股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献.docx
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股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献
股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献
(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
外文:
TakingStockSeriously:
Equity-MarketPerformance,GovernmentPolicy,andFinancialGlobalization
Mosley,LaynaSinger,DavidAndrew
Areequitymarketsjustanotherfacetofglobalfinance,oraretheyuniqueintheirresponsesto—andinfluenceson—governmentpoliciesandinstitutions?
Recentworkhasexploredtheimpactofpoliticalfactorsonbondmarketbehaviorandforeigndirectinvestment,butlittleattentionhasbeenpaidtostockmarkets.Onthebasisoftheparticularconcernsofequityinvestors,wehypothesizeapositiveassociationbetweenstock-marketvaluationsandlevelsofdemocracy,shareholderrights,legaltraditions,andcapital-accountliberalization,anegativeassociationwithrealinterestrates,andnoassociationwithfiscaldeficitsorsurpluses.Weassessourexpectationsbyanalyzingthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofaggregateprice-to-earningsratiosforasampleofupto37countriesfrom1985to2004,usingbothcross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectionalanalyses.Wefindsupportformost,butnotall,ofourhypotheses.Ourfindingssuggestthatwemustdisaggregatetheeffectsofdifferentassetmarketstounderstandtheimpactofeconomicglobalizationongovernmentpolicies.
Howdogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsaffectequity-marketperformanceacrosscountries?
Asstockmarketsgrowbroaderanddeeperinboththedevelopedanddevelopingworlds,thisquestionbecomesmorecritical.In2004,globalstock-marketcapitalizationstoodat$37.2trillion,comparedtoglobalGDPof$41.3trillion.Whilethisfigurewasslightlylessthanglobalcommercialbankassets,itmarkedlyexceededthetotalsizeofoutstandingpublicdebtsecurities,whichwere$23.1trillion.1Thebulkofglobalstock-marketcapitalizationrepresentsdeveloped-countryequitymarkets,butlessdevelopedcountrymarkets—whichaccountedfor14percentoftotalcapitalizationin2004—arequicklygainingground.Someemergingmarketcountries,suchasMalaysia,Singapore,andSouthAfrica,havetotalstock-marketcapitalizationsthatexceedtheirrespectivegrossdomesticproducts.Equitymarketsenhancecorporateefficiency,spurinnovation,andprovideavaluablesourceofcapitalforlong-termeconomicdevelopment.Theyalsoprovideausefulmechanismforgovernmentstoraisecapitalthroughthesaleofstate-ownedenterprises.Moreover,equity-marketinvestmentsconstituteanimportantelementofindividuals’assets,particularlyasgovernmentsshifttheirpensionsystemstowardtheprivatesector.Inshort,itisclearthatequitiesconstituteanincreasinglyimportantcapitalmarketintheworldeconomy.However,wecurrentlyknowverylittleabouthowgovernmentpolicychoicesandpoliticalinstitutionsinfluenceequityinvestors’decisions.
Thefewextantanalysesofstockmarketsandpoliticstendtofocusononeortwodevelopedcountries,oronsectoralvariationwithinaparticularmarket,ratherthanonthedeterminantsofnational-levelmarketoutcomesinabroadercross-countrycontext.Forinstance,DavidLeblangandBumbaMukherjeeconsidertheimpactofgovernmentpartisanshipandelectionsonstockmarketoutcomesintheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.Inawiderstudy,FionaMcGillivray(2003)considerstheimpactofpartisanchangesandelectoralinstitutionsonstock-marketoutcomesinfourteenadvanceddemocracies.Heranalyses,however,focuslargelyonindustry-levelvariation,arguingthatshiftsinpoliticalconstellationschangeinvestors’expectations
regardingwhichsectorswillbenefitfrompublicpolicies.Indeed,McGillivrayisinterestedlessinequity-marketoutcomespersethaninusingsuchoutcomesasaproxymeasureoftheexpectationsofeconomicactorsregardingpoliticaldecisions.Similarly,WilliamBernhardandDavidLeblangconsidertheimpactofpoliticsandpoliticaluncertaintyondailymarketbehaviorinseveraladvanceddemocracies.Unlikemostanalyses,theirsconsidersoutcomesinmultipleassetmarkets,includingcurrencies,equities,andgovernmentbonds.BernhardandLeblang’saim,however,istoexploretheconsequencesofdiscretepoliticalevents—suchaselectionsandcabinetformations—oncapitalmarkets,ratherthantoassessthebroaderimpactofpublicpolicyandinstitutionsoncapitalmarketoutcomes.
Thisarticleseekstoroundouttheliteratureonfinancialglobalizationbyexploringthelinkagesbetweenequity-marketoutcomesandnationalgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions.Itscontributionisboththeoreticalandempirical.Theoretically,weelaborateonthepoliticsofequity-marketperformance,focusinginparticularontheeffectsofgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsonstockmarketvaluations.Werelyontherelativelydevelopedliteratureonforeigndirectinvestmentandsovereignbondmarketstounderscorethedistinctivenessofequity-marketreactionstogovernmentpolicies.Empirically,weconductanovelevaluationofthecorrelatesoftotal-market,price-to-earningsratios(P⁄E)forasampleofupto37developedandemergingmarketcountriesduringthe1985–2004period.Cross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectional(TSCS)analysesrevealthatlevelsofdemocracy,marketliquidity,shareholderrights,andcapital-accountliberalizationarepositivelyassociatedwithequity-marketvaluations,whilerealinterestratesarenegativelyassociated.Wealsofindthatinvestorsarepositivelydisposedtowardequitymarketsinemerging-marketcountries,andnegativelydisposedtowardmarketswithhighdividendpayoutratios.Interestingly,manyofthepoliticalandeconomicfactors—includinginflation,andfiscalpolicy—deemedhighlysalienttoinvestorsinotherfinancialmarketsarenotstatisticallyassociatedwithstock-marketvaluations.Theseresultsarerobusttotheinclusionofanumberofcontrolvariables,includingcapital-assetpricingmodel(CAPM)factorsandalternativepricingmodelconsiderations.
Notethattheresponsesofinvestorstopoliciesandinstitutionsalsohaveimplicationsforfuturegovernmentpolicychoices.Forinstance,ifanation’seconomyreliesmoreheavilyonFDIthanonsovereignlendingorbankfinancing,itsgovernmentmayfacefewpressurestoreducepublicspending.Ontheotherhand,ifagovernmentreliesheavilyonthebondmarkettofinanceitsexpenditures,buthasarelativelylowlevelofstock-marketcapitalization,itmayfacegreaterpressuresforfiscalandmonetarytightening.Andifacountryreliesonavariedmenuoffinancialinflows,asmostdo,assetholderswillexpressdiversepreferencesoverpublicpolicy.Untanglingthevariousfinancial-marketinfluencesongovernmentpolicymakingisclearlyalongtermresearchproject.Thisarticle,whichfocusesonthepoliticaldeterminantsofequityinvestors’behavior,complementssimilaranalysesofsovereignbondmarketsandforeigndirectinvestment.Onceweunderstandhowinvestorsineachmarketreacttogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions,wecanthenadvancetoabroaderanalysisoftheimpactoffinancialmarkets—alongwithdomesticinstitutions,interestgroups,andotherfactors—ongovernmentpolicymakingandinstitutionaldesign.
Stock-marketperformanceisincreasinglyatargetofanalysisbypoliticalscientists,becauseequityinvestorsmaybehighlysensitivetotheeffectsofcertaingovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsontheirinvestments.Equityinvestmentsaregenerallyveryliquid,andthetimehorizonsofequityinvestorsareoftenrelativelyshort.Asaresult,changesingovernmentpoliciescantriggeraswiftresponsebyinvestors.Governmentpoliciesthatenhanceinvestorconfidence—eitherdirectly,byprovidingshareholderprotectionsandeaseofexit,orindirectly,byexpandingtheeconomyandimprovingcorporateearnings—willberewardedbyhigherstockpricesandmarketvaluations.Ontheotherhand,investorscanquicklywithdrawtheirfundsifgovernmentschoosemarket-unfriendlypolicies,therebygeneratingdownwardpressureonstockpricesandvaluations.Stockmarkets,inshort,areavaluableindicatoroffinancialactors’preferencesovergovernmentinstitutionsandpolicyoutcomes.
Afittingalternativemeasureofperformanceistheratioofthestockpricetocompanyearnings—or,inotherwords,thepricethatequityinvestorsarewillingtopayforanexpectedstreamofprofits.Aswithstockprices,theseratiosreflectinvestors’expectationsaboutfutureearnings,buttheyalsosignalinvestors’preferencesovertime-varyinggovernmentpolicyandlargelyinvariantpoliticalinstitutions.Becauseofthelatter,cross-nationalvariationinP⁄Eratiospersistsevenwhennationalstockmarketsarehitsimultaneouslybyglobalpriceshocks.
Theextantliteratureonthelinkagesbetweenglobalizationanddomesticpoliticshaspaidscantattentiontothediversewaysinwhichcountriesareintegratedintotheworldeconomy.Byassumingthatfinancialmarketsimposeaunifiedinfluenceongovernmentpolicies,priorstudieshaveoverlookedthestarkvariationinthepreferencesofinvestorsacrossdifferenttypesoffinancialassets.Inthisarticle,wearguethatequityinvestorsarebecominganincreasinglyinfluentialforceintheglobaleconomy,andthattheirpreferencesdivergefromthoseofotherfinancialactorsinimportantways.Toillustratethisdivergence,wepresentempiricalanalysesofthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofequitymarketperformanceacrossasampleofdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Amongthemostinterestingfindingsarethatmarketvaluationsaresignificantlyassociatedwithcapital-accountopenness,shareholderprotections,levelsofdevelopment,andalternativedomesticinvestments.Inaddition,equityinvestorsappear