Diamond金融中介理论.docx
《Diamond金融中介理论.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《Diamond金融中介理论.docx(49页珍藏版)》请在冰豆网上搜索。
Diamond金融中介理论
......
FinancialIntermediationandDelegatedMonitoring
——DOUGLASW.DIAMOND
UniversityofChicago
BackgroundofDiamond
DOUGLASW.DIAMOND
GraduateSchoolofBusiness
UniversityofChicago
Chicago,IL60637
Phone:
(773)702-7283
E-mail:
douglas.diamond@uchicago.edu
Born:
October1953
MartialStatus:
Married,twochildren
A.B.,Economics,BrownUniversity,June1975.
M.A.,Economics,YaleUniversity,December1976.
M.Phil.,Economics,YaleUniversity,December1977.
Ph.D.,Economics,YaleUniversity,June1980.
DouglasW.Diamondspecializesinthestudyoffinancial
intermediaries,financialcrises,andliquidity,bank
regulationanddepositinsurance;debtmaturitystructureandtheroleof
short-termdebt.
.专业专注.
......
Publications
(1)“InformationAggregationinaNoisyRationalExpectationsEconomy,”
JournalofFinancialEconomics,September1981(withRobertVerrecchia).
(2)“OptimalManagerialContractsandEquilibriumSecurityPrices,Finance,May1982(withRobertVerrecchia).
(3)“BankRuns,DepositInsuranceandLiquidity,”JournalofPoliticalEcon
June1983(withPhilipDybvig).
(4)“FinancialIntermediationandDelegatedMonitoring,”ReviewofEc
Studies,July1984.
(5)“OptimalReleaseofInformationbyFirms,”JournalofFinance,September
1985.
(6)“BankingTheory,DepositInsuranceandBankRegulation,Journal”ofBusiness,January1986(withPhilipDybvig).
(7)“DebtMaturityStructureandLiquidityRisk,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,August1991.
(8)“MonitoringandReputation:
TheChoiceBetweenBankLoansandDirectly
PlacedDebt,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy,August1991.
(9)“Disclosure,LiquidityandtheCostofCapital,Journal”ofFinance,September1991.(withRobertVerrecchia).
(10)“BankLoanMaturityandPriorityWhenBorrowersCanRefinance,in”
CapitalMarketsandFinancialIntermediation,ColinMayerandXavierVives
(editors),CambridgeUniversityPress,1993.
.专业专注.
......
(11)“SeniorityandMaturityofDebtContracts,”Journalcs,ofFinancialEcono
June1993.
(12)“CorporateCapitalStructure:
TheControlRolesofBankandPublicDebt,
withTaxesandCostlyBankruptcy,”EconomicQuarterlyoftheFederalReserve
BankofRichmond,Spring1994.
(13)“FinancialIntermediationasDelegatedMonitoring,aSimpleExample,”
EconomicQuarterlyoftheFederalReserveBankofRichmond,Summer1996.
(14)“Liquidity,Banks,andMarkets,Journal”ofPoliticalEconomy,October1997.
(15)“Liquidityrisk,liquiditycreationandfinancialfragility:
Atheoryofbanking,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy109(April2001).(withRaghuram
Rajan).
(16)“Banks,ShortTermDebtandFinancialCrises:
Theory,PolicyImplicationsandApplications,March”2000,CarnegieRochesterConferenceonPublicPolicy,54(Summer2001).(withRaghuramRajan).
(17)“BanksandLiquidity,American”EconomicReview,Papersand
Proceedings,(May2001).(withRaghuramRajan).
(18)“LiquidityShortagesandBankingCrises,”April2005,JournalofFinance.(withRaghuramRajan).
(19)
“MoneyinaTheoryofBanking,
”AmericanEconomicReview,March2006.
(withRaghuramRajan).
(20)
“DelegatedMonitoringandLegalProtection,
”workingpaper,Universit
.专业专注.
......
ofChicagoGSB,June2005,revisedOctober2006.
(21)“BanksandLiquidityCreation:
ASimpleExpositionofthe
Diamond-DybvigModel,”EconomicQuarterlyoftheFederalReserveBankof
Richmond,Spring2007Vol.93No.2.
(22)“Banks,RunsandLiquidityCreation,”workingpaper,UniversityofChicago
GSB,January2007,revisedAugust2007.
(23)“IlliquidityandInterestRatePolicy,”workingpaper,UniversityofChica
GSB,September2008.(withRaghuramRajan).
FinancialIntermediation
CostInformationRisk
TradingInformationRisk
costasymmetriesAversion
RiskmanagementFinancial
&InnovationsFunction
ParticipationcostsSpiral
.专业专注.
......
◆Gurley&Shaw:
MoneyinaTheoryofFinance
◆Leland&Pyle:
Informationasymmetries,financialstructure,and
financialintermediation
◆Diamond:
FinancialIntermediationandDelegatedMonitoring
◆Merton:
FinancialInnovationsSpiral
◆Allen&Santomero:
Managerialself-interest,Thenon-linearityoftaxes,Thecostoffinancialdistress,Theexistenceofcapitalmarketimperfection
OUTLINE
Thispaperdevelopsatheoryoffinancialintermediationbasedon
minimizingthecostofmonitoringinformationwhichisusefulforresolving
incentiveproblemsbetweenborrowersandlenders.Itpresentsa
characterizationofthecostofprovidingincentivesfordelegatedmonitoring
byafinancialintermediary.
Diversificationwithinanintermediaryservestoreducethesecosts,even
inariskneutraleconomy.Thepaperpresentssomemoregeneralanalysisof
theeffectofdiversificationonresolvingincentiveproblems.Inthe
environmentassumedinthemodel,debtcontractswithcostlybankruptcy
.专业专注.
......
areshowntobeoptimal.Theanalysishasimplicationsfortheportfolio
structureandcapitalstructureofintermediaries.
1.INTRODUCTION
2.ASIMPLEMODELOFFIRMBORROWING
3.DELEGATEDMONITORINGBYAFINANCIALINTERMEDIARY
4.RISKAVERSIONANDDIVERSIFICATION
5.COMPARISONWITHLELAND-PYLE(1977)RESULTS
6.CONCLUSION
Section2and3
RiskNeutralandWealthConstraint
.专业专注.
......
现代金融中介理论基于功能分析范式
其基石:
交易成本理论和委托代理理论
Section4
RiskAversionandNoWealthConstraint
HOW
WHY
&
Section5
ComparisonwithLeland-Pyleresults
ASIMPLEMODELOFFIRMBORROWING
Basicmodel:
Whennointermediaries
.专业专注.
......
假设:
1.只考虑一期,所有经济主体均为风险中性。
~
[0,y]
y
2.企业家有一个项目,要投资1单位,
但他初始财富为0,只
要每单位资金预期回报不低于
R,投资者就愿意借出资金
~
3.产出为随机变量y
~
,E(y)RK,投资者只知道产出的概率分布,事后
实现值y只有企业家知道。
4.企业家支付给投资者为z,自己保留y-z,满足z≤y,即存在财富约束。
5.投资者可以对企业家实施非现金惩罚(Non-pecuniarypenalties)。
Mechanismdesign
(1)
max()Ey
[maxz[0,y]
~
~
~
(z)]
(1a)
yz
S.T.zargmax
yz(z)1b(IC)
z[0,y]
E[argmax~
yz[0,y]
~
(z)]R
Ib(IR)
yz
Theoptimalcontractisadebtcontract
命题1:
该机制设计问题的解为(z)max(hz,0)
其中h是方程
~~~
(2)
(P(yh)E~y[yyh])(P(yh)h)R
经济含义:
最优合约是一个债务合约,面值为h,非现金破
产惩罚为实际支付与h之间的差额,其中h是能够给予投资
.专业专注.
......
者的预期收益R的最小值。
Proof:
给定Φ*(z),易知:
argmaxz[0,y]yz
(z)
y,y
h
h,y
h
~
~
z
min(y,h)
即,
根据
(2)式,条件(
1c)满足。
根据构造,
h
是满足给定约束
z≤y,z≤h
且
~
E(z)R
的最小的值。
如果
(z)在给定的
下,h
h是激励相容的(当然还满足1(c)),即满
足条件(1b),必有
即对任意z’≤h+都有:
(z')h(h)z'
(z)h(h)z
hz
(z)
这意味着合约Φ*(z)是一个满足(1c)的且带来最小罚金的激励相容的合
同,也就是它最大化
(1)式。
.专业专注.
......
Threesolutionstomoralhazardwhenmlenders
1.签约不监督,成本为预期的非现金破产惩罚:
E~z[
*
~
E~y[
*
~
(z)]
(y)]
2.m个投资者都监督,成本为m*K(也可能由于搭便车没人监督)。
3.委托监督。
在以上几种方案中,成本最小的方案将被采用
委托监督的总成本:
1.若金融中介的行动与信息不为投资者所知,便存在委托代理的问题,需要提供激励使中介自动监督并执行契约,此成本为D。
2.中介执行监督的physicalcost,K。
3.所以若有:
KDmin[Ey[*(y)],(mK)]
那么,中介就会产生
Basicrelationships
(1)
Lenders
Intermediary
An
entrepreneur
.专业专注.
......
委托监督关系,发生监督关系,发生
委托监督成本=D监督成本=K
Delegatedmonitoringbyafinancialintermediary
◆Economistshavetriedtoexplaintheintermediaryrolebyarguingthat
thefinancialintermediaryhasacostadvantageincertaintasks.
◆Whensuchtasksinvolveunobservedactionsbytheintermediaryor
theobservationofprivateinformation,thenanagency/incentiveproblemfor
theintermediarymayexist
◆Anytheorywhichtriestoexplaintheroleofintermediarybyan
informationcostadvantagemustnetoutthecostofprovidingincentivesto
theintermediaryfromanycostsavingsinproducinginformation.
本节的假设与符号含义:
1.金融中介风险中性,初始财富为零,接受投资者的存款并受其委托监督企业的产出,监督每一个企业的成本为K,投资者可观测的只有他从金融中介得到的支付。
2.每个投资项目需一单位的初始资金,每个投资者的存款为1/m,中介与N个
企业签约,并有m*N个存款人。
.专业专注.
..
..
..
~
3.yi,i=1,,N,代表第i个企业的事后实现收入yi代表事前随机收入,他
~
[o,y],其分布为共同信息。
们不相关且yi
~
N
~
GN
N
gi(yi)
GN
i1gi(yi)
i1
4.
表示项目的收益为
。
且中介采取监督方案
时企业家支付给银行的非负金额
,
gi(yi)
yi
为相应的随
即企业的总收入。
机变量。
5.ZN代表代表银行对存款人的支付,由于财富约束ZN≤GN,所以
(ZN)表
示存款人对中介的非现金惩罚。
结论:
由命题1可知:
(ZN)max[HNZN,0]
其中HN是以下方程的最小解:
{(P(GNHN)EGN[GNGN
HN])([1
P(GNHN)]HN)}
NR
~
HN
~
中介的预期收入
E(GN)
,中介的监督决策是最大化
E(GN)
,
就好比它的监督决策是可被存款人观测一般
。
可见最小成本合约不仅提供了向
存款人支付的激励,也提供了自动监督的激励,故是债务合约。
Lenders
Intermediary
N
entrepreneurs
s
.专业专注.
......
委托监督关系,发生委托监
~
DEZ((Z))
督成本
~
每个项目为DN。
监督关系,发生监督
成本N*K,每个项目
为K。
命题2:
每一个被监督的企业的平均委托成本DN趋近于零,如果N→∞,且每
个企业的产出不相关并存在上下限。
Proof:
选择gi=gi(yi)Egi
[gi]RK
DN
使选择非现金惩罚
函数:
(ZN)max[HNZN,0]HNN(RDN/2)
其中给定非现金惩罚契约,中介对存款人的支付为:
Z
{GH
GN
H
N
H
N
NGN
N
N
中介的预期收益:
E(G)H
N
NK[N(RKD)][N(RDN)](NK)
GNN
N
2
N
0
DN
2
存款人的预期收益:
PNEGN[GN
GNHN](1
PN)HN,其中PNP(GNHN)