Air Force strategy study looks to long.docx

Air Force strategy study looks to long.docx

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AirForcestrategystudylookstolong

AirForcestrategystudylookstolong-termcriticalcapabilities

WiththeendoftheColdWar,theAirForce,likeitssisterservices,facedafundamentalchallengetoitsraisond’être.Whileaperiodofreflectionwouldtypicallyfollowsuchasignificantchange

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WiththeendoftheColdWar,theAirForce,likeitssisterservices,facedafundamentalchallengetoitsraisond’être.Whileaperiodofreflectionwouldtypicallyfollowsuchasignificantchange,theAirForcewasembarkedontwodecadesofcontinuousoperationsthatbeganwithDesertShield/DesertStormandcontinuedtotheconflictsinAfghanistanandIraq.Theseoperationsoccurredsimultaneouslywithdramaticpersonnel,platformandinfrastructurereductionsandreorganization.Thelackof“downtime”forintrospectionleftairmenwithlittleopportunitytocontemplatethelonger-termstrategicimperativesshapingtheAirForce’sfuture.

WithOperationIraqiFreedomrecentlyendedandtroopreductionsinAfghanistanscheduledtobeginthisyear,arenaissanceofstrategicthinkinghasbegunwithintheAirForce.Tospurbroaderstrategicdiscussion,thisarticlediscussesfindingsoftheAirForceResearchInstitute’srecentAirForceStrategyStudy2020-2030,whichaddressesasinglequestion:

WhatcriticalcapabilitieswillthenationrequireoftheAirForceby2030?

Currenttrends（drivers）suggestthattheAirForceshouldfocusitseffortsandresourcesonfivecriticalcapabilitiesincomingdecades:

powerprojection;freedomofactioninair,spaceandcyber;globalsituationalawareness;airdiplomacy;andmilitarysupporttocivilauthorities（MSCA）.AirForcesuccessintheseareaswilldependontheservice’sabilitytointegratecapabilitiesacrossair,spaceandcyberdomains.Airmenwillsucceedorfailbasedontheirabilitytoachieveacombatantcommander’sdesiredeffectsthrougheachoperationaldomain.

U.S.interestsareshiftingtoAsia.Thiswillplaceincreasingdemandonlong-rangepowerprojection—theAirForce’ssinglemostimportantcontribution.DefendingincreasinginterestsinAsiawilldoublethedistancesthemilitarymusttraveltoreachbasesandtargets.IntheAsia-centeredworldofthecomingdecades,theU.S.willneitheremploylargegroundforcesnorwillitsNavybeabletooperateclosetotheshoresofsomepotentialadversaries.PreparingforthisfuturewillplacesignificantdemandonanAirForcelargelydesignedforcurrentconflicts.Thus,ashiftinfocusisrequired.

POWERPROJECTION

Inaglobalsecurityenvironmentmarkedbyproliferationofadvancedanti-accessandarea-denialsystems,Americanforceswillfinditincreasinglydifficulttoestablishsecurebaseswithinstrikingdistanceofadversaries,increasingthedemandforlong-rangepowerprojection—principallylong-rangestrike.

ThekeychallengeforpotentialadversariesistodenytheU.S.accesstobasesandtargets.MostcannotcompetewithU.S.technologicaladvantagesinthenearterm;however,thisadvantageisdeclining.Battlefieldsofthefuturemaymoreresembletherecentcyber-centricRussian-GeorgianconflictthanIraqorAfghanistan,whichmeansthefirstsalvosmaynotbedetecteduntilsecond-andthird-ordereffectsofinitialstrikesaremanifest.

AccordingtotheQuadrennialDefenseReviewreport,“Thefutureoperationallandscapecouldalsoportendsignificantlong-durationairandmaritimecampaigns.”Tomeetthesechallenges,theAirForcemustprevailinenvironmentswhereadversarieshaveanunprecedentedabilitytodenyAmericanlandandnavalforcesaccess.Fourrecommendationsmayassistinmeetingfuturepower-projectionrequirements.

First,theAirForcemustbeginfusingair,spaceandcybercapabilitiesintocurrentandfutureplatformsandsystems.Forexample,aircraftrelyonGPS—aspaceasset—andarangeofcybersystems,butmuchmoreispossible.

Second,theservicemustrefineitspower-projectionflexibility.Optionsmustbescalablefromthehighend（F-35）tothelowend（lightattack）.Therefore,itshoulddevelop“generalpurpose”forcestooperatewithalliesbeyondconventionalpower-projectionroles—preservingnecessarycombatcapabilitiesformajorcontingencies.Asrecentlydemonstrated,themostcapableaircraftarenotalwaysnecessaryinirregularconflicts.

Third,developingunmannedplatformsenhancedbyartificialintelligencewillsupporttheconventionalpower-projectionmission.Suchsystemsmayprovecriticalpsychologicaltoolsinpeercompetition,whereanadversaryviewshisemploymentasareasontocooperatewiththeU.S.

Fourth,offensiveanddefensivecybercapabilitiesmustbefusedintoairandspaceplatforms.Cybercapabilitiesmaysoonbecomethegreatestpower-projectiontoolsintheAirForcearsenal,servingasforcemultipliers.SeveralnationsclearlyequalorleadtheU.S.intheirabilitytolaunchcyberattacks.DespiteAirForceattemptstoorganize,trainandequiptomeetcyberrequirements,theservice’sabilitytoconductcyberoperationsremainsunassured.

FREEDOMOFACTION

Freedomofactionacrossalldomainsofair,spaceandcyberisnecessarytoprojectpower.Thispointisworthnotingasthediscussionturnstothecontinuingimportanceofairsuperiority.

WiththeF-22andF-35likelytoserveasthenation’sprincipalairsuperiorityplatformsuntilatleast2030,relativelyinexpensiveforcemultiplierssuchasautonomousunmannedplatforms,human-computerenhancementsandcyber-attackcapabilitiesarekeytoimprovingAirForcecapabilities.Withadvancesinautonomoussystems,cyberattackandhumanperformanceaugmentationpossible,threerecommendationsarerelevant.

First,stealthy,high-performance,autonomousaircraftcanaugmentthenumbersandcapabilitiesoffifth-generationfighters,replacingthelostcontributionoflegacyfightersrelegatedtosupportingrolesbeforetheyarephasedout.

Second,augmentinghumanperformancecan“achievecapabilityincreasesandcostsavingsviaincreasedmanpowerefficienciesandreducedmanpowerneeds,”accordingtotheOfficeoftheAirForceChiefScientist’s“ReportonTechnologyHorizons.”Thiswillproveusefulasweaponsystemsbecomeincreasinglycomplexanddependentonadvancedman-machineinterfaces.

Third,aircraft-mounted,cyberattacksystemscapableofpenetratinganddisruptingthesoftwareofadversaryaircraft,radarandothersystemscanserveasakeyforcemultiplierforasmallerfleetofair-superiorityaircraft.Cyberisnomagicbulletbutcertainlyanareainwhichinvestmentsmaypaysignificantdividends.

AdversariesoftheU.S.continuouslydevelopnewmeansofchallengingAmericanairsuperiority.Denyingtheirsuccessrequirescontinuallyimprovingsystemsandchangingtactics,techniquesandprocedures.

SPACESUPERIORITY

TheAirForcemustachievespacesuperiority.Theprincipalobjectiveoverthenext20yearsmustbetoexertcontroloverspacetomaketheconceptofspacesuperiorityareality.Whilespaceisunlikelytobecomeadomainthroughwhichkineticeffectsaredeliveredinthenearterm,challengestoAmericanpre-eminencemayeventuallyleadtospace-basedweapons.DenialofspacewouldsignificantlydegradeU.S.civilandmilitaryoperationsinalldomains.AnattackonU.S.communication,navigationordetectionconstellationscoulddrivethepublictosupportspaceweapons.AsuccessfulstrategytodelaysuchanactandmaintainfreedomofactioninspacewillrequirethattheU.S.useitsdiplomatic,information,militaryandeconomiccapabilitiestodevelopamultilayeredconstructforspaceoperations.Multinationalpartneringwilllaythefoundationforinternationalnegotiation,regulationandgovernance.WiththeU.S.alreadypartytointernationalregulationsgoverningland,sea,airandspace,anewroundofinternationalagreementsbanningspace-basedweaponsandprovidingforverificationmayproveattractivetomanynations.Alone,thisvisionofcooperationandengagementisinsufficient.

Fourrecommendationswillassisttheserviceindevelopingsustainablespacesuperiority.First,theAirForcemustcontinuetoimprovespacesurveillance.Onestepinthisdirectionwasthe2010launchofPathfinder,firstinaplannedconstellationknownastheSpaceBasedSpaceSurveillancesystem.ItsmissionistoimprovetheDefenseDepartment’sabilitytodetectandtrackobjectsinorbit.

Second,theAirForcemustguaranteeaccesstospacewhileachievinglowerproductionandoperatingcosts.Theprimaryspace-launchvehiclesinusetodayareEvolvedExpendableLaunchVehicles（EELV）—Boeing’sDeltaIVandLockheedMartin’sAtlasV.TheEELVwasdesignedtostandardizeandimprovespace-launchoperability,reducegovernmentinvolvementinlaunchprocessingandsaveaprojected25percentoverlegacylaunchsystems.However,furthercostreductionsarerequired.

Third,increasedpartneringwithindustrywillassistinreachingthegoalofspacesuperiority.TheObamaadministration’smostrecentdecisionsonspaceoperations,shiftingspendingfromgovernmenttocommercialendeavors,pointtopotentiallydramaticchangesinAmericanspacepolicy.

Finally,tomitigatevulnerabilityinspace,theU.S.mustestablishgreaterresiliencyinitssatelliteconstellations.Spacesystemsmustbecomemoreresponsiveandlessvulnerabletomeetthewarfighter’sneedsascompetitioninspaceevolves.

THECYBERCHALLENGE

Withactivationofthe24thAirForce,theserviceclearlysignaledtheimportanceofcyberspace.Thetransformationofcommunicationsandinformationcareerfieldsintothecyberspaceoperationsandsupportcareerfields,andtheinitiationofundergraduatecyberspacetraining,illustratethispoint.T