最新财经文献分析素材.docx

最新财经文献分析素材.docx

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最新财经文献分析素材

C3G1GroupMembers：

杨文菊（41223014）牛玉霞（41204181）

栾甜甜（41204266）王思齐（41204273）

刘宇（41204299）江秀侠（41230038）

推荐理由：

金融危机让央行的日子不再平静，它不仅打破了央行长期保持经济平稳运行的记录，也使常规的经济调节工具不起作用，也许正是由此，你第一次了解到了QE的存在，事实上，它就归属于两大类非常规经济工具。

想知道QE是在何种背景下登上历史舞台的吗？

想看看它在经济舞台上的表现吗？

在这篇文章中探索你的答案吧！

ControllingInterest

Monetarypolicyafterthecrash

September21st2013

FromTheEconomist

Thethirdofourseriesofarticlesonthefinancialcrisislooksattheunconventionalmethodscentralbankershaveadoptedtostimulategrowthinitswake

1.Beforethefinancialcrisislifewassimpleforcentralbankers.Theyhadaclearmission:

temperboomsandbuststomaintainlowandstableinflation.Andtheyhadaseeminglyeffectivemeanstoachievethat:

nudge（推进）akeyshort-terminterestrateuptodiscourageborrowing（andthuscheckinflation（遏制通胀））,ordowntofosterloosercredit（andthusspurgrowthandemployment）p1.Deft（灵巧的）useofthistechniquehadkepttheworldhummingalongsosmoothlyinthedecadesbeforethecrashthateconomistshaddeclareda“GreatModeration”intheeconomiccycle.Asitturnedout,however,themoderation（自我节制）wastransitory—andthecrashthatendeditunderminednotonlythecentralbankers’recordbutalsothemethodtheyreliedontopropupgrowth.Monetarypolicyhasbeeninastateofupheaval（动荡）eversince.

2.Therecession（经济衰退）thataccompaniedthecreditcrunchintheautumnof2008deliveredamassiveblowtodemand.Inresponsecentralbanksintherichworldslashedtheirbenchmarkinterestrates.Byearly2009manywereclosetozero,approachingwhateconomistscallthe“zerolowerbound”.Evenso,growthremainedelusive.Pushingratesbelowzero,thoughtechnicallypossible,wouldnothavehelped.Negativerateswouldmerelyhaveencourageddepositorstowithdrawtheirmoneyfrombanksandholditascash,onwhichtherateofreturn,atzero,wouldhavebeenhigher.Centralbanksinthedevelopedeconomiesfacedafrighteningcollapse（崩溃）inoutputandsoaringunemploymentwithoutrecoursetothetoolthathadbeenthemainstayofmonetarypolicy-makingforageneration.

3.Centralbankswerenotentirelyunpreparedforthischallenge.Inthe1990stheJapaneseeconomyhadslumped（暴跌）followinganasset-pricecrash.FacingweakgrowthanddeflationtheBankofJapanhadslashedratestonear-zerobeforeembarkingonaseriesofexperimentswithunconventionalmonetarytools.AlthoughtheBankofJapan’sperformancewaswidelyconsidereddisappointing,ifnotanoutrightfailure,therichworld’scentralbanksbeganbydrawinguponitsplaybook.

4.Unconventionalpolicyfallsintotwobroadcategories:

assetpurchasesand“forwardguidance”.Assetpurchasesareanaturalextensionofcentralbanks’moretypicalactivities.America’sFederalReserve,forinstance,haslongboughtTreasurybillsandotherbondswithshortmaturitiestoincreasethemoneysupplyandreduceshort-terminterestrates.AfteritsbenchmarkratefellclosetozerotheFedbeganbuyinglonger-termsecurities,includingten-yearTreasurybondsandmortgage-backedsecurities,tobringdownlong-runborrowingcosts（seechart1）.

5.Printingmoneytobuyassetsisknownas“quantitativeeasing”（QE）becausecentralbanksoftenannouncepurchaseplansintermsofadesiredincreaseinthequantityofbankreserves.TheBankofJapanfirstattemptedQEin2001whenitpromisedtobuy{Yen（日元）}400billion-worthofgovernmentbondsamonthinordertoraisethelevelofreservesto{Yen}5trillion（万亿）.ThecentralbanksofAmerica,BritainandJapanhaveallengagedinQEsincethecrisisstruck,buyingupavaststockoffinancialassets（seechart2）.

6.Economistsreckon（评定）QEworksinafewways.Centralbankersemphasisethe“portfolio-balanceeffect”.Whenacentralbankbuysbondsfrominvestorswithnewlycreatedmoney,theyusetheproceedstorebalancetheirportfolio（总资产）bybuyingassetsofdifferentriskandmaturity.Indoingsotheyboostassetpricesanddepressinterestrates（increaseddemandforbondsallowsthemtobesoldatlowerrates）.Cheaperborrowing,inturn,prodsbusinessesandhouseholdstoinvest.

7.QEcanstimulate（刺激）theeconomyvia（通过，经由）afiscaleffect,too:

lowerinterestratesreducegovernmentborrowingcostsandsolowerexpectedfuturetaxation.AndQEalsohelpsshapeexpectationsofinflation.Acentralbankannouncinganew,higherinflationtargetmightuseQEtoconvincemarketsitwillmeetit,since,otherthingsbeingequal,anincreaseintheamountofmoneyincirculationleadstohigherprices.Ifpeoplethinktheirmoneywillbeworthlessinthefuture,theyhaveanincentive（动机，刺激）tospendmoreofitnow.

Talkingprop

8.Forwardguidance,theothermainunconventionaltool,isanattempttoboosttheeconomybysignalling（发信号）centralbanks’futurepoliciesmoreclearly.TheBankofJapanfirstattemptedtotalktheeconomybacktohealthin1999,whenitpromisedtokeepitsmaininterestratenearzero“untildeflationaryconcernssubside（消退）”.TheFedandtheBankofEnglandhavesincemimicked（模仿）thisapproach.Inearly2009theFedsaiditsinterestratewaslikelytoremainlowfor“anextendedperiod”.InAugust2011itsoughttoimprovethisformulation（构想）byaddingadate,specifying（说明）thatlowrateswouldstickaround（逗留）untilatleastmid-2013.

9.InDecember2012theFedadjusteditscommunicationsagain.Itannouncedthatrateswouldstaylowuntiltheunemploymentratehadfallentoatleast6.5%,aslongasshort-runexpectationsofinflationwerenomorethan2.5%.InAugust2013theBankofEnglandfollowedsuit,statingthatitwouldnotraiseratesuntilunemploymenthadfallento7%,provided（假如）financialmarketsbehavedthemselvesandinflationremainedsubdued（被抑制的）.

10.LikeQE,forwardguidanceworksinseveralways.Apromisetotoleratehigherinflationinthefuture,ifbelieved,canstimulate（刺激）economicactivityinthepresent,justasthethreatofhigherpricesduetoanexpandedmoneysupplydoes.Bythesametoken（表征）,apromisetoholdshort-termrateslowforalongtimeshouldreducelong-termratestoo,sincelong-termratesaretypicallycompounded（复合的）short-termratesalongwithapremium（溢价）toallowforrisinginflationandotherrisksp2.

11.Inaddition,investorsrespondtothe“real”orinflation-adjustedinterestrate,whichequalsthe“nominal”oradvertisedinterestrateminusexpectedinflation.Wheninflationisexpectedtobenegative,meaningthatpricesarefalling,therealinterestratemayactuallyrise.Deflation,byraisingthevalueofaunitofmoneyintermsofothergoods,ineffectincreasesthecostofborrowing.Ifacentralbankcrediblypromisesmorefutureinflation,bycontrast,therealinterestratecanfallandevendipbelowzero.Anegativerealinterestrateworkswhereanegativenominalinterestratedoesnot:

holdingcashdoesnogood,sinceinflationreducesthepurchasingpowerofhardcurrencyaswellasdeposits.Itisthereforeineveryone’sinteresttosaveless,andtoborrowandinvestmore.

Fromtheorytopractice

12.Studiesofquantitativeeasinggenerallyfindthatithasindeedreducedlong-terminterestrates.Oneruleofthumb（经验法则）hasitthat$600billioninpurchasesbringsdownlong-runratesby0.15-0.2percentagepoints,equivalentin（等价于）impacttoacutof0.75percentagepointsintheFed’sbenchmarkshort-terminterestrate.LowerratesareestimatedtohaveraisedrealoutputinBritainandAmerica2-3%higherthanitwouldhavebeenwithoutQE,eventhoughborrowingcostsremainedstubbornlyhighforBritishbanks.

13.RecentresearchalsosuggeststhatQEplaysastrongroleinreinforcingacentralbank’sforwardguidance.TheFed’ssignalling,forexample,seemstoberesponsibleformuchofthemovementinthepricesevenofassetsitisnotbuyingitself.p3Andmarketbetsonfutureinterestratesrevealthatinvestorsfindcentralbanks’promisestokeeprateslowmorecrediblewhenaccompaniedbyQEpurchases.

14.Whetherforwardguidanceiseffectiveatboostingoutputishardertosay.Thereissomeagreementthatcommunicationaboutfuturepolicyreduceslong-terminterestrates.Butitisunclearwhyratesfall.Theycoulddropbecausemarketsbelievethecentralbank’spromisetokeepshort-termrateslow,whichshouldencouragemoreinvestmentandgrowth.Buttheycoulddropbecausemarketsreadthecentralbank’sguidanceasasignalthattheeconomyisweakerthanexpected,implyinglessdemandforloans.Thatcouldactuallyprovecounterproductive（适得其反）ifitdiscouragednewinvestment.

15.SomerecentFedresearchsuggeststhefirsteffect—thecredibility（可信性）ofthepromise—ismoreimportant.Otherworkindicatesthatguidancemaybemorepowerfulwhenitclearlyrepresentsa“commitment”toaparticularpolicyratherthana“forecast”offutureeconomicconditionsandthepolicythatislikelytoflowfrom（来自）them.

16.Whatiscertainisthatforalltheexperimentation,therichworld’sbigeconomiesarestillstruggling.OutputinBritainremainsbelowitspre-crisis（危机前）peak.Some10mfewerAmericansarenowworkingthanmightreasonablyhavebeenexpectedin2007.Theeuroarea（欧元区）isonlyjustescapingthesecondtroughofadouble-diprecession,anditsunemploymentrateremainsindoubledigits.Unconventionalmonetarypolicy,inshort,doesnotseemtobeworkingaswellastheconventionalsortusedto—butthereisnoagreementwhy.

17.Someeconomistsmaintainthatmonetarypolicy,conventionalorotherwise,losesmuchofitspoweratthezerolowerbound.SimonWren-LewisofOxfordUniversityarguesthatmonetarypolicycannotstabilisetheeconomywithoutfiscaleasing,meaningmoregovernmentspendingorlowertaxes,totransmitnewlycreatedmoneyandlowratesintotherealecon