环境信息披露的规范理论分析外文翻译.docx

环境信息披露的规范理论分析外文翻译.docx

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环境信息披露的规范理论分析外文翻译

外文文献翻译

原文：

InformationDisclosureasEnvironmentalRegulation:

ATheoreticalAnalysis

Abstract

Governmentsaroundtheworldarebeginningtoembraceanewformofenvironmentalregulation–mandatorydisclosureofinformation.Whileinformationdisclosureprogramsappeartohaveanimpactonsubsequentfirmbehavior-oftenresultinginlowerlevelsofpollution-littleisknownaboutthecostsandbenefitsoftheseprogramsandwhetherornottheyenhancesocialwelfare.Thispaperpresentsasimplebargainingmodelwheremandatoryinformationdisclosureisusedtoovercomealackofinformationonthepartofthepublic.Wecharacterizetheconditionsunderwhichinformationdisclosurewillleadtoareductioninemissions,andultimately,theconditionsunderwhichitwillenhancesocialwelfare.Severalextensionsofthemodelarebrieflyexplored,includingtheeffectoftwosourcesofpollution-onlyoneofwhichissubjecttoinformationdisclosure

1.Introduction

Governmentsaroundtheworldarebeginningtoembraceanewformofenvironmentalregulation–mandatorydisclosureofinformation.Perhapsthebest-knownexampleistheToxicReleaseInventory（TRI）programintheU.S.,wherebyfirmsarerequiredtodiscloselegallyemittedchemicalreleases.TRIhasbroughtaboutsignificantreductionsinchemicalemissions.Forexample,totalon-siteandoff-sitereleasesoftoxicemissionsarereportedlydownby45.5%between1988and1999（EPA,2001:

TableE-6）.Otherdisclosureprogramshavefocusedondrinkingwatersafetyandriskmanagementplansforchemicalreleases.1Similarprogramshavebeeninstitutedinothercountriesandcontexts,includingIndia,Indonesia,Philippines,Colombia,MexicoandBrazil（Afsah,LaplanteandWheeler,1996）.

Themechanismsbywhichinformationdisclosureprogramsleadtoreductionsinpollutionarevariedandstillbeingstudied（seee.g.,Maxwell,LyonandHackett,2000;andKonarandCohen,2000）.Dependingonthecontext,consumersmaydecidetoreduceorwithdrawfromconsumingtheproductofafirmthatisahighpolluter.Investorsmayshunthestockoffirmsthatarefoundtobehighpolluters–eitherthroughsociallyactiveinvestmentdecisionsorbyanassessmentthathighlypollutingfirmswillultimatelybelessprofitable.Victims2maybringaboutpressureonpollutingfirmstoreduceemissionsbypicketing,lobbyinglocalzoningboardsformorestringentrestrictions,pressuringgovernmentenforcementagenciestoscrutinizelargepollutersmorecarefully,orcallingfornewregulations.Theymightalsosuefordamagesundervarioustheoriesoftortlaw.

Regardlessofthemechanism,informationdisclosureprogramsappeartohaveanimpactonsubsequentfirmbehavior.Tietenberg（1998）hascharacterizedinformationdisclosureasbeingthethirdwaveofenvironmentalregulation–followingtheoriginalcommandandcontrolapproachandthesubsequentintroductionofmarket-basedincentivessuchasemissionfeesandmarketablepermits.Informationdisclosureprogramshavebeenwidelytoutedbypolicymakersfornumerousreasons.Oneobviousbenefitisthefactthatinformationdisclosurehasbeenfoundtoresultinsignificantimprovementsinenvironmentalquality.Inaddition,however,informationdisclosureprogramssatisfythedemocraticbeliefthatthepublichasa‘righttoknow’thattheymightbeaffectedbythirdpartypollution.Onamorepracticallevel,informationdisclosureprogramsaregenerallythoughttocostthegovernmentfarlessthandraftingandimplementingindustrywideregulations.Asaresultofthesepresumedbenefits,informationdisclosureprogramsmightalsobepoliticallymorefeasiblethannewcoerciveregulations.

Despitethesepresumedbenefits,informationdisclosureprogramsarenotfree.Aswithanygovernmentpolicy,theyshouldbesubjecttothescrutinyofacost-benefitanalysis.Thebenefitsareobvious–improvementsintheenvironmentthatarepresumablyvaluedbysomemembersofsociety.Onthecostside,informationdisclosurerequiressomeamountofgovernmentrule-makingalongwithdatacollection,verification,anddissemination.Firmsalsoincurthecostsofcollectinganddisseminatingdataandpresumablyincurthecostsofanyvoluntarypollutionreduction.Consumergroupsandothernon-governmentalgroupsthatexertpressureonpollutingfirmstoreducetheiremissionsalsoincurcosts–thecostofcollectiveaction,lobbying,litigation,etc.Thesecostssubstitutetosomeextentforthesavingsfromreducedgovernmentmonitoringandenforcement.Finally,thereisanotherpotentialcostassociatedwithinformationdisclosureprograms–theopportunitycostofforegonepollutionreductionbenefitsoutsidetheindustry/pollutantsubjecttoinformationdisclosure.Thatis,byplacingattentionononeformofpollution,amandatorydisclosureprogrammightdiverttheattentionandlimitedresourcesofconsumer,community,andenvironmentalgroupsawayfromotherformsofpollutionthatmightbeworsethan–and/orlessexpensivetocontrolthan–thepollutantsubjecttoinformationdisclosureregulation.Worseyet,itispossiblethatinformationdisclosureprogramsmayresultinnonetbenefitinenvironmentalquality–andevenaworsening–totheextentthatfirmssubstituteoneformofpollutionforanother.

Todate,virtuallyalloftheliteratureoninformationdisclosurehasbeenempirical–eitherdemonstratingtheaggregateeffectofaninformationdisclosureprogramonemissionsorattemptingtocharacterizethemechanismsbywhichinformationdisclosureleadstotheseemissionreductions.ExamplesincludeHamilton（1995）,KonarandCohen（1997and2000）,Khanna,QuimioandBojilova（1998）,andMaxwell,LyonandHackett（2000）.Inspiteofthisgrowingliteratureoninformationdisclosure,noattempthasbeenmadetotheoreticallyanalyze.

2.Bargainingbetweenpolluterandvictim:

Theimpactofvictim’signoranceofhisdamage

Theproblemweareconsideringissimilarto–butnottypicalof–aCoaseanbargainingmodelwithasymmetricinformation（seeCoase,1960;andHuberandWirl,1998）.Inastandardasymmetricinformationproblem,thevictimknowsthedamagecausedbypollution,butdoesnotknowthecostofpollutioncontrol.However,inthismodel,thevictimdoesnotknowthedamage.Shemayormaynotknowthecostofpollutioncontrol.

Considertheproblemofasinglepolluterwhosepollutioncausesdamagetoasinglevictim.LetDbethedamageandCbethecostofcontrollingpollution.Thus,onecancharacterizethestateofknowledgebasedonacombinationoffourparameters,{（D,C）;（D,C）}wherethefirstpairisthestateofknowledgeofthepolluterandthesecondcharacterizestheknowledgeofthevictim.Thus,forexample,{（0,1）;（1,0）}indicatesthatthepolluterknowshiscosts（butnotthedamagetovictim）andthevictimknowsherdamage（butnotthecost）.Weexplorevariouspossiblestatesofknowledge,wherebythevictimmightormightnotknoweitherDorC.Thepolluteralwaysknowsthecostofabatement,C.Althoughwealsoassumethatthepolluteralwaysknowshowmuchpollutionisbeinggenerated,wedonotassumethatthepolluteralwaysknowsthefunctionalrelationshipbetweenpollutionanddamages.Inotherwords,itispossiblethatthepolluterdoesnotknowthedamagecausedbyhispollutionevenifthevictimdoes.

3、ExtensionsoftheModel

Ourresultsthusfarassumenotransactionscosts,onlyonepolluterandonevictim.Whileweleaveextensivemodelingtofutureresearch,inthissection,webrieflyexploresomeoftheobviousextensionsofthemodelandprovideconjecturesabouttheirimplications.

3.1．InformationDisclosurewithTransactionsCosts

Ourmodelassumedzerotransactionscostsandefficiencyhasbeendefinedsolelyintermsofcostlessbargaining.Inreality,therecanbenumerousformsoftransactionscostsincludingthecostofnegotiation,monitoringtoensurethattheprovisionsofanycontractareadheredto,andenforcement/punishmentcoststothegovernmenttoensurethatinformationishonestlydisclosed.Introducingtransactionscostsintothebargainingprocessreducesthelikelihoodthatinformationdisclosureprogramswillresultinpollutionreductions.Ofcourse,thehigherexpectedpollutionis,themorethevictimiswillingtodevoteresourcestobargainingforreducedpollution.Oneoftheobviousimplicationsofthisextensionisthatceterisparibus,wewouldexpectinformationdisclosureprogramstoworkbestincommunitiesthatarebetterofffinanciallyorareendowedwitharelativeabundanceoftime（i.e.havealowopportunitycostoftime）.Thesecommunitieswillhavetheresourcestobargainand/orpressurefirmstoreducepollution.

3.2．MultiplePollutersorTypesofPollution

Wealsoassumedonlyonepolluterandonetypeofpollution.Iftherearetwopolluterswithdifferentcoststructures,ortwotypesofpollutionwithdifferentdamages,thegovernmentmustdecidewhethertorequiredisclosureofallpollutiontypesand/orallsources.Ifthegovernmentarbitrarilydecidestoimposeaninformationdisclosureprogramononepolluterbutnottheother,itispossiblethatthiswilldistorttheexpectedbenefitsofpollutionreductioninsuchamannerthatthevictimwillnowbargainwiththewrongfirmforpollutionreductions.Thiscouldworkineitherdirection.Forexample,supposetherearetwotypesofpollution,P1andP2.IfinformationdisclosuresuggeststhatdamagesfromP1areworsethanthevictimthought,shemightshiftresourcestothatpollutionsourceeventhoughatthemarginshewouldprefertoreduceP2ifshehadbetterinformation.Similarly,iftheinformationdisclosuresuggeststhatdamagesfromP1arelessthanthevictimthought,shemightshi