上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料.docx

上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料.docx

《上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料.docx（20页珍藏版）》请在冰豆网上搜索。

上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料

本份文档包含：

关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述

一、外文文献

文献出处：

AborJ; BokpinA.Investmentopportunities,corporatefinance,anddividendpayoutpolicy.StudiesinEconomicsandFinance.2015;27（3）:

180-194.

Investmentopportunities,corporatefinance,anddividendpayoutpolicy

AborJ; BokpinA

Abstract

Purpose-Thepurposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheeffectsofinvestmentopportunitiesandcorporatefinanceondividendpayoutpolicy.Design/methodology/approach-Thisissueistestedwithasampleof34emergingmarketcountriescoveringa17-yearperiod,1990-2006.Fixedeffectspanelmodelisemployedinourestimation.Findings-Asignificantlynegativerelationshipbetweeninvestmentopportunitysetanddividendpayoutpolicyisfound.Thereare,however,insignificanteffectsofthevariousmeasuresofcorporatefinancenamely,financialleverage,externalfinancing,anddebtmaturityondividendpayoutpolicy.Profitabilityandstockmarketcapitalizationarealsoidentifiedasimportantininfluencingdividendpayoutpolicy.Profitablefirmsaremorelikelytosupporthighdividendpaymentstoshareholders.However,firmsinrelativelywell-developedmarketstendtoexhibitlowdividendpayoutpolicy.Originality/value-Themainvalueofthepaperisinrespectofthefactthatitusesalargedatasetfromemergingmarketcountries.Theresultsgenerallysupportexistingliteratureoninvestmentopportunitysetanddividendpayoutpolicy.

Keywords:

International;Dividends;Corporatefinance;

1.Introduction

Theimpactofinvestmentandfinancingdecisionsonfirmvaluehasbeenthefocusofextensiveresearchsince[50]ModiglianiandMiller（1958）proposedthe"separationprinciple".Thetheoryassertsthatinaperfectcapitalmarket,thevalueofthefirmisindependentofthemannerinwhichitsproductiveassetsarefinanced.Infactsomeauthorslike[12]Barnesetal.（1981）supporttheirview.However,othershavecontrastedthefindingsoftheearlierstudiessuggestingthatinvestment,financing,anddividendpolicyarerelated（[30]GrabowskiandMueller,1972;[46]McCabe,1979;[5]Anderson,1983）.ThisispredicatedontheassumptionthatModiglianiandMiller'sidealworlddoesnotexist.Financialmarketsarenotperfectgiventaxes,transactioncosts,bankruptcycosts,agencycosts,anduncertaininflationinthemarketplace.Accordingto[13]BiermanandHass（1983）,managementusuallyaddressesthedividendtargetpayoutlevelinthecontextofforecastingthefirm'ssourcesanduseoffunds.Consideringprospectiveinvestmentopportunitiesandtheinternalcashgenerationpotentialofthefirm,bothcapitalstructureanddividendpolicyarechosentoensurethatsufficientfundsareavailabletoundertakealldesirableinvestmentswithoutusingnewequity（[14]Black,1976）.Butwhatconstitutesa"desirable"investment?

Ifitisonethathasanexpectedreturngreaterthanthecostoffundsthatfinanceit,andifthecostofretainedearningsisdifferentfromthecostofnewequitycapital,thendividendpolicy,capitalstructure,andinvestmentstrategyarenecessarilyjointlydetermined（[15]BlackandSchools,1974）.

Dividendpayoutpolicyisanimportantcorporateissueandmaybecloselyrelatedto,andinteractswith,mostofthefinancialandinvestmentdecisionsfirmsmake.Aproperunderstandingofdividendpolicyiscriticalformanyotherareassuchasassetpricing,capitalstructure,mergersandacquisitions,andcapitalbudgeting（[2]AllenandMichael,1995）.Firms'dividenddecisionscouldalsobeinfluencedbytheirprofitlevel,risk,andsize.Thoughdividendpolicyhasbeenidentifiedasamajorcorporatedecisionfacedbymanagement,itremainsoneofthepuzzlesincorporatefinance（[52]Obi,2001）.Therehasbeenemergingconsensusthatthereisnosingleexplanationofdividends.[19]Brooketal.（1998）agreethat,thereisnoreasontobelievethatcorporatedividendpolicyisdrivenbyasinglegoal.

Attentionofempiricalresearchhasbeenatascertainingtherelationshipbetweeninvestmentopportunities,corporatefinancinganddividendpayout（[54]PruittandGilman,1991;[6]AviationandBooth,2003）.However,thesefindingshavefailedtoestablishanyclearlinkconcerningthisissue.Mostofthesestudiestendtofocusondevelopedmarkets.Littleis,however,knownabouthowinvestmentopportunitiesandcorporatefinanceinfluencedividendpayoutpolicyofemergingmarkets.Thispresentstudycontributestotheextantliteraturebyfocusingonemergingmarkets.FirmsinemergingmarketstendtoexhibitdifferentdividendbehaviorfromthoseofdevelopedmarketsliketheUS.Thismaybearesultofthedifferencesinlevelsofefficiencyandinstitutionalarrangementsbetweendevelopedmarketsandemergingmarkets.Itis,therefore,usefultoimproveourunderstandingoftheissuefromanemergingmarketperspective.

Thepurposeofthispaperistoexaminetheeffectsofinvestmentopportunitysetandcorporatefinanceondividendpayout.Thecontributionofthispaperliesinthefactthatitconsidersalarge-scaledatasetcovering34emergingmarketcountriesovera17-yearperiod,1990-2006.Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2coverstheliteratureondividendpolicy.Italsoreviewstheexistingliteratureontheeffectsofinvestmentopportunitiesandcorporatefinanceondividendpayoutpolicy.Section3discussesthedatausedinthestudyandalsodetailsthemodelspecificationusedfortheempiricalanalysis.Section4includesthediscussionoftheempiricalresults.Finally,Section5summarizesandconcludesthepaper.

2.Overviewofliterature

Sincethepublicationofthedividendirrelevancetheoryby[47]MillerandModigliani（1961）,alotofstudieshavebeenconductedintheareaofdeterminantsofdividendpayouttheworldover.Thedividendirrelevancetheoryispossibleinaperfectandefficientmarketwherestockholdersareperfectlyrationalandtherearenotaxesandtransactioncosts.Thetheory,however,pointedouttheimportanceofinvestmentasbeingthemainissue.MillerandModiglianiframeworkhasthusformedthefoundationofsubsequentworkondividendsandpayoutpolicyingeneral.Theirframeworkisrichenoughtoencompassbothdividendsandrepurchase,astheonlydeterminantofafirm'svalueisitsinvestmentpolicy（[3]AllenandMichael,2002）.Itisarguablysaidacompany'soverridinggoalistomaximizeshareholderwealth（[18]BerkleyandMyers,1996;[16]BlockandHart,2000）,butto[16]BlockandHart（2000）thisconceptisnotasimpletaskasmanagementcannotdirectlyinfluencethepriceofasharebutcanonlyactinamannerconsistentwiththedesiresofinvestors.Intheviewof[61]WoodsandRandall（1989）,shareholderwealthisgenerallyacceptedastheaggregatemarketvalueofthecommonshares,whichinturnisassumedtobethepresentvalueofthecashflowswhichwillaccruetoshareholders,discountedattheirrequiredrateofreturnonequity.Thesecashflowsincludedividendandperhapsmoreimportantlycapitalappreciationexceptforitshighvolatility.Firmsmust,therefore,makeimportantdecisionsoverandoveragainabouthowmuchcashthefirmshouldgivebacktoitsshareholdersandprobablywhatformitshouldtake.

Black（1976）observedthattheharderwelookatthedividendspicture,themoreitseemslikeapuzzle,withpiecesthatjustdonotfittogether.Thisatteststothemuchcontroversythatsurroundsdividendpolicy.Thedividendpuzzlerevolvesaroundfiguringoutwhycompaniespaydividendsandinvestorspayattentiontodividend.To[18]BerkleyandMyers（1996）,dividendpolicyisseenasatrade-offbetweenretainingearningsononehandandpayingoutcashandissuingnewsharesontheother.Thetheoreticalprinciplesunderlyingthedividendpolicyoffirmsrangefrominformationasymmetries,tax-adjustedtheorytobehavioralfactors.Theinformationasymmetriesencompassseveralaspects,includingtheagencycost,freecashflowhypothesis,andsignalingmodels.

Tax-adjustedmodelspresumethatinvestorsrequireandsecurehigherexpectedreturnsonsharesofdividend-payingstocks.Theconsequenceoftaxadjustedtheoryisthedivisionofinvestorsintodividendtaxclienteleandtheclienteleeffectisresponsibleforthealterationsinportfoliocomposition（[49]Modigliani,1982）.To[45]MarsalisandTruman（1988）,investorswithdifferingtaxliabilitieswillnotbeuniformintheiridealfirmdividendpolicy.Theyconcludethatastaxliabilityincreases,thedividendpaymentdecreaseswhileearningsreinvestmentincreasesandviceversa.

Shareholderstypicallyfacetheproblemofadverseselectionandmoralhazardinthefaceofseparationofownershipandcontrol.Theproblemofinformationasymmetryisevidentinconflictsofinterestbetweenvariouscorporateclaimholders.Itholdsthatinsiderssuchasmanagershavemoreinformationaboutthefirm'scashflowthantheprovidersofthefunds.Agencycostsarelowerinfirmswithhighmanagerialownershipstakesbecauseofbetteralignmentofshareholderandmanagerialcontrol（[39]JensenandHeckling,1976）andalsoinfirmswithlargeblockshareholdersthatarebetterabletomonitormanagerialactivities（[57]HeiferandVishnu,1986）.[27]FameandJensen（1983）arguethatagencyproblemscanberesolvedbythepaymentoflargedividendtoshareholders.

Accordingtothefreecashflowmodel,[37]Jensen（1986）explainsthatfinanceavailableafterfinancingallpositivenetpresentvalueprojectscanresultinconflictsofinterestbetweenmanagersandshareholders.Clearly,dividendsanddebtinterestpaymentdecreasethefreecashflowavailabletomanagerstoinvestinmarginalnetpresentvalueprojectsandmanagerper