外文翻译融资偏好的西班牙企业优序论证据节选.docx

外文翻译融资偏好的西班牙企业优序论证据节选.docx

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外文翻译融资偏好的西班牙企业优序论证据节选

2000单词，1.1万英文字符，3700汉字

出处：

Sánchez-VidalJ,Martín-UgedoJF.FinancingPreferencesofSpanishFirms:

EvidenceonthePeckingOrderTheory[J].ReviewofQuantitativeFinanceandAccounting,2005,25（4）:

341-355.

外文翻译

原文：

FinancingPreferencesofSpanishFirms:

EvidenceonthePeckingOrderTheory

JSánchez-Vidal，JFMartín-Ugedo

ThispaperanalysessomeoftheempiricalimplicationsofthepeckingordertheoryintheSpanishmarketusingapaneldataanalysisof1,566firmsover1994–2000.Theresultsshowthatthepeckingordertheoryholdsformostsubsamplesanalyzed,particularlyforthesmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesandforthehigh-growthandhighlyleveragedcompanies.Itisalsoshownthatboththemoreandthelessleveragedfirmstendtoconvergetowardsmorebalancedcapitalstructures.Finally,weobservethatfirmsfinancetheirfundsflowdeficitswithlongtermdebt.

AprimecontributiononinformationasymmetryincapitalstructuretheoryistheMyersandMajluf（1984）model.MyersandMajlufobservethattheempiricalevidenceisnotconsistentwithafinancialpolicythatisdeterminedbyatrade-offoftheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofmarketimperfections,mainlytaxes,costsoffinancialdistress,andagencycosts.Rather,companies’financialpoliciesseemtobebetterexplainedbythebehaviourdescribedbyDonaldson（1961）.Heestablishesahierarchydescribedbycompanypreferenceforinternalfundsoverexternalfunds;inthecaseofexternalfunds,acompanyprefersdebtfirst,thenhybridinstrumentslikeconvertiblebonds,andfinallyequityissues.Thishierarchy,broadlycharacterizedaspeckingordertheory,indicatesthatcompaniesdonotmakefinancingdecisionswiththeaimofachievingoptimalleverage.

Althoughtheytendtobetakenasthesamething,thepeckingordertheoryandtheMyersandMajluf（1984）modelarenotstrictlyspeakingthesame.Thepeckingordertheoryismerelyadescriptionofcompanies’financingpolicy,whiletheMyersandMajlufworkrepresentsthefirstmodelthatattemptstodescribethisbehaviourfromatheoreticalpointofview,basedonthepresenceofinformationasymmetry.Moreover,theMyersandMajluf（1984）modelassumeslistedcompaniesandmarketswhereequityisissuedthroughfirmcommitments,suchastheAmericanmarket,notformarketswherethepredominantflotationmethodisrightsofferings,suchasSpainandmostothercountries.

TheaimofthispaperistoprovideevidenceonthepeckingordertheoryintheSpanishmarket.Theanalysistakestwodirections.First,weexaminetheevolutionofthethreelargestaccountingsourcesoffundingforacompany—retainedearnings,equityissuesanddebt—usingamodelbasedonWatsonandWilson（2002）.Second,westudytheroleoflong-termdebtinmakingupfinancingdeficits,followingtheflowoffundsdeficitequationofShyam-SunderandMyers（1999）.

ThereareseveralfeatureswhichdistinguishtheSpanishfinancialsystemfromtheAmericanone.Probablythemaindifferenceaffectingthepeckingorderistheflotationmethodinequityissues.Equitysecuritiesareissuedinawidevarietyofways,mainlyfirmcommitmentsunderwrittenoffersandrightsissues.Therelativeimportanceofthesemethodsdependsontheissuingfirm’scountry.IntheUnitedStatesrightsofferingshavedeclinedinfrequency,havingvirtuallydisappearedby1980.InSpain,rightsprevail.Thisdifferencemayplayanimportantroleinthehierarchydescribedbythepeckingordertheory.Inaddition:

（a）debtfinancingisprimarilyraisedprivatelyinSpanishfirms,thusbanksplayaveryimportantrole;and（b）theSpanishcapitalmarketislessdevelopedthantheAmericansecuritiesmarket,havinglowercapitalizationandsmallertransactionvolumes.AlthoughseveralpapershavealreadyexaminedthecapitalstructureofSpanishfirms,mostofthemhaveanalyzedtheeffectofdifferentvariablesonleverage.However,thereislittleevidencefocusingonpeckingorderandnostudyemployingtheWatsonandWilson（2002）methodology.

Theresultsshowthatsmallandmedium-sizedcompaniesbehaveconsistentlywithpredictionsofthepeckingordertheory.Whenwedividethesampleintosubsamplesonthebasisofgrowthandthelevelofleverage,weseethathigh-growthcompaniesbasetheirgrowthonretainedearnings,andfirmswithveryhighandverylowdebtratiostendtoconvergetowardsmoremoderatedebtratios.Estimationoftheflowoffundsdeficitequationshowsthatfunddeficitsaremetbytheuseoflong-termdebt.

Thepeckingordertheorydescribesahierarchyincompanies’financialpolicyasfollows:

（1）Firmsprefertofinancetheirinvestmentswithfundsinternallygenerated,namely,retainedearningsanddepreciationexpenses;

（2）firmsbasethedividendpayoutratiosonthefutureinvestmentopportunitysetandtheirexpectedcashflows;（3）payoutratiostendtobestickyintheshortterm,soinsomeyearsinternallygeneratedflowswillbeenoughforfinancingcompanyneedsandinsomeyearsnot;（4）fundsobtainedinyearsoffinancialsurpluses,afterpaymentofdividendsandfinancing,aredirectedtofinanceshort-termfinancialinvestmentsortoreducedebt.Whenthereisafinancialdeficit,firmswillseekexternalfinance:

firstdebt,thenhybridsecuritieslikeconvertiblebonds,andfinallyequityissues.

ToexplainthisbehaviourMyersandMajluf（1984）constructamodelofinformationasymmetryassumingthatfirmmanagersactonbehalfofcurrentshareholders.Ifcompanieshaveenoughfinancialslack,theywillcarryoutallinvestmentsthathaveapositivenetpresentvalue.Ifexternalfundsareneededtofinancenewinvestments,themarketwillinterpretequityissuesasevidencethatcompanysharesareovervaluedandthusissueannouncementwillhaveanegativeimpactontheshareprice.

Thus,MyersandMajluf（1984）arguethat,ifthecompanydoesnothaveenoughfundstofinancenewinvestments,itwillissueequityonlywhenthereareveryprofitableinvestmentsthatcanneitherbepostponednorfinancedthroughdebt,orwhenmanagersbelievethatthestockisovervaluedenoughthatshareholderswillbedisposedtotoleratethemarketpenalty.Theinformationasymmetrymaycausecurrentshareholderstorenouncepositivenetpresentvalueinvestmentprojectsinordertoavoidadropinsharepriceduetotheissueofequity,therebycreatinganunderinvestmentproblem.Toavoidtheseresults,itseemsreasonablethatcompanieswillimplementfinancingpoliciesthatallowthemthecapacitytofinanceinvestmentsandavoidexternalfinancing.

However,theMyersandMajlufmodel（1984）hassomelimitations.ThefirstisthatitappliestomarketsliketheAmericanmarketwheresharesareofferedmainlythroughfirmcommitmentunderwritingsandnotthroughrightsissues,whichistheflotationmethodthatprevailsinmostothermarkets.Inanunderwrittenfirmcommitment,sharesareofferedsimultaneouslytothepublicatlarge.Thus,ifsharesareovervalued,therewillbeawealthtransferfromnewtocurrentshareholders.Inrightsofferings,currentshareholdersenjoypriorityinthepurchaseofnewshares,whichminimizesthepossibilityofwealthtransfers.Therefore,theMyersandMajluf（1984）argumentthatequityissueisthelastchoiceinfirms’financingpolicieshaslittlecurrencyinmarketswhererightsissuesaretheprevalentmethodofequityissue.

AnotherlimitationoftheMyersandMajluf（1984）modelisthatitisgenerallyintendedtodescribelistedcompanies,leavingtherest,mainlythesmallandmedium-sizedenterprises（SME）,outoftheexplanation.Becauseofthis,authorssincethenhavetriedtoexplainthepeckingordertheoryusingalternativeargumentsappropriatetonon-listedSMEcompanies.

AmajorprobleminSMEfinancing,especiallyinnon-Anglo-Saxoncountries,islimitedaccesstocapitalmarkets（afinancegap）（HolmesandKent,1991）.FinancingchoicesforSMEarethususuallyreducedtoretainedearningsandbankloans.Thisfinancegapcanbedividedintotwocomponents:

asupplygap,becauseoflimitedavailabilityoffundsorhighercost,andaknowledgegap,becauseoflimitedknowledgeaboutallthepossibilitiesofexternalfinanceandalackofawarenessoftheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofdebt.Asaconsequenceofthesetwocomponentsofthefinancegap,themainlong-termsourceoffinancewillbeinternalfinancingand,ifnecessary,bankloans.

Anotherfactorthatmayplayapartinthehierarchyoffirmchoicesisthemotivationtoretaincontrolofthefirm（HolmesandKent,1991;HamiltonandFox,1998）.Aswehavenoted,inafirmcommitmentofferingstockissoldatonetimetothegeneralpublic;thus,currentshareholders’relativeownershipoffirm,aswellastheircontrolofthecompanymaybediminishedwithnewshareofferings.Suchacontrolproblemmayarisealsoinrightsissues,buttoalesserextent,becausecurrentshareholdersmayhavelimitedfundstoinvestinthefirstplaceormaywanttodiversifytheirinvestments,sotheymightnotpurchaseadditionalsharestomaintaintheirownershippercentage.Asaresultofallofthis,thecurrentshareholderswouldalsobereluctanttoissueequity.

ThesefactorsmentionedaboveimplyasimilarhierarchytotheonedescribedbyMyersandMajluf（1984）;thatis,thecompanywouldmakeuseofretainedearningsinthefirstplace,thendebt（bankloans）and,finally,equityissues.

Variousauthorshavetriedtotesttheempiricalimplicationsofthepeckingordertheory.Next,webrieflysummarizesomeofthem.WatsonandWilson（2002）useadescriptivemodelintheBritishmarketandconfirmthepeckingordertheory,especiallyforclosely-heldcompanies（companieswhoseownershipisveryconcentratedandwhosemanagerisu