Goods(经济学原理,RHFrank_BenBernank).pptx

Goods(经济学原理,RHFrank_BenBernank).pptx

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,Chapter18,ExternalitiesandPublicGoods,1,Chapter1,TopicstobeDiscussed,ExternalitiesWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureExternalitiesandPropertyRightsCommonPropertyResources,2,Chapter1,TopicstobeDiscussed,PublicGoodsPrivatePreferencesforPublicGoods,3,Chapter1,Externalities,NegativeActionbyonepartyimposesacostonanotherpartyPositiveActionbyonepartybenefitsanotherparty,4,Chapter1,ExternalCost,ScenarioSteelplantdumpingwasteinariverTheentiresteelmarketeffluentcanbereducedbyloweringoutput（fixedproportionsproductionfunction）,5,Chapter1,ExternalCost,ScenarioMarginalExternalCost（MEC）isthecostimposedonfishermendownstreamforeachlevelofproduction.MarginalSocialCost（MSC）isMCplusMEC.,6,Chapter1,Aggregatesocialcostofnegativeexternality,ExternalCosts,Firmoutput,Price,Industryoutput,Price,7,Chapter1,ExternalCost,NegativeExternalitiesencourageinefficientfirmstoremainintheindustryandcreateexcessiveproductioninthelongrun.,8,Chapter1,Externalities,PositiveExternalitiesandInefficiencyExternalitiescanalsoresultintoolittleproduction,ascanbeshowninanexampleofhomerepairandlandscaping.,9,Chapter1,ExternalBenefits,RepairLevel,Value,D,Isresearchanddevelopmentdiscouragedbypositiveexternalities?

q1,10,Chapter1,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Assumption:

ThemarketfailureispollutionFixed-proportionproductiontechnologyMustreduceoutputtoreduceemissionsUseanoutputtaxtoreduceoutputInputsubstitutionpossiblebyalteringtechnology,11,Chapter1,TheEfficientLevelofEmissions,LevelofEmissions,2,4,6,DollarsperunitofEmissions,0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,18,20,22,24,26,MSC,MCA,Assume:

1）Competitivemarket2）Outputandemissionsdecisionsareindependent3）Profitmaximizingoutputchosen,Whyisthismoreefficientthanzeroemissions?

12,Chapter1,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,OptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionStandardSetalegallimitonemissionsatE*（12）EnforcedbymonetaryandcriminalpenaltiesIncreasesthecostofproductionandthethresholdpricetoentertheindustry,13,Chapter1,StandardsandFees,LevelofEmissions,DollarsperunitofEmissions,MSC,MCA,14,Chapter1,OptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionsFeeChargeleviedoneachunitofemission,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,15,Chapter1,TotalFeeofAbatement,StandardsandFees,LevelofEmissions,DollarsperunitofEmissions,16,Chapter1,StandardsVersusFeesAssumptionsPolicymakershaveasymmetricinformationAdministrativecostsrequirethesamefeeorstandardforallfirms,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,17,Chapter1,TheCaseforFees,LevelofEmissions,2,4,6,FeeperUnitofEmissions,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,1,3,5,14,Thecostminimizingsolutionwouldbeanabatementof6forfirm1and8forfirm2andMCA1=MCA2=$3.,Ifafeeof$3wasimposedFirm1emissionswouldfallby6to8.Firm2emissionswouldfallby8to6.MCA1=MCA2:

efficientsolution.,18,Chapter1,AdvantagesofFeesWhenequalstandardsmustbeused,feesachievethesameemissionabatementatlowercost.Feescreateanincentivetoinstallequipmentthatwouldreduceemissionsfurther.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,19,Chapter1,ABCistheincreaseinsocialcostlessthedecreaseinabatementcost.,TheCaseforStandards,LevelofEmissions,FeeperUnitofEmissions,0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,A,20,Chapter1,Summary:

Feesvs.StandardsStandardsarepreferredwhenMSCissteepandMCAisflat.Standards（incompleteinformation）yieldmorecertaintyonemissionlevelsandlesscertaintyonthecostofabatement.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,21,Chapter1,Summary:

Feesvs.StandardsFeeshavecertaintyoncostanduncertaintyonemissions.Preferredpolicydependsonthenatureofuncertaintyandtheslopesofthecostcurves.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,22,Chapter1,TransferableEmissionsPermitsPermitshelpdevelopacompetitivemarketforexternalities.AgencydeterminesthelevelofemissionsandnumberofpermitsPermitsaremarketableHighcostfirmwillpurchasepermitsfromlowcostfirms,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,23,Chapter1,QuestionWhatfactorscouldlimittheefficiencyofthisapproach?

WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,24,Chapter1,TheCostsandBenefitsofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissions,CostofReducingEmissionsConversiontonaturalgasfromcoalandoilEmissioncontrolequipment,25,Chapter1,BenefitsofReducingEmissionsHealthReductionincorrosionAesthetic,TheCostsandBenefitsofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissions,26,Chapter1,SulfurDioxideEmissionsReductions,Sulfurdioxideconcentration（ppm）,20,40,60,0,Dollarsperunitofreduction,0.02,0.04,0.06,0.08,MarginalSocialCost,MarginalAbatementCost,ObservationsMAC=MSC.0275.0275isslightlybelowactualemissionlevelEconomicefficiencyimproved,27,Chapter1,EmissionsTradingandCleanAir,BubblesFirmcanadjustpollutioncontrolsforindividualsourcesofpollutantsaslongasatotalpollutantlimitisnotexceeded.OffsetsNewemissionsmustbeoffsetbyreducingexistingemissions2000offsetssince1979,28,Chapter1,Costofachievingan85%reductioninhydrocarbonemissionsforDuPontThreeOptions85%reductionateachsourceplant（totalcost=$105.7million）85%reductionateachplantwithinternaltrading（totalcost=$42.6million）85%reductionatallplantswithinternalandexternaltrading（totalcost=$14.6million）,EmissionsTradingandCleanAir,29,Chapter1,1990CleanAirActSince1990,thecostofthepermitshasfallenfromanexpected$300tobelow$100.CausesofthedropinpermitpricesMoreefficientabatementtechniquesPriceoflowsulfurcoalhasfallen,EmissionsTradingandCleanAir,30,Chapter1,RecyclingHouseholdscandisposeofglassandothergarbageatverylowcost.Thelowcostofdisposalcreatesadivergencebetweentheprivateandthesocialcostofdisposal.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,31,Chapter1,TheEfficientAmountofRecycling,Scrap,Cost,0,4,8,12,32,Chapter1,RefundableDeposits,AmountofGlass,$,D,PricefallstoPandtheamountofrecycledglassincreasestoM*.,33,Chapter1,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,PropertyRightsLegalrulesdescribingwhatpeopleorfirmsmaydowiththeirpropertyForexampleIfresidentsdownstreamownedtheriver（cleanwater）theycontrolupstreamemissions.,34,Chapter1,BargainingandEconomicEfficiencyEconomicefficiencycanbeachievedwithoutgovernmentinterventionwhentheexternalityaffectsrelativelyfewpartiesandwhenpropertyrightsarewellspecified.,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,35,Chapter1,ProfitsUnderAlternativeEmissionsChoices（Daily）,Nofilter,nottreatmentplant500100600Filter,notreatmentplant300500800Nofilter,treatmentplant500200700Filter,treatmentplant300300600,FactorysFishermensTotalProfitProfitProfit,36,Chapter1,AssumptionsFactorypaysforthefilterFishermenpayforthetreatmentplantEfficientSolutionBuythefilteranddonotbuildtheplant,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,37,Chapter1,BargainingwithAlternativePropertyRights,NoCooperationProfitoffactory$500$300Profitoffishermen$200$500CooperationProfitoffactory$550$300Profitoffishermen$250$500,RighttoDumpRighttoCleanWater,38,Chapter1,Conclusion:

CoaseTheoremWhenpartiescanbargainwithoutcostandtotheirmutualadvantage,theresultingoutcomewillbeefficient,regardlessofhowthepropertyrightsarespecified.,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,39,Chapter1,CostlyBargaining-TheRoleofStrategicBehaviorBargainingrequiresclearlydefinedrulesandpropertyrights.,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,40,Chapter1,ALegalSolution-SuingforDamagesFishermenhavetherighttocleanwaterFactoryhastwooptionsNofilter,paydamagesProfit=$100（$500-$400）Filter,nodamagesProfit=$300（$500-$200）,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,41,Chapter1,ALegalSolution-SuingforDamagesFactoryhastherighttoemiteffluentFishermenhavethreeoptionsPutintreatmentplantProfit=$200FilterandpaydamagesProfit=$300（$500-$200）Noplant,nofilterProfit=$100,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,42,Chapter1,ConclusionAsuitfordamagesresultsinanefficientoutcome.QuestionHowwouldimperfectinformationimpacttheoutcome?

ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,43,Chapter1,TheCoaseTheorematWork,NegotiatinganEfficientSolution1987-NewYorkgarbagespill（200tons）litteredtheNewJerseybeachesThepotentialcostoflitigationresultedinasolutionthatwasmutuallybeneficialtobothparties.,44,Chapter1,CommonPropertyResources,CommonPropertyResourceEveryonehasfreeaccess.LikelytobeoverutilizedExamplesAirandwaterFishandanimalpopulationsMinerals,45,Chapter1,CommonPropertyResources,FishperMonth,Benefits,Costs（$perfish）,Demand,46,Chapter1,CommonPropertyResources,SolutionPrivateownershipQuestionWhenwouldprivateownershipbeimpractical?

47,Chapter1,CrawfishFishinginLousiana,FindingtheEfficientCrawfishCatchF=crawfishcatchinmillionsofpounds/yrC=costindollars/pound,48,Chapter1,CrawfishFishinginLousiana,DemandC=0.401=0.0064FMSCC=-5.645+0.6509FPCC=-0.357+0.0573F,49,Chapter1,CrawfishFishinginLousiana,EfficientCatch9.2millionpoundsD=MSC,50,Chapter1,CrawfishCatch（millionsofpounds）,CCost（dollars/pound）,Demand,CrawfishasaCommonPropertyResource,51,Chapter1,PublicGoods,QuestionWhenshouldgovernmentreplacefirmsastheproducerofgoodsandservices?

52,Chapter1,PublicGoods,PublicGoodCharacteristicsNonrivalForanygivenlevelofproductionthemarginalcostofprovidingittoanadditionalconsumeriszero.NonexclusivePeoplecannotbeexcludedfromconsumingthegood.,53,Chapter1,PublicGoods,NotallgovernmentproducedgoodsarepublicgoodsSomearerivalandnonexclusiveEducationParks,54,Chapter1,EfficientPublicGoodProvision,Output,0,Benefits（dollars）,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,9,$4.00,$5.50,$7.00,MarginalCost,55,Chapter1,PublicGoods,PublicGoodsandMarketFailureHowmuch