even if a managers efforts are expected to lead to a lower ETR, a firm will use an after-tax performance measure only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs of doing so. An after-ta

19、x performance measure is expected to lead to a lower ETR because it motivates the managers increased cooperation with tax professionals to help identify, develop, and execute tax-planning strategies. McLemore (1997, 1) cites Hewlett Packards tax director to support the need for SBU-manager involveme

20、nt in tax-planning efforts: Tax planning is only as good as being involved in the early stages of such things as business planning, strategic planning, and merger and acquisition work.Your tax department has to be represented at the table when those decisions are made. The evolving model for the fut

21、ure is the tight integration of tax people with business unit planning. Costs associated with using after-tax performance measures include the additional wage that must be paid to compensate the manager for the increased risk due to potential tax law changes and the increased effort that results fro

22、m including income tax expense in the compensation contract. Other potential costs associated with after-tax compensation include the administrative cost of allocating tax expense to a firms SBU, increased tax examination costs, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Contrary to measuring after-tax c

23、ompensations benefits via observed ETR, there are no clear empirical surrogates for after-tax performance measures costs. This study thus focuses on the realized benefits of compensating managers on an after-tax basis but does not provide evidence of the associated costs magnitude. Proprietary data

24、obtained in a survey of corporate executives are used to construct certain test variables, including those indicating whether CEOs and SBU managers are compensated using after-tax accounting-based performance measures. Publicly available data are used to construct ETR and other test variables. The r

25、esults are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating SBU managers, but not CEOs, on an after-tax basis leads to lower ETR, resulting in an estimated median tax savings of $13.3 million annually. Sensitivity tests performed on a subsample of firms with high simulated MTR (Graham 1996) provide

26、further evidence that low-MTR firms potential ETR-lowering actions that could have ambiguous effects on cash flows and after-tax profits are not driving this result. Further sensitivity tests help rule out the proportion of tax function outsourcing as an alternative explanation for the statistically

27、 and economically significant negative relation between after- tax SBU-manager compensation and ETR. The results contribute to the accounting-based compensation literature by linking after- tax accounting-based performance measures to SBU-manager involvement that is incrementally effective in loweri

28、ng firms ETR. Consistent with Guidry et al. (1999) who document bonus-induced earnings management at the SBU level, this finding provides additional insight into the effect that SBU-manager accounting-based incentives have on managers actions. Also, the estimated explicit tax savings resulting from

29、after-tax performance measures provide corporate decision makers with information relevant to the design of SBU-manager incentive compensation plans. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets forth the hypotheses tested in this study. Section III outlines the empirical models and estimati

30、on procedures used in testing these hypotheses. Section IV provides a discussion of the data and sample, including a brief overview of the survey used to obtain proprietary compensation data. Results are presented in Section V. The final section provides the conclusion and a discussion of the studys

31、 limitations.II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Newman (1989), Cares and Guffey (2000), and Atwood et al. (1998) investigate firms choices of after-tax earnings as the contracting variable in CEO bonus plans. These studies hypothesize that firms with greater tax-planning opportunities, consistent with the A

32、ntle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, are more likely to use after-tax performance measures. Using proxies for tax-planning opportunities, these studies collectively find that multinational status, number of operating segments, firm size, and capital intensity are positively associated with after-tax CEO compensation. Atwood et al. (1998) also presents evidence that leverage is negatively associated with this choice.企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用（上）约翰D 菲利普斯 康涅狄格大学摘 要本研究探讨首席执行官是否修正主管和业务部门经理利用税后会计为基础的绩效措施，导致较低的实际税率，以报酬激励用于税收筹划的有效性。企业的主管由于被激励获得的专有报酬的数据，运用建模和估计这两个步骤来研究有效