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对于上述案件,上海市第一中级人民法院首先要确定这是一个国际私法案件还是国内民事案件,而确定国际私法案件的标准就是看案件所涉及的法律关系是否是涉外民事关系。
从该案的事实看,站在中国的角度,继承关系的主体、客体以及继承关系发生的事实含有印度因素,因而这是一个典型的涉外继承关系,该案也是一个典型的国际私法案件。
另外,与该案有关的中国女子与印度男子的夫妻关系,还含有美国因素。
【案例1.2】一中国人1995年死亡时在日本东京设有住所,并在东京留下若干动产,未立遗嘱,其继承人因析产不均诉诸日本法院。
日本法院受理该涉外继承案件后,先要适用1989年修订的《日本法例》第26条关于“继承依被继承人本国法”的规定,从而认定应适用中国法律处理该涉外继承案件。
但日本法院在案件审理过程中,查明中国《民法通则》第149条规定,遗产的法定继承,动产应适用被继承人死亡时住所地法律,把应适用的法律指回日本。
这时,日本法院面临以下问题:
究竟应依被继承人的本国法(中国法)还是他的住所地法(日本法)来处理这个继承案件呢?
如果依中国法处理,是否违反日本的公共秩序?
如果依日本法处理,是否能为中国继承人所接受,是否符合公正原则?
等等。
可见,法院在采用冲突规范调整涉外民事关系时,需要进行复杂的司法程序,判决的结果很难为当事人所预测。
【思考题】
1.下列案件涉及哪些民事关系?
根据我国的法律,这些民事关系是否是涉外民事关系?
【案例1.3】“富山海轮”与波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船碰撞案
2003年5月31日格林尼治时间10点30分(北京时间18点30分),在距丹麦博恩霍尔姆岛以北4海里的海域,中国远洋运输集团公司所属的“富山海轮”与一条波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船相撞,外轮撞到“富山海轮”左舷一、二舱之间,导致生活舱突然大量进水,“富山海轮”沉没,船上27名船员获救。
“富山海轮”船员离船前,封闭了船舶上所有的油路,避免了原油外溢造成严重的海域污染。
“富山海轮”载有6.6万吨化肥,货主是中国农业生产资料集团公司,货物保险金额为870万美元。
“富山海轮”船体保险金额为2050万美元。
中国人民保险公司是“富山海轮”船体、货物的独家保险人。
中国人民保险公司承保后,进行了再保险。
“富山海轮”运载的货物出险后,中国人民保险公司迅速与国际再保险经纪人和再保险人取得联系,启动应急理赔程序,聘请律师等有关中介机构进行前期调查取证工作,分析事故原因,勘验定损,协助船东开展救助。
“富山海轮”出险后,中国人民保险公司于2003年6月6日决定预付赔款7000万人民币。
“富山海轮”船体与货物保险金额为2920万美元,中国人民保险公司预计赔付金额在2亿元人民币左右,创我国国内海损赔付之最。
2.谈谈你对国际私法调整对象的理解。
3.如何正确理解国际私法的范围?
4.试述国际私法的基本原则。
5.试述国际私法的性质。
6.你认为我国《民法通则》第142条中“国际惯例”所指为何?
7.通过本章学习,你认为国际私法与国际经济法最大的区别在哪里?
【扩展性阅读材料】
1.韩德培、李双元:
《应当重视对冲突法的研究》,《武汉大学学报(社会科学版)》1993年第6期。
2.李双元等:
《关于国际私法的几个理论问题》,《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》(2001年卷),法律出版社2001年版。
3.李双元、欧福永:
《国际私法研究方法之我见》,《法学论坛》2003年第3期。
4.李健男:
《论国际私法的国际法因素》,《暨南学报》2005年第3期。
5.李健男:
《论国际私法的社会基础》,《法学评论》2006年第5期。
6.林燕平:
《对我国国际私法司法解释现象的法理分析》,《法学》2000年第5期。
7.SubstantivismversusSelectivism
(1)TheOriginalSubstantivistMethod
Theverynameofoursubject“conflictoflaws”,andinparticular“choiceoflaw”,presupposesthatinallcasesthathavecontactswithmorethanonestate:
(a)eachinvolvedstatehasanactiveorpassivedesireorclaimtohaveitslawapplied;
(b)thattheseclaims“conflict”inthesenseofbeingofroughlyequalintensityandvalidity;
and(c)thattheonlywaytoresolvetheconflictistochoosethelawofoneoftheinvolvedstates.
Eachofthesepremiseshasbeenseriouslydisputedindifferentperiodsinhistory.Forexample,thelastoftheabovepremiseshasbeenrejectedbywhatisgenerallyregardedasoneofthefirstrecordedmethodsofresolvingmultistateproblems.Thatmethod,whichwasemployedbytheRomanpraetorperegrinusinadjudicatingdisputesbetweenRomanandnon-Romansubjects,wasbasedonthenotionofaconstructiveblendingoftheinvolvedlawsratherthanonachoicefromamongthem.Thepraetorresolvedthesedisputesbyconstructingandapplyingtothecaseathandanewsubstantiveruleofdecisionderivedfromthelawsofbothorallinvolvedcountries.Thus,thefirstinstinctofthelegalmindwhenconfrontedwithamultistateprivate-lawdisputewasoneofcompromiseratherthanofchoice,eclecticismratherthanallornothing.Insteadofchoosingthelawofoneoftheinvolvedstatesregardlessoftheoutcomesuchachoicemightproducefortheparticularcase,thepraetorwouldfocusontheneedsofthatcaseanddeviseforitthemostappropriatesubstantivesolution,drawnfromthelawsofallinvolvedstates.
ThissubstantivistmethoddiedoutbeforethefalloftheRomanempireand,bythetimeRomanlawwas“rediscovered”inWesternEurope,theideaofchoosingoneoftheinvolvedlawsratherthanblendingthemhadsetin.Themodernselectivistmethodwasthusbornandsoonbegantodominatetheinternationalscene.
(2)ContemporaryScholasticSubstantivism
Duringthetwentiethcentury,thesubstantivistmethodmadeafairlymomentousreappearanceininternationalandinterstatecommercialarbitration,whereithasbecomethepreferredmethodamongarbitrators.Theresultistheproductionofavoluminous,ifnotwidelypublicized,bodyoftransnational,andatthesametimeanational,substantivelaw.
IntheUnitedStates,thesubstantivistmethodhasalsoacquirednewandeloquentsupportersinthewritingsofestablishedacademiccommentators,includingtwoparticipantsinthisSymposium,ProfessorsvonMehrenandJuenger.
ProfessorArthurT.vonMehrenhassuggestedthatmanytrueconflictscanberesolvedexpedientlybyacompromiseoftheconflictingpoliciesoftheinvolvedstates,ratherthanbyafullvindicationofthepoliciesoftheonestateandacompletesubordinationofthoseoftheotherstate.Thiscompromisewouldtaketheformofaspecialsubstantiverulethatwouldbeconstructedadhocforthecaseathandandwouldbederivedfromthelawsofbothorallinvolvedstates.Forexample,atrueconflictbetweenthestrictliabilitylawofonestateandthelawofanotherstatethatdoesnotimposeliabilitycouldberesolvedbyaspecialsubstantiverulethatwouldallowtherecoveryofonlyhalfofplaintiff’sactualdamages,orofcertainitemsonly,suchasmedicalexpensesandlossofearnings.
ProfessorFriedrichK.Juengeradvocatedawideruseofthesubstantivistapproach.Heproposedthatconflictsoflawsberesolvedbyconstructingfromamongtheinvolvedstatesaruleoflawthatbestaccordswithmodernsubstantive-lawtrendsandstandards.Forexample,forproductsliabilityconflicts,Juengerproposedthat,fromamongthelawsoftheplacesofconduct,injury,acquisitionoftheproduct,anddomicileoftheparties,thecourtshouldchoose“[a]stoeachissue...thatruleofdecisionwhichmostcloselyaccordswithmodernstandardsofproductsliability.”
Finally,ProfessorLutherL.McDougalarguedthat,inconstructingtheadhocsubstantiveruleofdecision,courtsshouldnotconfinethemselvestothelawsofthestatesinvolvedintheconflictbutshouldinsteadlookbeyondthoselawsandtrytoconstruct“thebest”ruleoflaw.
(3)ContemporaryJudicialSubstantivism
Theabovescholarlysuggestionshavenotyethadanyappreciableconsciousfollowingfromthebench.However,JudgeJackB.Weinstein,anotherparticipanttothisSymposium,cameclosetousingthesubstantive-lawsolutionwhenheproposedthedevelopmentofa“nationalconsensuslaw”forhandlingacomplexproduct-liabilityclassactionbroughtbythevictimsofAgentOrange.InhiscontributiontothisSymposium,JudgeWeinsteinseemstomoveinadifferentdirectionwhenheproposestheapplicationofthelawoftheforumquaforuminasimilarhypotheticalcase.BothofWeinstein’sproposalsseemtobemotivatedbyhisprofounddisillusionmentwiththeselectivistmethodaspracticedintheUnitedStates.Suchdisillusionmentonthepartofajudgewiththisbreadthanddepthofconflictsexperienceshouldgiveallofusareasonforpause.Thisdisillusionmentisquitecommonamongjudgescalledupontodecidethecomplex“megatorts”discussedbyWeinstein.Indeed,theselectivistmethodcomesveryclosetothecrashingpointincopingwiththesecasesandthusthethoughtofabandoningthemethodisentirelyunderstandable.Inordinarysingletortcases,however,theselectivistmethodremainsdominantanditsuseisrarelyquestioned.
Onepossibleexceptiontothejudicialuseoftheselectivistmethodistheincreasinguseofdé
peç
age,namelytheapplicationofthelawsofdifferentstatestodifferentissuesoraspectsofthesamecauseofaction.Dé
agecomesclosetothesubstantivistmethodinthatitleadstothecreationofahybridsubstantiverulethatdoesnotexistassuchinanyoftheinvolvedstatesandthatspringsintoexistenceonlyforthecaseathand.Nevertheless,dé
agediffersfromthesubstantivistmethodinthatitisdrivenbyselectivistratherthansubstantiveconsiderations.Itisnotanintendedsubstantivesolution,butrathertheunintendedresultofonefeatureofmodernselectivistmethods--theirinsistenceinanalyzingandresolvingeachissueseparately(called“issue-by-issueanalysis”).
Onbalance,thelackofcontemporaryjudicialfollowingofthesubstantivistmethodshouldnotbesurprising.Onereasonisthefactthatforsolong“[w]ehavebecomesoaccustomedbytraditionandtheorytoideasofconflict,choiceandselection.”Amoreseriousreason,however,hastodowithcontemporaryunderstandingsabouttheappropriateroleofjudgesandthehierarchyofsourcesoflaw.For,unlikesomearbitrators,judgesareexpectedtodecidedisputesaccordingtolaw,notexaequoetbono.Theproblemwiththejudicialversionofthesubstantivistmethodisthatitauthorizestheretroactiveapplicationtounsuspectinglitigantsofa“law”thatdoesnotinfactexistanywhereuntilthemomentthejudgeinventsanduttersit.Althoughitcouldbearguedthatthisisnodifferentthanwhatjudgeshavebeendoinginexpandingthecommonlaw,thebetterviewisthatthereis,ataminimum,alargedifferenceindegree(thedegreeofpretension)and,morelikely,animportantdifferenceinkind.
(4)LegislativeSubstantivism
Incontrast,thesubstantivistmethoddoesnotencountertheabovedifficultieswhenemployedbythelegislature,thatis,bythebodythathastheunquestionableauthoritytopromulgatenewlawthatismeanttobeappliedprospectivelyonly.Duringthetwentiethcenturythesubstantivistmethodhasbeenemployedrepeatedlyinenactinguniformsubstantiverulesintendedtoresolvemultistateproblemsdirectly,withouttheinterventionofchoice-of-lawrules.
Attheinternationallevel,theserulesoriginateininternationalconventionssuchasthe1980UnitedNationsConventionontheInternationalSaleofGoods,whichisnowinforcein56countries;
the1929WarsawConventionfortheUnificationofCertainRulesrelatingtoInternationalCarriagebyAir;
the1956GenevaConventionontheCont