国际资本流动文献综述及外文文献资料.docx

国际资本流动文献综述及外文文献资料.docx

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国际资本流动文献综述及外文文献资料

本份文档包含：

关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述

一、外文文献

文献信息

标题:

ControllingInternationalCapitalFlow:

EmergingEconomyExperiences

作者:

TKim,Yoonbai

期刊名称:

SERIQuarterly；第3卷；第3期；页码：

51-63

ControllingInternationalCapitalFlow:

EmergingEconomyExperiences

ABSTRACT

TheglobalfinancialcrisisrevealedlingeringproblemsinKorea'sfinancialsystem,especiallylarge,short-termforeign-currencydebt.Duringthecrisis,theKoreanwondepreciatedmuchmorethanotherEastAsiacurrencies.Enoughrestrictionsintheeconomyremaintogiveforeigninvestorspauseandpromptthemtofleeatthefirstsignsoftrouble.AlookathowTaiwanandSingaporehavemanagedtheirmonetarypolicyandreformwouldbeinstructiveforcurrencystability.

Keywords：

capitalcontrols,globalfinancialcrisis,Asiancurrencycrisis,financialmarkets

CRISISANDCAPITAL

The1997AsianfinancialcrisiswasawatershedeventinKorea'sfinancialhistory.InreturnfortheInternationalMonetaryFund's（IMF）fundingtosurvivethecrisis,theKoreangovernmentacceptedthedemandforliberalizationoffinancialmarkets.Inthetenyearsorsosince,thegovernmenthasbeenearnestinkeepingitspromises.Bythemid-2000s,Koreaappearedtobeasopenasanyadvancedindustrialcountryintermsofregulations（orlackthereof）oninternationalcapitalmovements.Nonetheless,Koreawasnotabletoescapethespilloveroftheglobalcrisisin2008-09eventhoughitsmacroeconomicconditionappearedtobesound.Infact,theKoreanwon（KRW）declinedmorethanmostothercurrenciesinEastAsia,whiletheequitymarkettumbledasmuchasmostothercountries.Thereisconsensusthatbothfinancialcriseswereatleastinpartinducedbyhighcapitalmobility.Liberalizationofthefinancialmarketscombinedwiththeabundanceofliquidityencouragedinternationalcapitalflowstoemergingmarketeconomies.Theinflowcametoasuddenstopandreversed,givingrisetoacurrencycrisisandbringingdowntheeconomyalongwithit.Theilliquidityoffinancialandnonfinancialbusinessfirmswasanimportantcauseoffinancialcrises.Thecurrencymismatch-assetsinlocalcurrencyfinancedbyliabilitiesinforeigncurrency-andthematuritymismatch-long-termprojects（assets）financedbyshort-termdebt-havebeenpointedoutasoneofthemajorweaknessesoftheKoreanandothercrisis-riddeneconomies.

Havethelessonsbeenlearnedfromthesecrises?

Thesecondcrisisrevealedthatsomeproblems-inparticular,largeshort-termforeigncurrencydebt-remainedwithKorea'sfinancialsystem.Thefinancialliberalizationpursuedsincetheearly1990sandwithmuchmorevigorafterthe1997crisishasleftthevulnerablesegmentofthefinancialsectorintactorevenmoreexposedtoexternalorinternalshocks.

WereviewtheexperiencesofSingaporeandTaiwan,bothofwhichweatheredthe1997crisisbuthadtoendurethe2008crisisalongwithKorea.However,despitetheirhighexportdependencyandsmallereconomicsize,theextentofcurrencydepreciationwasmuchsmallerthanthatoftheKoreanwon.Totheextentthatexchangeratestabilityisimportantforsoundmanagementofmacroeconomicenvironments,weshouldleamfromtheirexperiences.

Thetwocrises,especiallytherecentone,havebroughtsomemajorchangesinourunderstandingofinternationalcapitalmovementanditsregulations.Oneisthechangingperceptionaboutcapitalcontrols.Inarecentglobalfinancialreport,theIMFadmittedthatcapitalcontrolswereacomplementarypolicytoolinagovernment'stoolkitfordealingwithsurgesofcapitalthatcandisruptexchangeratesorassetprices.1ThenewstudyfoundthatsuchcapitalcontrolshelpedbufferagainstsomeoftheworsteffectsofthefinancialcrisisinemergingmarketeconomiessuchasColombia,Brazil,India,Thailand,andChina.AcademicssuchasDaniRodrikandGuillermoCalvohavebeenwarningaboutthepotentiallyharmfuleffectsof（short-term）internationalcapitalinflowsandadvocatingareexaminationofthestandardIMFprescriptionfordevelopingcountriesoraid-recipientcountries.ThechangeinthepositionoftheIMFisremarkableasithadpreviouslyadvocatedunrestrictedflowofmoneyandcapitaltoandfromanycountries,regardlessoflevelofdevelopment.Inthisarticle,wereexaminetheroleofcapitalcontrolsinthecontextoftheKoreaneconomyandtheglobalfinancialcrisis.

STORYOFTWOCRISESINKOREA

Figures1and2showthemovementofthestockpriceindicesandexchangeratesagainstthedollarforsevenEastAsiancountriesfromJanuary1990toApril2010.BothareinlogarithmandshownasdeviationsfromthebaseperiodofJanuary2002,whichischosenarbitrarilyandroughlythemidpointbetweenthetwocrises.Themagnitudesofthestockmarketdeclinesduringthe1997crisisarewellknown.Allstockindicesfelldrasticallyduringthe2008globalfinancialcrisis.Inthefivecrisis-riddencountriesshowninFigureIA,stockpricesfell50percentormore.Thedeclinesinstockpricesduringthe2008crisisinSingaporeandTaiwanasshowninFigureIBarecomparabletothoseofKorea's.Inallthreecountries,thestockpricefellbyabout50percentonaverage,andtheoverallpatternofmovementsissurprisinglysimilarinKoreaandSingapore.However,Taiwanseemstohavehadmuchlessvolatilityinthestockmarketovertwentyyears.

Themovementsoftheexchangerateswerequitedifferent.ThelargedeclineoftheIndonesianrupiah（IDR）duringthe1997crisisandthefollowingrecoveryismostnoticeable.TheMalaysianringgit（MYR）washeldatafixedexchangeratesoonafterthe1997crisisuntil2005.TheKoreanwondepreciatedlessthantheIndonesianrupiahortheThaibaht（THB）,depreciatedmorethantheSingaporedollar（SGD）ortheNewTaiwandollar（TWD）.ThefluctuationsafterthecrisisweresurprisinglysimilarinallcountriesinFigure2Aalthoughtherupiahshowedsomewhatgreatervolatilityforafewyearsafterthe1997crisis.Allfivecurrencieshadmassivedepreciationduringthe2008crisis.Duringtherun-uptothe2008globalcrisis,theKoreanwonhadshownquitedistinctivemovement.Itappreciatedmostinthe2005-07period.Afterwards,itdepreciatedmorethananyothercurrency,collapsingbymorethan40percentcomparedtotherecentpeak.Therupiahisnextwithdepreciationoflessthan30percent.ThecurrenciesofSingaporeandTaiwanshowninFigure2B（andThailand）havebeenmuchmorestable,depreciatingalittlemorethan12percent.

WhydidthewonfallmuchmorethanothercurrenciesinEastAsia,inparticular,theSingaporeorTaiwandollar?

GiventhatthecrisiswasessentiallyimportedfromtheUnitedStatesandEuropeancountriesandthatSingaporeandTaiwanhavemuchgreaterexportdependencyratiosthanKorea,onewouldexpectthewontohavedepreciatedless.Onecanconjecturethatthemaintransmissionchanneloftheglobalcrisiswasmorelikelyinthefinancial-morespecifically-theforeignexchangesectorratherthanintherealsectorsuchasinternationaltradeofgoodsandservices.

LIBERALIZATIONOFKOREANFINANCIALMARKETS

EarlystagesofrapidgrowthinKoreaoccurredinthepresenceofextensivecontrolsoninternationalcapitalflowsaspartofamoregeneralpolicyoffinancialrepression.2Financialliberalizationduringthe1980swascautiousandslow,andthesystemremainedtightlycontrolleduntiltheearly1990s.TheliberalizationprocesswasgreatlyacceleratedundertheKimYoungSamgovernment（1993-97）.Afive-yearfinancialliberalizationplanwasaimedat,amongotherthings,interestratederegulation,abolitionofpolicyloans,grantingofmoremanagerialautonomytobanks,reductionofentrybarrierstofinancialactivitiesand,mostimportantly,capitalaccountliberalization.3Theresultwasarapidincreaseinforeigndebt.Aspartoffinancialreform,bankswereallowedtoopenandexpandoperationsoverseas,whichledtoasharpincreaseinforeigncurrencyliabilitiesofoverseasbranchesthatwasalmostaslargeastheexternaldebtsofdomesticbranches.Foreigndebtnearlytrebledfrom$44billionin1993to$120billioninSeptember1997,ontheeveofthefinancialcrisis.

Korea'sdebtwasconsideredwithinasustainablerangealthoughitwasgrowingfast.OnecriticalprobleminKorea'sdebtstructurewasitsmaturitystructure.Theshareofshort-termdebt（lessthanayear'smaturity）oftotaldebtrosefrom47.3percentin1993toanastonishing58.3percentattheendof1996.Therapidbuildupofshort-termforeigncurrencydebtwasledbymerchantbanksthatwerenewlylicensedbytheKimgovernment.Moreover,supervisionofthemerchantbankswasvirtuallynonexistent.Thegovernmentwasapparentlynotevenawareofthehugemismatchinthematuritystructurebetweenborrowingandlending:

while64percentoftheir$20billiontotalforeignborrowingwasshort-term,85percentoftheirlendingwaslong-term.

Liberalizationthatprecededthe1997crisiswasquitepartialandfrequentlyviolatedstandardeconomicadviceabouthowliberalizationshouldproceedintermsofthenecessarypreconditionsandsequencing.ThetotalamountofdomesticandinternationalfinancialliberalizationundertakenbyKoreabeforethe199798crisiswasfarlessthanisoftenassumed.EvenwiththecompletionoftheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment（OECD）applicationplan,theKoreanfinancialsystemwouldhaveremainedamongthemostrepressedinAsia.4PresidentKim'sdesiretojointheOECD,combinedwithpressuresfromtheIMFandtheUSgovernment,mayhaveledtotheliberalizationofdomesticfinancialmarketsbeforeexistingweaknessesinthebankingsystemcouldbeaddressed.5

PerhapsthestrangestaspectofKorea'sliberali