财务控制外文翻译.docx

财务控制外文翻译.docx

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财务控制外文翻译

原文：

FinancialControl

Effectivecorporategovernanceandfinancialcontrolincludestheuseofmonitoringandincentivemechanismstoaligndivergentinterestsbetweenshareholdersandmanagersandencouragethecreationofshareholdervalue.Value-basedmanagementsystems（VBM）provideanintegratedmanagementstrategyandfinancialcontrolsystemintendedtoincreaseshareholdervaluebymitigatingagencyconflicts.Inconcept,VBMreducesagencyconflictsandhelpscreateshareholdervaluesinceitrevealsvalue-increasingdecisionstoemployees,allowsforeasiermonitoringofmanagers’decisions,andprovidesamethodtotiecompensationtooutcomesthatcreateshareholdervalue.However,thedegreetowhichVBMsystemsactuallyimprovetheeconomicperformanceofpubliclyheldfirmsisanopenquestion.Togaininsightintothisissue,weexaminetheuseandeconomicefficacyofvalue-basedmanagementsystemsby84firmsthatadoptVBMsystemsfrom1984to1997.Weinvestigatetworelatedresearchquestions:

（1）DoestheadoptionofaVBMsystemimproveeconomicperformance?

And

（2）WhatfactorsenhanceorhindertheeffectivenessofVBMsystems?

OurprimarygoalistoexaminewhethertheadoptionofaVBMsystemimproveseconomicperformance.WerecognizethatfirmperformanceandthedecisiontotiecompensationtoaVBMmetriccanbeendogenous,whichcreatesapotentialsampleselectionbias.Forinstance,firmsthatareperformingpoorlyfacetougherchallengestocreatingeconomicvalueandcouldbemorelikelytotiecompensationtoVBMtoprovidemanagerstheincentivestoovercomethesechallenges.Alternatively,managerswhoexpecttoachieveacertainlevelofperformancecannegotiateacompensationcontractbasedontheVBMmetricthatessentiallyassuresabonuspayout.OursampleincludesfirmsthatbasecompensationonVBMmetrics,butalsofirmsthatuseVBMforanalysisandevaluationonly.Thus,wecanexaminewhyfirmschoosetotiecompensationtoVBM,whichallowsustocontrolforpotentialsampleselectionbiasthatresultsfromendogenousrelationsbetweencompensationplansandfirmperformance.

Withregardtoourfirstresearchquestion,wefindthatfirmperformanceincreasesfollowingtheadoptionofvalue-basedmanagementsystems.Comparedtoamatchedfirmbasedonindustry,priorperformance,andsize,firmsthatadoptVBMsystemsincreaseresidualincomeforthefiveyearssubsequenttotheadoptionofaVBMsystemrelativetotheyearbeforeadoption.Themedianfirminoursampleincreasesindustry-andperformance-adjustedresidualincomedividedbyinvestedcapitalbyover7percentagepointsforthefive-yearperiodsubsequenttoVBMadoption.WedonotfindevidencethatVBMencouragesunderinvestmentinhigh-growthfirms,suggestingthattheimprovementinresidualincomedoesnotcomeattheexpenseoflong-termvalue.

Withregardtooursecondresearchquestion,wefindthatfirmsizeistheonlyfirmspecificcharacteristicthatrelatestotheeffectivenessofVBMinallyears.Aftercontrollingforpossiblesampleselectionbias,wefindthatlargefirmsshowlessimprovementthansmallfirms.Wenote,however,thattheseregressionshavelowadjustedR2s.Possibly,thisresultsuggeststhatlargerfirmsfacegreatermonitoringcosts,whichmakeitmoredifficulttoimplementprogramsinlargerfirms.Inourmultivariateanalysis,wealsofindthat（i）firmsthatperformbetterpriortoadoptionaremorelikelytotiecompensationtoVBMand（ii）thepostadoptionadjustedperformanceinthefirsttwoyearsafteradoptionnegativelyrelatestotheuseofVBMtodeterminecompensation.Thiseffectisnotstatisticallysignificantaftertwoyears.ItispossiblethatfirmsthatalreadyfocusonvaluecreationaremorelikelytotieVBMtocompensationandthatthesefirmssimplyhavelesspotentialforimprovement.Alternatively,firmsmightcapbonuspayoutstoolowwhentheyimplementplans,whichreducesinitialefficacy.WealsofindthatfirmsreducecapitalexpendituresfollowingVBMadoption.Thesereductionsinspendingdonotdifferbasedonthefirms’growthopportunities.Thus,theimprovementinperformancedoesnotappeartocomeattheexpenseoflong-termvalue.

Overall,ourresultsprovidesupportthatvalue-basedmanagementsystemsareeffectivemechanismsforimprovingcorporateperformance.

Theliteratureonpropertyrights（e.g.,AlchianandDemsetz,1972）andagencytheory（e.g.,JensenandMeckling,1976）maintainsthatdifferentincentivesleadtoconflictsbetweenshareholdersandmanagersofthepublicfirmthatresultinalossinfirmvalue.Ultimately,theshareholdersbearthisloss.Value-basedmanagementprovidesanintegratedmanagementstrategyandfinancialcontrolsystemdesignedtomitigatetheseagencyconflictsandincreaseshareholdervalue.VBMsystemsattempttoaccomplishthisgoalbyprovidingmanagerswithasetofdecision-makingtoolsthat,atleastintheory,identifywhichalternativescreateordestroyvalue,andoftenbylinkingcompensationandpromotionstoshareholdervalue.Firmscanusethesemetricstomonitorandrewardmanagementperformance.Theyprovideamechanismforlinkingmanagers’decisionstofirmperformanceoutcomesthatcreateshareholdervalueandprovideameanstofurtheralignshareholderandmanagerialinterests.

Value-basedmanagementhascapturedtheinterestofthecorporateandinvestmentcommunities.RyanandTrahan（1999）reportthat87percentof86CFOssurveyedindicatethattheyarefamiliarwithvalue-basedmanagement.MostoftheseCFOsalsoindicatethattheirfirmusesoneormoreVBMsystems.Thisinteresthasalsobeendemonstratedinthebusinesspress.ArticlesinFortune（e.g.,Stires,2001;Colvin,2000;Tully,1999）includealistof1,000companiesrankedbyhowmuchmarketvaluetheyaddedduringthepastdecade,basedonSternStewart’smarketvalueadded（MVA）metric.Thesearticlesprofileseveralcorporationsthathaveadoptedavarietyofmanagementsystems,basedondifferentVBMmetrics,inanefforttoincreasetheirvalue.

WeidentifyfourvariationsofVBMmetricsfromthesearticlesinthepopularpress.Allofthemetricsaresimilarinthattheyaresingle-periodmeasuresofperformancethattakeintoaccountreturnoninvestedcapitalandtherelevantcostofcapital.Theyareallconsistentwithdiscountedcashflowvaluation.Althoughconsultingfirmshavepopularizedthesemetrics,manycompaniesapplytheirownversionsofthemetrics.Wedonottakeanygivenmetrictorepresenttheworkofaconsultingfirmthatmayhavepopularizedthemethod.Weprovideasummaryofthesefourmetricsbelow:

（1）DiscountedCashFlow（DCF）—DCFmethods,forinstanceshareholdervalueadded（SVA）,expressvalueasexpectedfuturecashflowsdiscountedtothepresenttimeatthecompany’scostofcapital.SeeRappaport（1998）foramoredetaileddiscussionofDCFmethodsastheyrelatetovalue-basedmanagement.

（2）CashFlowReturnonInvestment（CFROI）—CFROIexpressesanestimateofacompany’ssingle-periodcashflowasapercentageoftotalinvestment.Madden（1999）providesadetaileddiscussionofCFROI.

（3）ReturnonInvestedCapital（ROIC）—ROICisdefinedastheratioofnetoperatingprofitslessadjustedtaxes（NOPLAT）toinvestedcapital.SeeCopeland,etal.,（2000）foramoredetaileddiscussionofROIC.

（4）ResidualIncome（RI）—RImeasurestheexcessearningsoveracapitalchargebasedoninvestmentopportunitiesofsimilarrisk.SternStewart&Co.popularizedRIunderthemarketnameofEVA.SeeWallace（1997）foramoredetaileddiscussionofRI.

Despitetheattentionaffordedvalue-basedmanagementtechniquesandtheirwidespreadapplication,wehavescantevidenceontheirabilitytoimprovefirmperformance.Muchoftheexistingempiricalresearch,oftenconductedbytheconsultingfirmswhomarketvalue-basedmanagementsystems,focusesontherelationsbetweenthemetrics（orvalue-drivers）andshareholdervalue.Thesestudiesbyconsultants（e.g.,Stewart,1994）documentpositiverelationsbetweenperformancemetrics（e.g.,EconomicValueAdded（EVA））andhistoricalstock-priceperformance.Incontrast,anacademicstudybyBiddle,etal.,（1997）concludesthatEVAexplainsshareholderreturnsnobetterthanearnings.Copeland（2002）arguesthatcontemporaneousmeasuresofcommonvalue-basedmanagementmetricsdonotdoagoodjobofexplainingchangesinstockprices,andthatchangesinexpectationsneedtobeconsidered.Copeland’sargumentunderscoresthedifficultyintestingforanyrelationbetweentheuseofVBMsystemsandstockpriceimprovement.

Oursampleselectionmethoddistinguishesourstudyfrompreviousstudies.TheserelevantstudiesonlyhaveaccesstodataonVBMcompensationplansfortopexecutives,andexcludefirmsthatuseVBMsystemsforevaluationandbudgeting（seeIttnerandLarcker,1998,2001）.OursampleincludesfirmsthattieVBMtocompensation,andalsofirmsthatuseVBMsystemsforevaluation,budgeting,andmonitoringbutnotforcompensation.ThisfeatureallowsustoexplorethemoreextensiveuseofVBM,andalsoallowsustoshedlightontheendogenousdecisionprocess.Oursamplealsoallowsustoexamineabroadergroupofvalue-basedmanagementsystems,ratherthanonlysystemsbasedontheEVA-typemeasuresofresidualincomeusedinthesepriorstudies.

Ourmethodmakesthreeadditionalcontributions.First,weextendouranalysisofpost-adoptionperformancetofiveyearsbeyondtheyearofadoption,allowingustoexaminelonger-termeffects.Second,weusedifferenttaxratesbasedonthestatutorytaxrateineffectforaparticularyearasopposedtoassumingaconstanttaxrateforallyears.Third,weuseacostofequitybasedonthecapitalassetprici