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WTODisputeSettlementMechanism4
WTODisputeSettlementMechanism(4)
ChapterIV
FunctionofPanels:
Art.11oftheDSU
OUTLINE
IIntroduction
IIApplicationofArt.11asaGeneralStandardofReview
IIIReviewin“neitherdenovonortotaldefence”
IVAllegationagainstPanels’StandardofReview
VExerciseofJudicialEconomy
IIntroduction
ThefunctionofpanelsisexpresslydefinedinArt.11oftheDSU,whichreadsasfollows:
“ThefunctionofpanelsistoassisttheDSBindischargingitsresponsibilitiesunderthisUnderstandingandthecoveredagreements.Accordingly,apanelshouldmakeanobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit,includinganobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecaseandtheapplicabilityofandconformitywiththerelevantcoveredagreements,andmakesuchotherfindingsaswillassisttheDSBinmakingtheremendationsoringivingtherulingsprovidedforinthecoveredagreements.Panelsshouldconsultregularlywiththepartiestothedisputeandgivethemadequateopportunitytodevelopamutuallysatisfactorysolution.”
ThisprovisionsuggeststhatthefunctionofpanelsistomakeanobjectiveassessmentsuchastoassisttheDSBinmakingtheremendationsoringivingtherulingsprovidedforinthecoveredagreements.However,howdopanelsfulfilltheirfunctionsasprovidedinArt.11oftheDSU?
Itistheissuethatwewilltouchoninthischapter.Inthischapter,theauthorexploresonthestandardofreviewissueundertheWTO,“anobjectiveassessment”;aswellasontheexercisedjudicialeconomyprincipledevelopedinpanel’sreview.
Withregardtothestandardofreviewissue,theGATT/WTOdisputesettlementprocedureshaveincreasinglyconfrontedquestionsconcerningthedegreetowhichaninternationalbody,undertheGATT/WTO,should“secondguess”adecisionofanationalgovernmentagencyconcerningeconomicregulationsthatareallegedlyinconsistentwithaninternationalrule.Itseemsclearthattheinternationalagreementdoesn’tpermitanationalgovernment’sdeterminationalwaystoprevail,otherwisetheinternationalrulescouldbeeasilyevadedorrenderedineffective.Butshouldtheinternationalbodyapproachtheissuesinvolvedwithoutanydeferencetothenationalgovernment?
IthasbeenarguedintheGATT/WTOproceedingsthatpanelsshouldrespectnationalgovernmentdeterminations,uptosomepoint.That“point”isthecrucialissuethathassometimesbeenlabelledthe“standardofreview”.1
Ofcourse,thisissueisnotuniquetotheGATT/WTO.Naturally,thestandard-of-reviewissueisonethatmanylegalsystemsface.“Thestandard-of-reviewquestionisfacedatleastimplicitlywheneversovereignmembersofatreatyyieldinterpretiveanddisputesettlementpowerstointernationalpanelsandtribunals.Moreover,asnationaleconomiesbeeincreasinglyinterdependent,andastheneedforinternationalcooperationandcoordinationaccordingl
ybeesgreater,thestandard-of-reviewquestionwillbeeincreasinglyimportant.”2And“itcanbeseenthatthestandard-of-reviewquestionisarecurringanddelicateone,andonethattosomeextentgoestothecoreofaninternationalprocedurethatmust(inarule-basedsystem)assessanationalgovernment’sactionsagainsttreatyorotherinternationalnorms”.3
However,fortheimmediatepurpose,wewanttofocusbelowonthemoreparticularquestionoftheproperstandardofreviewforaWTOpanelwhenitundertakestoexamineanationalgovernment’sactionsorrulingsthatengagethequestionofconsistencywiththevariousWTOagreementsandaresubjecttotheDSUprocedures.
IIApplicationofArt.11asaGeneralStandardofReview
UndertheWTOjurisprudence,it’sdemonstratedthatArt.11oftheDSUhasbeenappliedasageneralstandardofreview.Art.11suggeststhatthefunctionofpanelsistomake“anobjectiveassessment”soastoassisttheDSBinmakingtheremendationsoringivingtherulingsprovidedforinthecoveredagreements.
Forexample,inUS-ShirtsandBlouses(DS33),thePanelrulesthat,“althoughtheDSUdoesnotcontainanyspecificreferencetostandardsofreview,weconsiderthatArticle11oftheDSUwhichdescribestheparametersofthefunctionofpanels,isrelevanthere”.4
AndtheapplicationofArt.11asageneralstandardofreviewundertheDSUisanalyzedsystematicallyinEC-Hormones(DS26/DS48)wheretheAppellateBodyrulesthat:
5
“Thefirstpointthatmustbemadeinthisconnection,isthattheSPSAgreementitselfissilentonthematterofanappropriatestandardofreviewforpanelsdecidinguponSPSmeasuresofaMember.NorarethereprovisionsintheDSUoranyofthecoveredagreements(otherthantheAnti-DumpingAgreement)prescribingaparticularstandardofreview.OnlyArticle(i)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementhaslanguageonthestandardofreviewtobeemployedbypanelsengagedinthe‘assessmentofthefactsofthematter’.WefindnoindicationintheSPSAgreementofanintentonthepartoftheMemberstoadoptorincorporateintothatAgreementthestandardsetoutinArticle(i)oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.Textually,Article(i)isspecifictotheAnti-DumpingAgreement.
[…]
Wedonotmean,however,tosuggestthatthereisatpresentnostandardofreviewapplicabletothedeterminationandassessmentofthefactsinproceedingsundertheSPSAgreementorunderothercoveredagreements.Inourview,Article11oftheDSUbearsdirectlyonthismatterand,ineffect,articulateswithgreatsuccinctnessbutwithsufficientclaritytheappropriatestandardofreviewforpanelsinrespectofboththeascertainmentoffactsandthelegalcharacterizationofsuchfactsundertherelevantagreements[…]”
Insum,forallbutoneofthecoveredagreements,Art.11oftheDSUsetsforththeappropriatestandardofreviewf
orpanels.Asstatedonmorethanoneoccasion,Art.11oftheDSU,and,inparticular,itsrequirementthat“apanelshouldmakeanobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit,includinganobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecaseandtheapplicabilityofandconformitywiththerelevantcoveredagreements”,setsforththeappropriatestandardofreviewforpanelsexaminingtheconsistencyorinconsistencyofallegedmeasuresundertheWTOjurisprudence.AndtheonlyexceptionistheAgreementonImplementationofArticleVIoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade1994,inwhichaspecificprovision,Art.,setsoutaspecialstandardofreviewfordisputesarisingunderthatAgreement(tobediscussedinsubsequentchapter).6
IIIReviewin“neitherdenovonortotaldefence”
InEC-Hormones(DS26/DS48),intheviewoftheEuropeanCommunities,“theprincipalalternativeapproachestotheproblemofformulatingthe‘properstandardofreview’sofaraspanelsareconcernedaretwo-fold.Thefirstisdesignatedas‘denovoreview’.ThisstandardofreviewwouldallowapanelpletefreedomtoetoadifferentviewthanthepetentauthorityoftheMemberwhoseactordeterminationisbeingreviewed.Apanelwouldhaveto‘verifywhetherthedeterminationbythenationalauthoritywas…correct(bothfactuallyandprocedurally)’.Thesecondisdescribedas‘deference’.Undera‘deference’standard,apanel,inthesubmissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,shouldnotseektoredotheinvestigationconductedbythenationalauthoritybutinsteadexaminewhetherthe‘procedure’requiredbytherelevantWTOruleshadbeenfollowed”.7Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrulesthat:
8
“Sofarasfact-findingbypanelsisconcerned,theiractivitiesarealwaysconstrainedbythemandateofArticle11oftheDSU:
theapplicablestandardisneitherdenovoreviewassuch,nor‘totaldeference’,butratherthe‘objectiveassessmentofthefacts’.Manypanelshaveinthepastrefusedtoundertakedenovoreview,wisely,sinceundercurrentpracticeandsystems,theyareinanycasepoorlysuitedtoengageinsuchareview.Ontheotherhand,‘totaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthorities’,ithasbeenwellsaid,‘couldnotensurean‘objectiveassessment’asforeseenbyArticle11oftheDSU’.”
Therulingisconfirmedonmanyotheroccasions.Forexample,thePanelonUS-Underwear(DS24)findsthat:
9
“Inouropinion,apolicyoftotaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthoritiescouldnotensurean‘objectiveassessment’asforeseenbyArticle11oftheDSU.Thisconclusionissupported,inourview,bypreviouspanelreportsthathavedealtwiththisissue,andmostnotablyinthepanelreportonthe‘Transformers’case.
Thepanelinthe‘Transformers’casewasconfrontedwiththeargumentofNewZealandthatthedeterminationof‘materialinjury’bythepetentNewZealandinvestigatingauthor
itycouldnotbescrutinizedbythepanel.The‘Transformers’panelrespondedtothisargumentasfollows:
‘ThePanelagreedthattheresponsibilitytomakeadeterminationofmaterialinjurycausedbydumpedimportsrestedinthefirstplacewiththeauthoritiesoftheimportingcontractingpartyconcerned.However,thePanelcouldnotsharetheviewthatsuchadeterminationcouldnotbescrutinizedifitwerechallengedbyanothercontractingparty.Onthecontrary,thePanelbelievedthatifacontractingpartyaffectedbythedeterminationcouldmakeacasethattheimportationcouldnotinitselfhavetheeffectofcausingmaterialinjurytotheindustryinquestion,thatcontractingpartywasentitled,undertherelevantGATTprovisionsandinparticularArticleXXIII,thatitsrepresentationsbegivensympatheticconsiderationandthateventually,ifnosatisfactoryadjustmentwaseffected,itmightreferthemattertotheCONTRACTINGPARTIES,ashadbeendonebyFinlandinthepresentcase.Toconcludeotherwisewouldgivegovernmen