新公共管理外文翻译文献.docx

1、新公共管理外文翻译文献新公共管理外文翻译文献 (文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：New Public Management and the Quality of Government:Coping with the New Political Governance in CanadaPeter AucoinDalhousie UniversityHalifax, CanadaConference on New Public Management and the Quality of Government,SOG and the Quality of Government Insti

2、tute,University of GothenburgSwedenA tension between New Public Management (NPM) and good governance, including good public administration, has long been assumed by those who regard the structures and practices advocated and brought about by NPM as departing from the principles and norms of good gov

3、ernance that underpinned traditional public administration (Savoie 1994). The concern has not abated (Savoie 2008). As this dynamic has played out over the past three decades, however, there emerged an even more significant challenge not only to the traditional structures, practices and values of th

4、e professional, non-partisan public service but also to those reforms introduced by NPM that have gained wide, if not universal, acceptance as positive development in public administration. This challenge is what I call New Political Governance (NPG). It is NPG, and not NPM, I argue, that constitute

5、s the principal threat to good governance, including good public administration, and thus the Quality of Government (QoG) as defined by Rothstein and Teorell (2008). It is a threat to the extent that partisans in government, sometimes overtly, mostly covertly, seek to use and override the public ser

6、vice an impartial institution of government to better secure their partisan advantage (Campbell 2007; MacDermott 2008 a, 2008b). In so doing, these governors engage in a politicization of the public service and its administration of public business that constitutes a form of political corruption tha

7、t cannot but undermine good governance. NPM is not a cause of this politicization, I argue, but it is an intervening factor insofar as NPM reforms, among other reforms of the last three decades, have had the effect of publicly exposing the public service in ways that have made it more vulnerable to

8、political pressures on the part of the political executive.I examine this phenomenon by looking primarily at the case of Canada, but with a number of comparative Westminster references. I consider the phenomenon to be an international one, affecting most, if not all, Western democracies. The pressur

9、es outlined below are virtually the same everywhere. The responses vary somewhat because of political leadership and the institutional differences between systems, even in the Westminster systems. The phenomenon must also be viewed in the context of time, given both the emergence of the pressures th

10、at led to NPM in the first instance, as a new management-focused approach to public administration, and the emergence of the different pressures that now contribute to NPG, as a politicized approach to governance with important implications for public administration, and especially for impartiality,

11、 performance and accountability.New Public Management in the Canadian Context Since the early 1980s, NPM has taken several different forms in various jurisdictions. Adopting private-sector management practices was seen by some as a part, even if a minor part, of the broader neo-conservative/neo-libe

12、ral political economy movement that demanded wholesale privatization of government enterprises and public services, extensive deregulation of private enterprises, and significant reductions in public spending rolling back the state, as it was put a at the outset (Hood 1991). By some accounts, almost

13、 everything that changed over the past quarter of a century is attributed to NPM. In virtually every jurisdiction, nonetheless, NPM, as public management reform, was at least originally about achieving greater economy and efficiency in the management of public resources in government operations and

14、in the delivery of public services (Pollitt 1990). The focus, in short, was on management. Achieving greater economy in the use of public resources was at the forefront of concerns, given the fiscal and budgetary situations facing all governments in the 1970s, and managerial efficiency was not far b

15、ehind, given assumptions about the impoverished quality of management in public services everywhere. By the turn of the century, moreover, NPM, as improved public management in this limited sense, was well embedded in almost all governments, at least as the norm (although it was not always or everyw

16、here referred to as NPM). This meant increased managerial authority, discretion and flexibility: for managing public resources (financial and human); for managing public-service delivery systems; and, for collaborating with other public-sector agencies as well as with privatesectoragencies in tackli

17、ng horizontal multi-organizational and/or multisectoral issues.This increased managerial authority, flexibility and discretion was, in some jurisdictions, notably the Britain and New Zealand, coupled with increased organizational differentiation, as evidenced by a proliferation of departments and ag

18、encies with narrowed mandates, many with a single purpose. “Agencification, however, was not a major focus reform in all jurisdictions, including Canada and Australia where such change, if not on the margins, was clearly secondary to enhanced managerial authority and responsibility (Pollitt and Talb

19、ot 2004). The major NPM innovations quickly led to concerns, especially in those jurisdictions where these developments were most advanced, about a loss of public service coherence and corporate capacity, on the one hand, and a diminished sense of and commitment to public-service ethos, ethics and v

20、alues, on the other. Reactions to these concerns produced some retreat, reversals, and re-balancing of the systems in questions (Halligan 2006). Nowhere, however, was there a wholesale rejection of NPM, in theory or practice, and a return to traditional public administration, even if there necessari

21、ly emerged some tension between rhetoric and action (Gregory 2006). The improvements in public management brought about by at least some aspects of NPM were simply too obvious, even if these improvements were modest in comparison to the original claims of NPM proponents. At the same time that NPM be

22、came a major force for change in public administration, however, it was accompanied by a companion force that saw political executives seeking to assert greater political control over the administration and apparatus of the state, not only in the formulation of public policies but also in the admini

23、stration of public services. Accordingly, from the start, at least in the Anglo-American systems, there was a fundamental paradox as political executives, on both the left and the right sides of the partisan-political divide, sought to (re)assert dominance over their public-service bureaucracies whi

24、le simultaneously devolving greater management authority to them (Aucoin 1990). The impetus for this dynamic lay in the dissatisfaction of many political executives with the responsiveness of public servants to the political authority and policy agendas of these elected officials. Public choice and

25、principal-agency theoriesprovided the ideological justifications for taking action against what were perceived as self-serving bureaucrats (Boston 1996). Beyond theory and ideology, however, the practice of public administration by professional public servants in some jurisdictions, notably Australi

26、a, Britain and New Zealand, offered more than sufficient evidence to political leaders of a public-service culture that gave only grudging acceptance, at best, to the capacity of elected politicians to determine what constituted the public interest in public policy and administration. The Canadian c

27、ase is of interest, I suggest, for several reasons. In comparative perspective, Canada did not approach public management reform with much of an ideological perspective. When the Conservatives defeated the centrist Liberals in 1984, neither the new prime minister, Brian Mulroney, nor his leading min

28、isters were hardcore neo-conservatives in the Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher mold. At that time, and until the end of the Conservative government in 1993, the party was essentially a centrist party in the Canadian brokerage party tradition. While important aspects of neoliberalism unfolded, espe

29、cially under the umbrella of economic deregulation that came with a free-trade agreement with the United States, there were no major administrative reforms that were politically driven. Pragmatism prevailed (Gow 2004). As a result, the reforms initiated during this period were essentially undertakin

30、gs of the professional public-service leadership that sought to stay abreast with developments elsewhere. The scope and depth of these reforms were affected, however, by the extent to which ministers wanted to maintain an active involvement in administration (Aucoin 1995). By comparison to developme

31、nts elsewhere, Canadian ministers were less inclined to worry about the professional public service being unresponsive to their political direction. Nonetheless, the Mulroney regime saw an expansion in the number, roles and influence of political staff appointed to ministers offices, most notably in

32、 the Prime Ministers Office (PMO). These staff, who have grown continuously in number over the past four decades, are not public servants, although they are employed on the public payroll. Unlike public servants, who are appointed independently of ministers, political staff are appointed and dismiss

33、ed at the discretion of ministers and, of course, they have no tenure beyond their ministers. And, in official constitutional doctrine, they have no separate authority to direct the public service. In the Canadian tradition, moreover, they are appointed almost exclusively from partisan-political circles