国际资本流动文献综述及外文文献资料.docx

1、国际资本流动文献综述及外文文献资料本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献 、文献综述一、外文文献文献信息标题: Controlling International Capital Flow: Emerging Economy Experiences作者: TKim, Yoonbai期刊名称: SERI Quarterly；第3卷； 第3期；页码：51-63Controlling International Capital Flow: Emerging Economy ExperiencesABSTRACTThe global financial crisis revealed lingering

2、problems in Koreas financial system, especially large, short-term foreign-currency debt. During the crisis, the Korean won depreciated much more than other East Asia currencies. Enough restrictions in the economy remain to give foreign investors pause and prompt them to flee at the first signs of tr

3、ouble. A look at how Taiwan and Singapore have managed their monetary policy and reform would be instructive for currency stability. Keywords： capital controls, global financial crisis, Asian currency crisis, financial marketsCRISIS AND CAPITALThe 1997 Asian financial crisis was a watershed event in

4、 Koreas financial history. In return for the International Monetary Funds (IMF) funding to survive the crisis, the Korean government accepted the demand for liberalization of financial markets. In the ten years or so since, the government has been earnest in keeping its promises. By the mid-2000s, K

5、orea appeared to be as open as any advanced industrial country in terms of regulations (or lack thereof) on international capital movements. Nonetheless, Korea was not able to escape the spillover of the global crisis in 2008-09 even though its macroeconomic condition appeared to be sound. In fact,

6、the Korean won (KRW) declined more than most other currencies in East Asia, while the equity market tumbled as much as most other countries. There is consensus that both financial crises were at least in part induced by high capital mobility. Liberalization of the financial markets combined with the

7、 abundance of liquidity encouraged international capital flows to emerging market economies. The inflow came to a sudden stop and reversed, giving rise to a currency crisis and bringing down the economy along with it. The illiquidity of financial and nonfinancial business firms was an important caus

8、e of financial crises. The currency mismatch - assets in local currency financed by liabilities in foreign currency - and the maturity mismatch - long-term projects (assets) financed by short-term debt - have been pointed out as one of the major weaknesses of the Korean and other crisis-ridden econo

9、mies.Have the lessons been learned from these crises? The second crisis revealed that some problems - in particular, large short-term foreigncurrency debt - remained with Koreas financial system. The financial liberalization pursued since the early 1990s and with much more vigor after the 1997 crisi

10、s has left the vulnerable segment of the financial sector intact or even more exposed to external or internal shocks.We review the experiences of Singapore and Taiwan, both of which weathered the 1997 crisis but had to endure the 2008 crisis along with Korea. However, despite their high export depen

11、dency and smaller economic size, the extent of currency depreciation was much smaller than that of the Korean won. To the extent that exchange rate stability is important for sound management of macroeconomic environments, we should leam from their experiences.The two crises, especially the recent o

12、ne, have brought some major changes in our understanding of international capital movement and its regulations. One is the changing perception about capital controls. In a recent global financial report, the IMF admitted that capital controls were a complementary policy tool in a governments tool ki

13、t for dealing with surges of capital that can disrupt exchange rates or asset prices.1 The new study found that such capital controls helped buffer against some of the worst effects of the financial crisis in emerging market economies such as Colombia, Brazil, India, Thailand, and China. Academics s

14、uch as Dani Rodrik and Guillermo Calvo have been warning about the potentially harmful effects of (short-term) international capital inflows and advocating a reexamination of the standard IMF prescription for developing countries or aid-recipient countries. The change in the position of the IMF is r

15、emarkable as it had previously advocated unrestricted flow of money and capital to and from any countries, regardless of level of development. In this article, we reexamine the role of capital controls in the context of the Korean economy and the global financial crisis.STORY OFTWO CRISES IN KOREAFi

16、gures 1 and 2 show the movement of the stock price indices and exchange rates against the dollar for seven East Asian countries from January 1990 to April 2010. Both are in logarithm and shown as deviations from the base period of January 2002, which is chosen arbitrarily and roughly the midpoint be

17、tween the two crises. The magnitudes of the stock market declines during the 1997 crisis are well known. All stock indices fell drastically during the 2008 global financial crisis. In the five crisis-ridden countries shown in Figure IA, stock prices fell 50 percent or more. The declines in stock pri

18、ces during the 2008 crisis in Singapore and Taiwan as shown in Figure IB are comparable to those of Koreas. In all three countries, the stock price fell by about 50 percent on average, and the overall pattern of movements is surprisingly similar in Korea and Singapore. However, Taiwan seems to have

19、had much less volatility in the stock market over twenty years.The movements of the exchange rates were quite different. The large decline of the Indonesian rupiah (IDR) during the 1997 crisis and the following recovery is most noticeable. The Malaysian ringgit (MYR) was held at a fixed exchange rat

20、e soon after the 1997 crisis until 2005. The Korean won depreciated less than the Indonesian rupiah or the Thai baht (THB), depreciated more than the Singapore dollar (SGD) or the New Taiwan dollar (TWD). The fluctuations after the crisis were surprisingly similar in all countries in Figure 2A altho

21、ugh the rupiah showed somewhat greater volatility for a few years after the 1997 crisis. All five currencies had massive depreciation during the 2008 crisis. During the run-up to the 2008 global crisis, the Korean won had shown quite distinctive movement. It appreciated most in the 2005-07 period. A

22、fterwards, it depreciated more than any other currency, collapsing by more than 40 percent compared to the recent peak. The rupiah is next with depreciation of less than 30 percent. The currencies of Singapore and Taiwan shown in Figure 2B (and Thailand) have been much more stable, depreciating a li

23、ttle more than 12 percent.Why did the won fall much more than other currencies in East Asia, in particular, the Singapore or Taiwan dollar? Given that the crisis was essentially imported from the United States and European countries and that Singapore and Taiwan have much greater export dependency r

24、atios than Korea, one would expect the won to have depreciated less. One can conjecture that the main transmission channel of the global crisis was more likely in the financial - more specifically - the foreign exchange sector rather than in the real sector such as international trade of goods and s

25、ervices.LIBERALIZATION OF KOREAN FINANCIAL MARKETSEarly stages of rapid growth in Korea occurred in the presence of extensive controls on international capital flows as part of a more general policy of financial repression.2 Financial liberalization during the 1980s was cautious and slow, and the sy

26、stem remained tightly controlled until the early 1990s. The liberalization process was greatly accelerated under the Kim Young Sam government (1993-97). A five-year financial liberalization plan was aimed at, among other things, interest rate deregulation, abolition of policy loans, granting of more

27、 managerial autonomy to banks, reduction of entry barriers to financial activities and, most importantly, capital account liberalization.3 The result was a rapid increase in foreign debt. As part of financial reform, banks were allowed to open and expand operations overseas, which led to a sharp inc

28、rease in foreign currency liabilities of overseas branches that was almost as large as the external debts of domestic branches. Foreign debt nearly trebled from $44 billion in 1993 to $120 billion in September 1997, on the eve of the financial crisis.Koreas debt was considered within a sustainable r

29、ange although it was growing fast. One critical problem in Koreas debt structure was its maturity structure. The share of short-term debt (less than a years maturity) of total debt rose from 47.3 percent in 1993 to an astonishing 58.3 percent at the end of 1996. The rapid buildup of short-term forei

30、gn currency debt was led by merchant banks that were newly licensed by the Kim government. Moreover, supervision of the merchant banks was virtually nonexistent. The government was apparently not even aware of the huge mismatch in the maturity structure between borrowing and lending: while 64 percen

31、t of their $20 billion total foreign borrowing was short-term, 85 percent of their lending was long-term.Liberalization that preceded the 1997 crisis was quite partial and frequently violated standard economic advice about how liberalization should proceed in terms of the necessary preconditions and

32、 sequencing. The total amount of domestic and international financial liberalization undertaken by Korea before the 199798 crisis was far less than is often assumed. Even with the completion of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) application plan, the Korean financial sy

33、stem would have remained among the most repressed in Asia.4 President Kims desire to join the OECD, combined with pressures from the IMF and the US government, may have led to the liberalization of domestic financial markets before existing weaknesses in the banking system could be addressed.5Perhaps the strangest aspect of Koreas liberali