毕业论文外文翻译优化资本结构思考经济和其他价值.docx

毕业论文外文翻译优化资本结构思考经济和其他价值.docx

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毕业论文外文翻译优化资本结构思考经济和其他价值

OptimalCapitalStructure:

Reflectionsoneconomicandothervalues

ByMarcSchauten&JaapSpronk1

1.Introduction

Despiteavastliteratureonthecapitalstructureofthefirm（seeHarrisandRaviv,1991,GrahamandHarvey,2001,Bravetal.,2005,foroverviews）therestillisabiggapbetweentheoryandpractice（seee.g.Cools,1993,Tempelaar,1991,Boot&Cools,1997）.StartingwiththeseminalworkbyModigliani&Miller（1958,1963）,muchattentionhasbeenpaidtotheoptimalityofcapitalstructurefromtheshareholders’pointofview.

Overthelastfewdecadesstudieshavebeenproducedontheeffectofotherstakeholders’interestsoncapitalstructure.Well-knownexamplesaretheinterestsofcustomerswhoreceiveproductorserviceguaranteesfromthecompany（seee.g.Grinblatt&Titman,2002）.Anotherareathathasreceivedconsiderableattentionistherelationbetweenmanagerialincentivesandcapitalstructure（Ibid.）.Furthermore,theissueofcorporatecontrol2（seeJensen&Ruback,1983）and,related,theissueofcorporategovernance3（seeShleifer&Vishney,1997）,receivealion’spartofthemorerecentacademicattentionforcapitalstructuredecisions.

Fromallthesestudies,onethingisclear:

Thecapitalstructuredecision（orrather,themanagementofthecapitalstructureovertime）involvesmoreissuesthanthemaximizationofthefirm’smarketvaluealone.Inthispaper,wegiveanoverviewofthedifferentobjectivesandconsiderationsthathavebeenproposedintheliterature.Wemakeadistinctionbetweentwobroadlydefinedsituations.Thefirstisthetraditionalcaseofthefirmthatstrivesforthemaximizationofthevalueofthesharesforthecurrentshareholders.Wheneverotherconsiderationsthanvaluemaximizationentercapitalstructuredecisions,theseconsiderationshavetobeinstrumentaltothegoalofvaluemaximization.Thesecondcaseconcernsthefirmthatexplicitlychoosesformoreobjectivesthanvaluemaximizationalone.Thismaybebecausetheshareholdersadoptamultiplestakeholdersapproachorbecauseofadifferentownershipstructurethantheusualcorporatestructuredominatingfinanceliterature.Anexampleofthelatteristheco-operation,alegalentitywhichcanbefoundina.o.manyEuropeancountries.Foradiscussiononwhyfirmsarefacingmultiplegoals,werefertoHallerbachandSpronk（2002a,2002b）.

InSection2wewilldescribeobjectivesandconsiderationsthat,directlyorindirectly,clearlyhelptocreateandmaintainacapitalstructurewhichis'optimal'forthevaluemaximizingfirm.Thethirdsectiondescribesotherobjectivesandconsiderations.Someofthesemayhaveaclearnegativeeffectoneconomicvalue,othersmaybeneutralandinsomecasestheeffectoneconomicvalueisnotalwayscompletelyclear.Section4showshow,forbothcases,capitalstructuredecisionscanbeframedasmultiplecriteriadecisionproblemswhichcanthenbenefitfrommultiplecriteriadecisionsupporttoolsthatarenowwidelyavailable.

2.Maximizingshareholdervalue

Accordingtotheneoclassicalviewontheroleofthefirm,thefirmhasonesingleobjective:

maximizationofshareholdervalue.Shareholderspossessthepropertyrightsofthefirmandarethusentitledtodecidewhatthefirmshouldaimfor.Sinceshareholdersonlyhaveoneobjectiveinmind-wealthmaximization-thegoalofthefirmismaximizationofthefirm'scontributiontothefinancialwealthofitsshareholders.Thefirmcanaccomplishthisbyinvestinginprojectswithpositivenetpresentvalue4.Partofshareholdervalueisdeterminedbythecorporatefinancingdecision5.Twotheoriesaboutthecapitalstructureofthefirm-thetrade-offtheoryandthepeckingordertheory-assumeshareholderwealthmaximizationastheoneandonlycorporateobjective.Wewilldiscussboththeoriesincludingseveralmarketvaluerelatedextensions.Basedonthisdiscussionweformulatealistofcriteriathatisrelevantforthecorporatefinancingdecisioninthisessentiallyneoclassicalview.

TheoriginalpropositionIofMillerandModigliani（1958）statesthatinaperfectcapitalmarkettheequilibriummarketvalueofafirmisindependentofitscapitalstructure,i.e.thedebt-equityratio6.IfpropositionIdoesnotholdthenarbitragewilltakeplace.Investorswillbuysharesoftheundervaluedfirmandsellsharesoftheovervaluedsharesinsuchawaythatidenticalincomestreamsareobtained.Asinvestorsexploitthesearbitrageopportunities,thepriceoftheovervaluedshareswillfallandthatoftheundervaluedshareswillrise,untilbothpricesareequal.

Whencorporatetaxesareintroduced,propositionIchangesdramatically.MillerandModigliani（1958,1963）showthatinaworldwithcorporatetaxthevalueoffirmsisa.o.afunctionofleverage.Wheninterestpaymentsbecometaxdeductibleandpaymentstoshareholdersarenot,thecapitalstructurethatmaximizesfirmvalueinvolvesahundredpercentdebtfinancing.Byincreasingleverage,thepaymentstothegovernmentarereducedwithahighercashflowfortheprovidersofcapitalasaresult.Thedifferencebetweenthepresentvalueofthetaxespaidbyanunleveredfirm（Gu）andanidenticalleveredfirm（Gl）isthepresentvalueoftaxshields（PVTS）.Figure1depictsthetotalvalueofanunleveredandaleveredfirm7.Thehigherleverage,thelowerGl,thehigherGu-Gl（=PVTS）.

Inthetraditionaltrade-offmodelsofoptimalcapitalstructureitisassumedthatfirmsbalancethemarginalpresentvalueofinteresttaxshields8againstmarginaldirectcostsoffinancialdistressordirectbankruptcycosts.9Additionalfactorscanbeincludedinthistrade-offframework.Othercoststhandirectcostsoffinancialdistressareagencycostsofdebt（Jensen&Meckling,1976）.Oftencitedexamplesofagencycostsofdebtaretheunderinvestmentproblem（Myers,1977）10,theassetsubstitutionproblem（Jensen&Meckling,1976andGalai&Masulis,1976）,the'playfortime'gamebymanagers,the'unexpectedincreaseofleverage（combinedwithanequivalentpayouttostockholderstomaketoincreasetheimpact）',the'refusaltocontributeequitycapital'andthe'cashinandrun'game（Brealey,Myers&Allan,2006）.Theseproblemsarecausedbythedifferenceofinterestbetweenequityanddebtholdersandcouldbeseenaspartoftheindirectcostsoffinancialdistress.Anotherbenefitofdebtisthereductionofagencycostsbetweenmanagersandexternalequity（JensenandMeckling,1976,Jensen,1986,1989）.JensenenMeckling（1976）arguethatdebt,byallowinglargermanagerialresidualclaimsbecausetheneedforexternalequityisreducedbytheuseofdebt,increasesmanagerialefforttowork.Inaddition,Jensen（1986）arguesthathighleveragereducesfreecashwithlessresourcestowasteonunprofitableinvestmentsasaresult.11Theagencycostsbetweenmanagementandexternalequityareoftenleftoutthetrade-offtheorysinceitassumesmanagersnotactingonbehalfoftheshareholders（only）whichisanassumptionofthetraditionaltrade-offtheory.

InMyers'（1984）andMyersandMajluf's（1984）peckingordermodel12thereisnooptimalcapitalstructure.Instead,becauseofasymmetricinformationandsignallingproblemsassociatedwithexternalfinancing13,firm'sfinancingpoliciesfollowahierarchy,withapreferenceforinternaloverexternalfinance,andfordebtoverequity.Astrictinterpretationofthismodelsuggeststhatfirmsdonotaimatatargetdebtratio.Instead,thedebtratioisjustthecumulativeresultofhierarchicalfinancingovertime.（SeeShyum-Sunder&Myers,1999.）OriginalexamplesofsignallingmodelsarethemodelsofRoss（1977）andLelandandPyle（1977）.Ross（1977）suggeststhathigherfinancialleveragecanbeusedbymanagerstosignalanoptimisticfutureforthefirmandthatthesesignalscannotbemimickedbyunsuccessfulfirms14.LelandandPyle（1977）focusonownersinsteadofmanagers.Theyassumethatentrepreneurshavebetterinformationontheexpectedcashflowsthanoutsidershave.Theinsideinformationheldbyanentrepreneurcanbetransferredtosuppliersofcapitalbecauseitisintheowner'sinteresttoinvestagreaterfractionofhiswealthinsuccessfulprojects.Thustheowner'swillingnesstoinvestinhisownprojectscanserveasasignalofprojectquality.Thevalueofthefirmincreaseswiththepercentageofequityheldbytheentrepreneurrelativetothepercentagehewouldhaveheldincaseofalowerqualityproject.（Copeland,Weston&Shastri,2005.）

ThestakeholdertheoryformulatedbyGrinblatt&Titman（2002）15suggeststhatthewayinwhichafirmanditsnon-financialstakeholdersinteractisanimportantdeterminantofthefirm'soptimalcapitalstructure.Non-financialstakeholdersarethosepartiesotherthanthedebtandequityholders.Non-financialstakeholdersincludefirm'scustomers,employees,suppliersandtheoverallcommunityinwhichthefirmoperates.Thesestakeholderscanbehurtbyafirm'sfinancialdifficulties.Forexamplecustomersmayreceiveinferiorproductsthataredifficulttoservice,suppliersmaylosebusiness,employeesmaylosejobsandtheeconomycanbedisrupted.Becauseofthecoststheypotentiallybearintheeventofafirm'sfinancialdistress,non-financialstakeholderswillbelessinterestedceterisparibusindoingbusinesswithafirmhavingahigh（er）potentialforfinancialdifficulties.Thisunderstandablereluctancetodobusinesswithadistressedfirmcreatesacostthatcandeterafirmfromundertakingexcessivedebtfinancingevenwhenlendersarewillingtoprovideitonfavorableterms（Ibid.,p.598）.Theseconsiderationsbynon-financialstakeholdersarethecauseoftheirimporta