新公共管理外文翻译文献.docx

新公共管理外文翻译文献.docx

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新公共管理外文翻译文献

新公共管理外文翻译文献

（文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译）

原文：

NewPublicManagementandtheQualityofGovernment:

CopingwiththeNewPoliticalGovernanceinCanada

PeterAucoin

DalhousieUniversity

Halifax,Canada

Conferenceon‘NewPublicManagementandtheQualityofGovernment’,

SOGandtheQualityofGovernmentInstitute,

UniversityofGothenburg

Sweden

AtensionbetweenNewPublicManagement（NPM）andgoodgovernance,includinggoodpublicadministration,haslongbeenassumedbythosewhoregardthestructuresandpracticesadvocatedandbroughtaboutbyNPMasdepartingfromtheprinciplesandnormsofgoodgovernancethatunderpinnedtraditionalpublicadministration（Savoie1994）.Theconcernhasnotabated（Savoie2008）.

Asthisdynamichasplayedoutoverthepastthreedecades,however,thereemergedanevenmoresignificantchallengenotonlytothetraditionalstructures,practicesandvaluesoftheprofessional,non-partisanpublicservicebutalsotothosereformsintroducedbyNPMthathavegainedwide,ifnotuniversal,acceptanceaspositivedevelopmentinpublicadministration.ThischallengeiswhatIcallNewPoliticalGovernance（NPG）.ItisNPG,andnotNPM,Iargue,thatconstitutestheprincipalthreattogoodgovernance,includinggoodpublicadministration,andthustheQualityofGovernment（QoG）asdefinedbyRothsteinandTeorell（2008）.Itisathreattotheextentthatpartisansingovernment,sometimesovertly,mostlycovertly,seektouseandoverridethepublicservice–animpartialinstitutionofgovernment–tobettersecuretheirpartisanadvantage（Campbell2007;MacDermott2008a,2008b）.Insodoing,thesegovernorsengageinapoliticizationofthepublicserviceanditsadministrationofpublicbusinessthatconstitutesaformofpoliticalcorruptionthatcannotbutunderminegoodgovernance.NPMisnotacauseofthispoliticization,Iargue,butitisaninterveningfactorinsofarasNPMreforms,amongotherreformsofthelastthreedecades,havehadtheeffectofpubliclyexposingthepublicserviceinwaysthathavemadeitmorevulnerabletopoliticalpressuresonthepartofthepoliticalexecutive.

IexaminethisphenomenonbylookingprimarilyatthecaseofCanada,butwithanumberofcomparativeWestminsterreferences.Iconsiderthephenomenontobeaninternationalone,affectingmost,ifnotall,Westerndemocracies.Thepressuresoutlinedbelowarevirtuallythesameeverywhere.Theresponsesvarysomewhatbecauseofpoliticalleadershipandtheinstitutionaldifferencesbetweensystems,evenintheWestminstersystems.Thephenomenonmustalsobeviewedinthecontextoftime,givenboththeemergenceofthepressuresthatledtoNPMinthefirstinstance,asanewmanagement-focusedapproachtopublicadministration,andtheemergenceofthedifferentpressuresthatnowcontributetoNPG,asapoliticizedapproachtogovernancewithimportantimplicationsforpublicadministration,andespeciallyforimpartiality,performanceandaccountability.

NewPublicManagementintheCanadianContext

Sincetheearly1980s,NPMhastakenseveraldifferentformsinvariousjurisdictions.Adoptingprivate-sectormanagementpracticeswasseenbysomeasapart,evenifaminorpart,ofthebroaderneo-conservative/neo-liberalpoliticaleconomymovementthatdemandedwholesaleprivatizationofgovernmententerprisesandpublicservices,extensivederegulationofprivateenterprises,andsignificantreductionsinpublicspending–‘rollingbackthestate’,asitwasputaattheoutset（Hood1991）.Bysomeaccounts,almosteverythingthatchangedoverthepastquarterofacenturyisattributedtoNPM.Invirtuallyeveryjurisdiction,nonetheless,NPM,aspublicmanagementreform,wasatleastoriginallyaboutachievinggreatereconomyandefficiencyinthemanagementofpublicresourcesingovernmentoperationsandinthedeliveryofpublicservices（Pollitt1990）.Thefocus,inshort,wason‘management’.Achievinggreatereconomyintheuseofpublicresourceswasattheforefrontofconcerns,giventhefiscalandbudgetarysituationsfacingallgovernmentsinthe1970s,andmanagerialefficiencywasnotfarbehind,givenassumptionsabouttheimpoverishedqualityofmanagementinpublicserviceseverywhere.

Bytheturnofthecentury,moreover,NPM,asimprovedpublicmanagementinthislimitedsense,waswellembeddedinalmostallgovernments,atleastasthenorm（althoughitwasnotalwaysoreverywherereferredtoasNPM）.Thismeantincreasedmanagerialauthority,discretionandflexibility:

•formanagingpublicresources（financialandhuman）;

•formanagingpublic-servicedeliverysystems;and,

•forcollaboratingwithotherpublic-sectoragenciesaswellaswithprivatesector

agenciesintacklinghorizontal–multi-organizationaland/ormultisectoral

–issues.

Thisincreasedmanagerialauthority,flexibilityanddiscretionwas,insomejurisdictions,notablytheBritainandNewZealand,coupledwithincreasedorganizationaldifferentiation,asevidencedbyaproliferationofdepartmentsandagencieswithnarrowedmandates,manywithasinglepurpose.“Agencification’,however,wasnotamajorfocusreforminalljurisdictions,includingCanadaandAustraliawheresuchchange,ifnotonthemargins,wasclearlysecondarytoenhancedmanagerialauthorityandresponsibility（PollittandTalbot2004）.

ThemajorNPMinnovationsquicklyledtoconcerns,especiallyinthosejurisdictionswherethesedevelopmentsweremostadvanced,aboutalossofpublicservicecoherenceandcorporatecapacity,ontheonehand,andadiminishedsenseofandcommitmenttopublic-serviceethos,ethicsandvalues,ontheother.Reactionstotheseconcernsproducedsomeretreat,reversals,andre-balancingofthesystemsinquestions（Halligan2006）.Nowhere,however,wasthereawholesalerejectionofNPM,intheoryorpractice,andareturntotraditionalpublicadministration,eveniftherenecessarilyemergedsometensionbetweenrhetoricandaction（Gregory2006）.TheimprovementsinpublicmanagementbroughtaboutbyatleastsomeaspectsofNPMweresimplytooobvious,eveniftheseimprovementsweremodestincomparisontotheoriginalclaimsofNPMproponents.

AtthesametimethatNPMbecameamajorforceforchangeinpublicadministration,however,itwasaccompaniedbyacompanionforcethatsawpoliticalexecutivesseekingtoassertgreaterpoliticalcontrolovertheadministrationandapparatusofthestate,notonlyintheformulationofpublicpoliciesbutalsointheadministrationofpublicservices.Accordingly,fromthestart,atleastintheAnglo-Americansystems,therewasafundamentalparadoxaspoliticalexecutives,onboththeleftandtherightsidesofthepartisan-politicaldivide,soughtto（re）assertdominanceovertheirpublic-servicebureaucracieswhilesimultaneouslydevolvinggreatermanagementauthoritytothem（Aucoin1990）.

Theimpetusforthisdynamiclayinthedissatisfactionofmanypoliticalexecutiveswiththe‘responsiveness’ofpublicservantstothepoliticalauthorityandpolicyagendasoftheseelectedofficials.Publicchoiceandprincipal-agencytheories

providedtheideologicaljustificationsfortakingactionagainstwhatwereperceivedasself-servingbureaucrats（Boston1996）.Beyondtheoryandideology,however,thepracticeofpublicadministrationbyprofessionalpublicservantsinsomejurisdictions,notablyAustralia,BritainandNewZealand,offeredmorethansufficientevidencetopoliticalleadersofapublic-serviceculturethatgaveonlygrudgingacceptance,atbest,tothecapacityofelectedpoliticianstodeterminewhatconstitutedthe‘publicinterest’inpublicpolicyandadministration.

TheCanadiancaseisofinterest,Isuggest,forseveralreasons.Incomparativeperspective,Canadadidnotapproachpublicmanagementreformwithmuchofanideologicalperspective.WhentheConservativesdefeatedthecentristLiberalsin1984,neitherthenewprimeminister,BrianMulroney,norhisleadingministerswerehardcoreneo-conservativesintheRonaldReaganorMargaretThatchermold.Atthattime,anduntiltheendoftheConservativegovernmentin1993,thepartywasessentiallyacentristpartyintheCanadian‘brokerage’partytradition.Whileimportantaspectsofneoliberalismunfolded,especiallyundertheumbrellaofeconomicderegulationthatcamewithafree-tradeagreementwiththeUnitedStates,therewerenomajoradministrativereformsthatwerepoliticallydriven.Pragmatismprevailed（Gow2004）.Asaresult,thereformsinitiatedduringthisperiodwereessentiallyundertakingsoftheprofessionalpublic-serviceleadershipthatsoughttostayabreastwithdevelopmentselsewhere.Thescopeanddepthofthesereformswereaffected,however,bytheextenttowhichministerswantedtomaintainanactiveinvolvementinadministration（Aucoin1995）.

Bycomparisontodevelopmentselsewhere,Canadianministerswerelessinclinedtoworryabouttheprofessionalpublicservicebeingunresponsivetotheirpoliticaldirection.Nonetheless,theMulroneyregimesawanexpansioninthenumber,rolesandinfluenceof‘politicalstaff’appointedtoministers’offices,mostnotablyinthePrimeMinister’sOffice（PMO）.Thesestaff,whohavegrowncontinuouslyinnumberoverthepastfourdecades,arenotpublicservants,althoughtheyareemployedonthepublicpayroll.Unlikepublicservants,whoareappointedindependentlyofministers,politicalstaffareappointedanddismissedatthediscretionofministersand,ofcourse,theyhavenotenurebeyondtheirministers.And,inofficialconstitutionaldoctrine,theyhavenoseparateauthoritytodirectthepublicservice.IntheCanadiantradition,moreover,theyareappointedalmostexclusivelyfrompartisan-politicalcircles