外文翻译绩效管理最大的问题管理者为什么使用绩效信息.docx

外文翻译绩效管理最大的问题管理者为什么使用绩效信息.docx

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外文翻译绩效管理最大的问题管理者为什么使用绩效信息

外文翻译--绩效管理最大的问题：

管理者为什么使用绩效信息？

外文翻译--绩效管理最大的问题:

管理者为什么使用绩

效信息,

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

外文出处JournalofPublicAdministrationResearchandTheory

外文作者Moynihan,Pandey

原文:

TheBigQuestionforPerformanceManagement:

WhyDoManagersUsePerformanceInformation?

Moynihan,Pandey

AMODELOFPERFORMANCEINFORMATIONUSE

PreviousResearch

Thereareanumberofempiricalpiecesonperformanceinformationuseinthepublicsector,andthemajorityofsuchresearchisrecent.Heinrich1999notedthatmostempiricalevidencecamefromtheprivatesector.Herstudyofperformancestandardsinjobtrainingfoundthatdatawereusedbutmuchdependeduponthedesignoftheoverallperformancesystemandthattherewaslittletoguidedesignersbeyondneoclassicaleconomicargumentsforfinancialincentives.

Sincethen,moreresearchhasemergedtoofferalternativesto

neoclassicalmodels,

usuallyrelyingonself-reportedsurveydata.Itappearsfairtoassertthatthisprevious

workhasnotresultedinacommonoroverarchingtheoryofperformanceinformation

use.deLancerJulnesandHolzer2001theorizedabasicdistinctionbetweenrational/technocraticandpolitical/culturalfactors.Otherresearchhasfocusedmoreonexplicitlypoliticalvariables.BourdeauxandChikoto2008examinedtheroleofthegovernor,thelegislature,andthestatepoliticalcontext.MelkersandWilloughby2005categorizedvariablesintermsofcommunitycharacteristics,respondentcharacteristics,organizationalculture,andperformancemeasurementcharacteristics.MoynihanandIngraham2004andDull2009bothplacedtheroleofleadershipascentral.ThestudybyAskim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008ofmunicipalbenchmarkingnetworksinNorwayexaminednetworkcharacteristics,administrativefactors,politicalvariables,taskcharacteristics,andhistorydependence.MoynihanandLanduyt2009characterizedperformanceinformationuseasanelementoforganizationallearningandidentifiedstructuralandculturalvariablesthatpredictsuchuse.

Manyoftheresultsofsuchresearcharediscussedbelowinthecontextofspecific

hypothesesinordertoindicatewherethisarticlebuildsuponanddepartsfrompreviousresearch.Here,wesummarizesomeoftheadditionalfindingsofthisresearchthatarenotdirectlytiedtoourmodel.Someofthesefindingsresultfromtestingsimilarvariablesacrossmodels.Forexample,theprovisionofadequateresourceshasbeenconsistentlyfoundtobeassociatedwithperformanceinformationuseAskim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008;deLancerJulnesandHolzer2001;MoynihanandLanduyt2009.TheexistenceofdedicatedlearningforumsisalsoassociatedwithuseAskim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008;MoynihanandLanduyt2009.EvidencefromUSstategovernmentsandNorwegianmunicipalgovernmentsassociatesperformanceinformationusewithmoreliberalpoliticalsettingsAskim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008;BourdeauxandChikoto2008;MoynihanandIngraham2004.Thereismixedevidenceonsize.LargerUSstategovernmentshavebeenassociatedwithperformanceinformationuseBourdeauxand

Chikoto2008;MoynihanandIngraham2004,butsmallergovernmentsweremorelikelytouseperformancedataamongNorwegianmunicipalities.PoliticalcompetitionAskim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008hasbeenfoundtobepositivelyassociatedwithuse,althoughothermodelshavenotfoundsignificantresultsMoynihanandIngraham2004,andinsomeinstances,politicalconflicthasbeenshowntohaveanegativeornonsignificanteffectDull2009.Thepresenceofbasicbureaucratic

competenceandexpertiseinperformancemanagementisassociatedwithuseBourdeauxandChikoto2008;Dull2009.Measuresoflegislativeinvolvementvaryintheirinfluenceonuseamongexecutivebranchofficials,rangingfrompositiveBourdeauxandChikoto2008,negativeMoynihanandIngraham2004,tononsignificantDull2009.

Otherfindingsarespecifictoparticularstudies.Thefollowingvariableshavebeen

foundtobepositivelyassociatedwithperformanceinformationuse:

administrativestabilityAskim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008;internalrequirementsandlowerlevelsofgovernmentdeLancerJulnesandHolzer2001;inclusionoforganizationalmembersinperformancemanagementprocessesMelkersandWilloughby2005;andchiefexecutivepowerBourdeauxandChikoto2008.FactorsthathavebeennegativelyassociatedwithperformanceinformationuseincludeeffortsbythecentralagencytocontrolthepolicyagendaMoynihanandIngraham2004andmeasurementchallengesDull2009.

Qualitativeworkhasexaminedfewervariablesandhasgenerallynotattemptedtoconstructformalmodels.Butithasidentifiedsomecommonfindingsthatoverlapwithmuchofthequantitativeworkcitedabove.LeadershipandorganizationalculturearerecurringthemesBroadnaxandConway2001;Franklin2000;Moynihan2005.Radin2006pointsoutthatsometasksaremorecompatiblewithperformancemanagementthanothers,

whereasAmmonsandRivenbark2008findthatthequalityofperformancedatamatters.

ConceptualizingPerformanceInformationUseasOrganizationalBehavior

Weconceptualizeperformanceinformationuseasaformoforganizationalbehavior.Likeotherformsoforganizationalbehavior,employeeshavediscretionaboutwhetherandthedegreetowhichtheyengageinitbutareinfluencedbythesocialcontextandformalsystemsinwhichtheywork.Wetestcategoriesofvariablesconsistentwiththisconceptualization,incorporatingindividualbeliefs,jobattributes,organizationalfactors,andenvironmentalinfluences.

Ourmodeldrawsuponsomeofthevariablesusedinpreviousresearch,althoughweseektousealternativemeasuresoftheunderlyingconcept.Forexample,ratherthanmeasureleadershipsupportforperformancemanagement,wemeasurewhethertheleaderisinageneralistofspecialistposition.Ratherthanmeasurepublicparticipationinperformancemanagementroutines,wemeasureifmoregeneralformsofparticipationmatter.Themodelalsoincludesvariableswhoserelationshipwiththedependentvariablehasbeenpreviouslyuntested,includingpublicservicemotivationPSM,rewardexpectations,roleclarity,task-specificexperience,theroleofbudgetofficials,andtheinfluenceofprofessionalorganizations.

IndividualBeliefs

Thereissignificantevidencethataltruisticbeliefsaffectpublicemployeebehaviorinwaysthatbenefittheorganization.MuchofthisevidencefallsundertherubricofthePSMconceptseePerryandHondeghem2008.HighPSMemployeesexhibithigherlevelsoforganizationalcommitment,enjoyhigherjobsatisfaction,experiencegreaterjobinvolvement,andrequirelessextrinsicrewardsPandeyandStazyk2008.ThereisalsoevidencethatPSMfosterspositivecitizenshipbehaviorbothinternalPandey,Wright,andMoynihan2008andexternaltotheorganizationBrewer2003;Houston2006.

Therehas,thusfar,beensurprisinglylittleinvestigationintohowPSMmightaffectorganizationaldecisionmaking.TherearetworeasonstoassumethatPSMmightfosterperformanceinformationuse.First,performanceinformationuseinvolvescostsfortheemployees.Performanceinformationuseisabehaviorthatimposescostsontheemployee.Itdisplacestraditionalmodesofdecisionmakingandheuristics,whileaddinganotherdecisioncriterion,makingdecisionprocessesmoreratherthanlesscomplex.Althoughusingperformancedatamightgenerateorganizationalbenefits,individualbenefitsareunlikelyoruncertain.Itthusresemblesaformofextra-rolebehaviorwhereemployeesmakegiftsoftheirtimeandefforttotheorganizationwithouttheexpectationofindividualreward.1Suchbehaviorislikelytobeexhibitedbyemployees

drivenbyprosocialoraltruisticmotives.Second,itisplausiblethathighPSMemployeesidentifywithandcareabouttheachievementforganizationalgoals.IthasbeenproposedthatPSMfostershigherindividualandorganizationalperformance,althoughwithoutdefinitiveevidenceBrewer2008.IfhighPSMemployeesseeperformanceinformationuseasameansofachievingorganizationalgoals,theymayalsoseeitasameanstofulfilltheirdesiretoserve.

H1ManagerswithhigherlevelsofPSMaremorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

H2Managerswhoperceivealinkbetweenextrinsicrewardsandperformancearemorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

H3Task-specificleadersaremorelikelytouseperformanceinformationthangeneralistleaders.

H4Managerswithgreatertask-specificexperiencearemorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

H5Managerswhoperceiveperformanceinformationisavailableandtiedtomanagementsystemsaremorelikelytouseit.

H6Adevelopmentalorganizationalculturefostersperformanceinformationuse.

H7Managerswhoperceivedecisionflexibilityaremorelikelytouseperformance

information.

H9Thewillingnessofbudgetstafftoadoptanadversarialstanceaffectsperformanceinformationuse.

H10Perceptionsofcitizenparticipationaffectsperformanceinformationuse.

H11Managersinfluencedbyprofessionalorganizationsaremorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

CONCLUSION

Thisarticlearguesforexaminingperformanceinformationuseasakeyvariableifwearetodevelopsystematicknowledgeaboutcontemporarygovernance.Theusualcaveatsandflawsofcross-sectionalsurveydataapply.Inparticular,thepotentialthatcommonsourcebiasinflatestherelationshipbetweenindependentvariablesandthedependentvariablecannotbedismissed.Butintestingsuchrelationships,capturingalargenumberofcomparableindividualresponsesonitemsthataredifficulttoexternallyobserve―suchasPSMorculture