最新财经文献分析素材.docx

1、最新财经文献分析素材C3G1 Group Members：杨文菊（41223014） 牛玉霞（41204181） 栾甜甜（41204266） 王思齐（41204273） 刘 宇（41204299） 江秀侠（41230038）推荐理由：金融危机让央行的日子不再平静，它不仅打破了央行长期保持经济平稳运行的记录，也使常规的经济调节工具不起作用，也许正是由此，你第一次了解到了QE的存在，事实上，它就归属于两大类非常规经济工具。想知道QE是在何种背景下登上历史舞台的吗？想看看它在经济舞台上的表现吗？在这篇文章中探索你的答案吧！Controlling InterestMonetary policy aft

2、er the crashSeptember 21st 2013From The EconomistThe third of our series of articles on the financial crisis looks at the unconventional methods central bankers have adopted to stimulate growth in its wake1. Before the financial crisis life was simple for central bankers. They had a clear mission: t

3、emper booms and busts to maintain low and stable inflation. And they had a seemingly effective means to achieve that: nudge（推进） a key short-term interest rate up to discourage borrowing (and thus check inflation（遏制通胀）), or down to foster looser credit (and thus spur growth and employment)p1. Deft（灵巧

4、的） use of this technique had kept the world humming along so smoothly in the decades before the crash that economists had declared a “Great Moderation” in the economic cycle. As it turned out, however, the moderation（自我节制） was transitoryand the crash that ended it undermined not only the central ban

5、kers record but also the method they relied on to prop up growth. Monetary policy has been in a state of upheaval（动荡） ever since.2. The recession（经济衰退） that accompanied the credit crunch in the autumn of 2008 delivered a massive blow to demand. In response central banks in the rich world slashed the

6、ir benchmark interest rates. By early 2009 many were close to zero, approaching what economists call the “zero lower bound”. Even so, growth remained elusive. Pushing rates below zero, though technically possible, would not have helped. Negative rates would merely have encouraged depositors to withd

7、raw their money from banks and hold it as cash, on which the rate of return, at zero, would have been higher. Central banks in the developed economies faced a frightening collapse（崩溃） in output and soaring unemployment without recourse to the tool that had been the mainstay of monetary policy-making

8、 for a generation.3. Central banks were not entirely unprepared for this challenge. In the 1990s the Japanese economy had slumped（暴跌） following an asset-price crash. Facing weak growth and deflation the Bank of Japan had slashed rates to near-zero before embarking on a series of experiments with unc

9、onventional monetary tools. Although the Bank of Japans performance was widely considered disappointing, if not an outright failure, the rich worlds central banks began by drawing upon its playbook.4. Unconventional policy falls into two broad categories: asset purchases and “forward guidance”. Asse

10、t purchases are a natural extension of central banks more typical activities. Americas Federal Reserve, for instance, has long bought Treasury bills and other bonds with short maturities to increase the money supply and reduce short-term interest rates. After its benchmark rate fell close to zero th

11、e Fed began buying longer-term securities, including ten-year Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities, to bring down long-run borrowing costs (see chart 1). 5. Printing money to buy assets is known as “quantitative easing” (QE) because central banks often announce purchase plans in terms of a

12、desired increase in the quantity of bank reserves. The Bank of Japan first attempted QE in 2001 when it promised to buy Yen（日元）400 billion-worth of government bonds a month in order to raise the level of reserves to Yen5 trillion（万亿）. The central banks of America, Britain and Japan have all engaged

13、in QE since the crisis struck, buying up a vast stock of financial assets (see chart 2). 6. Economists reckon（评定） QE works in a few ways. Central bankers emphasise the “portfolio-balance effect”. When a central bank buys bonds from investors with newly created money, they use the proceeds to rebalan

14、ce their portfolio（总资产） by buying assets of different risk and maturity. In doing so they boost asset prices and depress interest rates (increased demand for bonds allows them to be sold at lower rates). Cheaper borrowing, in turn, prods businesses and households to invest.7. QE can stimulate（刺激） th

15、e economy via（通过，经由） a fiscal effect, too: lower interest rates reduce government borrowing costs and so lower expected future taxation. And QE also helps shape expectations of inflation. A central bank announcing a new, higher inflation target might use QE to convince markets it will meet it, since

16、, other things being equal, an increase in the amount of money in circulation leads to higher prices. If people think their money will be worth less in the future, they have an incentive（动机，刺激） to spend more of it now.Talking prop8. Forward guidance, the other main unconventional tool, is an attempt

17、 to boost the economy by signalling(发信号) central banks future policies more clearly. The Bank of Japan first attempted to talk the economy back to health in 1999, when it promised to keep its main interest rate near zero “until deflationary concerns subside（消退）”. The Fed and the Bank of England have

18、 since mimicked（模仿） this approach. In early 2009 the Fed said its interest rate was likely to remain low for “an extended period”. In August 2011 it sought to improve this formulation（构想） by adding a date, specifying（说明） that low rates would stick around（逗留） until at least mid-2013.9. In December 20

19、12 the Fed adjusted its communications again. It announced that rates would stay low until the unemployment rate had fallen to at least 6.5%, as long as short-run expectations of inflation were no more than 2.5%. In August 2013 the Bank of England followed suit, stating that it would not raise rates

20、 until unemployment had fallen to 7%, provided（假如） financial markets behaved themselves and inflation remained subdued（被抑制的）.10. Like QE, forward guidance works in several ways. A promise to tolerate higher inflation in the future, if believed, can stimulate（刺激） economic activity in the present, jus

21、t as the threat of higher prices due to an expanded money supply does. By the same token（表征）, a promise to hold short-term rates low for a long time should reduce long-term rates too, since long-term rates are typically compounded（复合的） short-term rates along with a premium（溢价） to allow for rising in

22、flation and other risksp2.11. In addition, investors respond to the “real” or inflation-adjusted interest rate, which equals the “nominal” or advertised interest rate minus expected inflation. When inflation is expected to be negative, meaning that prices are falling, the real interest rate may actu

23、ally rise. Deflation, by raising the value of a unit of money in terms of other goods, in effect increases the cost of borrowing. If a central bank credibly promises more future inflation, by contrast, the real interest rate can fall and even dip below zero. A negative real interest rate works where

24、 a negative nominal interest rate does not: holding cash does no good, since inflation reduces the purchasing power of hard currency as well as deposits. It is therefore in everyones interest to save less, and to borrow and invest more.From theory to practice12. Studies of quantitative easing genera

25、lly find that it has indeed reduced long-term interest rates. One rule of thumb (经验法则） has it that $600 billion in purchases brings down long-run rates by 0.15-0.2 percentage points, equivalent in（等价于） impact to a cut of 0.75 percentage points in the Feds benchmark short-term interest rate. Lower ra

26、tes are estimated to have raised real output in Britain and America 2-3% higher than it would have been without QE, even though borrowing costs remained stubbornly high for British banks.13. Recent research also suggests that QE plays a strong role in reinforcing a central banks forward guidance. Th

27、e Feds signalling, for example, seems to be responsible for much of the movement in the prices even of assets it is not buying itself.p3 And market bets on future interest rates reveal that investors find central banks promises to keep rates low more credible when accompanied by QE purchases.14. Whe

28、ther forward guidance is effective at boosting output is harder to say. There is some agreement that communication about future policy reduces long-term interest rates. But it is unclear why rates fall. They could drop because markets believe the central banks promise to keep short-term rates low, w

29、hich should encourage more investment and growth. But they could drop because markets read the central banks guidance as a signal that the economy is weaker than expected, implying less demand for loans. That could actually prove counterproductive（适得其反） if it discouraged new investment.15. Some rece

30、nt Fed research suggests the first effectthe credibility（可信性） of the promiseis more important. Other work indicates that guidance may be more powerful when it clearly represents a “commitment” to a particular policy rather than a “forecast” of future economic conditions and the policy that is likely

31、 to flow from（来自） them.16. What is certain is that for all the experimentation, the rich worlds big economies are still struggling. Output in Britain remains below its pre-crisis(危机前) peak. Some 10m fewer Americans are now working than might reasonably have been expected in 2007. The euro area(欧元区)

32、is only just escaping the second trough of a double-dip recession, and its unemployment rate remains in double digits. Unconventional monetary policy, in short, does not seem to be working as well as the conventional sort used tobut there is no agreement why.17. Some economists maintain that monetar

33、y policy, conventional or otherwise, loses much of its power at the zero lower bound. Simon Wren-Lewis of Oxford University argues that monetary policy cannot stabilise the economy without fiscal easing, meaning more government spending or lower taxes, to transmit newly created money and low rates into the real econ