WTODisputeSettlementMechanism2.docx

WTODisputeSettlementMechanism2.docx

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WTODisputeSettlementMechanism2

WTODisputeSettlementMechanism

（2）

ChapterⅡ

CausesofActionbeforetheDSB:

Art.XXIIIoftheGATT1994

OUTLINE

SectionOneRighttoPursueaProceedingundertheWTO

ITheConceptofNullificationorImpairment

IITheStandingIssuebeforetheDSB

IIILackofPossibleCompensation

IVSummaryandConclusions

SectionTwoCausesofActionbeforetheDSBinGeneral

IThePresumptioninViolationComplaints

（i）Introduction

（ii）PracticeundertheGATTJurisprudence

（iii）RulingsundertheWTOJurisprudence

（iv）ASummary

IIAnOverviewofNon-ViolationComplaints

（i）RelatedTexts

（ii）RelationshipbetweenArts.XXIII:

1（a）andXXIII:

1（b）

（iii）UnderlyingPurposeofArt.XXIII:

1（b）

（iv）Non-violationClaimsintheContextofPrinciplesofCustomaryInternationalLaw

（v）AppropriateAttitudesastoNon-ViolationRemedy

IIIPresupposedSituationComplaints

SectionThreeEstablishmentofNon-violationComplaints

IIntroduction

IIApplicationofaMeasure:

ScopeofMeasuresCoveredbyArt.XXIII:

1（b）

（i）MeasuresshortofLegallyBindingObligations

（ii）MeasuresFallingunderOtherProvisionsoftheGATT1994

（iii）MeasuresConcerningtheProtectionofHumanHealth

（iv）MeasuresContinuinglyApplied

IIIExistenceofaBenefit:

ProtectionofLegitimateExpectations

（i）ProtectionofLegitimateExpectations（PLE）

（ii）Non-foreseeabilityofMeasuresatIssue

（iii）BenefitsintheNegotiations

（iv）BenefitsunderSuccessiveRounds

IVNullificationorImpairmentofBenefit:

Causality

VSummaryandConclusions

SectionOne

RighttoPursueaProceedingundertheWTO

ITheConceptofNullificationorImpairment

NullificationorimpairmentisamostimportantconceptdevelopedinpreviousGATTdisputesettlementsystem.ItisincorporatedintotheGATT1994bytheso-calledincorporationclause（paragraph1oftheGATT1994）andgoesontooperateasanimportantfeatureoftheDSUundertheWTO.DisputesettlementmechanismundertheWTOcontinuestorevolvearoundtheconceptofnullificationorimpairment.Art.oftheDSUrequiresMembersto“affirmtheiradherencetotheprinciplesforthemanagementofdisputesheretoforeappliedunderArticlesXXIIandXXIIIofGATT1947”.

AccordingtoArt.XXIII:

1oftheGATT,aMembermayhaverecoursetodisputesettlementundertheWTOwhenitconsidersthat:

“...anybenefitaccruingtoitdirectlyorindirectlyunderthisAgreementisbeingnullifiedorimpairedorthattheattainmentofanyobjectiveoftheAgreementisbeingimpededastheresultof

（a）thefailureofanothercontractingparty[MemberoftheWTO]tocarryoutitsobligationsunderthisAgreement,or

（b）theapplicationbyanothercontractingparty[MemberoftheWTO]ofanymeasure,whetherornotitconflictswiththeprovisionsofthisAgreement,or

（c）theexistenceofanyothersituation.”

Asitimplies,unlike

thatinmanyotherdisputesettlementproceduresgenerallydesignedtoresolvedifferencesontheinterpretationorapplicationoftheprovisionsundermostinternationaltreaties,internationalresponsibilityinWTOlawisnotassessedonlyintermsofpliancewiththespecificprovisionsoftherelevantagreements.Rather,itistheideaofnullificationorimpairmentthatdetermineswhetherrightstoplainariseunderthecoveredagreement.

Art.XXIII:

1suggeststhatlegalconsiderationsneednotbethesolefocusofaplaintundertheDSU,andthattheDSUprocedurescanbeinvokedforthesettlementofanytradedisputearisingfromanygovernmentalmeasure,whetherlegalorillegal,andthatarisingfromanysituation,whetherattributabletoagovernmentornot.Amemberdemonstratingthatameasureoranyothersituationnullifiedorimpairedtheirbenefitsaccruingtothecoveredagreementsisgivenredresseveniftherewasnofailuretocarryouttheobligations.What’smore,abenefitdoesn’tneedtoaccruedirectlytotheparty;anindirectbenefitisprotectedaswell.ItseemsthattheaimofArt.XXIII:

1istoensurethatthenegotiatedbalanceofconcessionsismaintainedeveninsituationsthatcannotbeforeseenandthatcanconsequentlynotbedefined.

Inpractice,itisdemonstratedthatpanelsandtheAppellateBodyhavebroadlydefinednullificationorimpairmentofabenefit.Theequationof“nullificationorimpairment”with“upsettingthepetitiverelationship”establishedbetweenmembershasbeenconsistentlyused.However,asaresultofthedivergencebetweenthetextoftheprovisionsandthepracticeunderit,theactualscopeandfunctionoftheconceptofnullificationorimpairmentisoftenmisunderstood.ItishelpfulfortheclarificationofthisconcepttogofurtherintothestandingissuebeforetheDSB.

IITheStandingIssuebeforetheDSB

Theterm“standing”hasnotbeenexplicitlyembodiedinthetextoftheDSUorinanyothercoveredagreements.Itisusedhereforthepurposeofexaminingwhetherapartymustdemonstratetheexistenceofsomeinterestconcerned,asusuallyrequiredindomesticjudicialprocess,inlaunchingaplaintbeforetheDSB.

InEC-Bananas（DS27）1,theAppellateBodydoesnotacceptthattheneedfora“legalinterest”isimpliedintheDSUorinanyotherprovisionoftheWTOAgreementwhentheECqueriestherightofUStobringclaimsundertheGATT1994.Duringtheappellatereview,theAppellateBodyagreewiththePanelthat,“neitherArt.noroftheDSUnoranyotherprovisionoftheDSUcontainsanyexplicitrequirementthataMembermusthavea‘legalinterest’asaprerequisiteforrequestingapanel”.AsfoundbytheAppellateBody,itistruethatunderArt.oftheDSU,aMemberwishingtojoininmultipleconsultationsmusthave“asubstantialtradeinterest”,andthatunderArt.oftheDSU,athirdpartymustha

ve“asubstantialinterest”inthematterbeforeapanel.ButneitheroftheseprovisionsintheDSU,noranythingelseintheWTOAgreement,providesabasisforassertingthatpartiestothedisputehavetomeetanysimilarstandard.

TheparticipantsinthisappealalsorefertocertainjudgmentsoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeandthePermanentCourtofInternationalJusticerelatingtowhetherthereisarequirement,ininternationallaw,ofalegalinteresttobringacase.TheAppellateBodycannotreadanyofthesejudgmentsasestablishingageneralrulethatinallinternationallitigationaplainingpartymusthavea“legalinterest”inordertobringacase.Nordotheythinkthatthesejudgmentsdenytheneedtoconsiderthequestionofstandingunderthedisputesettlementprovisionsofanymultilateraltreaty,byreferringtothetermsofthattreaty.ThisleadstheAppellateBodytoexamineArt.XXIIIoftheGATT1994,whichisthedisputesettlementprovisionfordisputesbroughtpursuanttoGATT1994.

AfterreferringtothechapeauofArt.XXIII:

1,theAppellateBodynotesthatofspecialimportancefordeterminingtheissueofstanding,arethewords“[i]fanyMembershouldconsider...”.TheythinkthatthisprovisioninArt.XXIIIisconsistentwithArt.oftheDSU,whichstatesthat“[b]eforebringingacase,aMembershallexerciseitsjudgmentastowhetheractionundertheseprocedureswouldbefruitful”.Accordingly,theAppellateBodyfindsthat“aMemberhasbroaddiscretionindecidingwhethertobringacaseagainstanotherMemberundertheDSU.ThelanguageofArticleXXIII:

1oftheGATT1994andofArticleoftheDSUsuggest,furthermore,thataMemberisexpectedtobelargelyself-regulatingindecidingwhetheranysuchactionwouldbe‘fruitful’”.

WhileinKorea-DairyProducts（DS98）,regardingKorea’sreferencetothelackofeconomicinterestoftheEC,thePanelfindsthatundertheDSUthereisnorequirementthatpartiesmusthaveaneconomicinterest.RecallingsomeconcernedfindingsinEC-Bananas,thePanelrulesthattheycan’treadintheDSUanyrequirementforan“economicinterest”.2

IIILackofPossibleCompensation

Asnotedabove,thereisnorequirementundertheWTOfora“legalinterest”oran“economicinterest”forMemberstoinvoketheDSUproceduresforthesettlementofanytradedispute.However,istherighttopursueaproceedingdeniedbythelackofanypossiblepensation?

InEC-Bananas（DS27），ECresortstoarbitrationunderArt.oftheDSU.AndtheArbitratorsnotethat,interalia,ECcontendsthatespeciallywithrespecttotradeingoodsthenullificationorimpairmentsufferedbytheUnitedStatesisnegligibleornilsincethereisnoactualtradeandlittleprospectforpotentialtradeinbananasbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheEC.Inthisrespect,theArbitratorsrecalltheEC’sargumentintheoriginaldisputethatevenifa

MembernotsufferingnullificationorimpairmentofWTObenefitsinrespectofbananaswereallowedtoraiseaclaimundertheGATT,thatMemberwouldnothavehadaneffectiveremedyunderArt.22oftheDSU.TheArbitratorsalsonotetheplainants’argumentintheoriginaldisputethatArt.oftheDSUpresupposesafindingofinfringementpriortoaconsiderationofthenullificationorimpairmentissue,suggestingthatevenifnopensationweredue,aninfringementfindingcouldbemade.

TheArbitratorsagreetheplainants’argument,andrulethat,Art.XXIII:

1oftheGATT1994andArt.oftheDSUdonotestablishaproceduralrequirement.AsfoundbytheArbitrators,theseprovisionsconcerntheinitiationofaWTOdisputesettlementproceedingwhereaMemberconsidersbenefitsdirectlyorindirectlyaccruingtoitwerenullifiedorimpaired.SuchaninitialdecisiononwhetherornottoraiseaplaintisnecessarilytheresultofasubjectiveandstrategicconsiderationfromtheindividualperspectiveofaMember.However,adecisiononwhethertheassertionofnullificationorimpairmentbyan