独立董事制度建设中英文外文文献翻译.docx

独立董事制度建设中英文外文文献翻译.docx

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独立董事制度建设中英文外文文献翻译

独立董事制度建设中英文外文文献翻译 

（含：

英文原文及中文译文）

英文原文

Concerningtheconstructionofthesystemofindependentdirectors

TFujioka

Abstract

Thispaperfromthepaysystemofindependentdirectorsincentiveandrestrictiveeffectsofperspective,choosingthepersonneloftheindependentdirectors,compensationdevelopment,performanceappraisal,paycash,supervisionandsafeguardmechanism,andseveralotheraspectsofdirectandindirectremunerationsystemcomparethepaysystemtobetterimprovethesalarysystemofindependentdirectors,andstrengthentheincentivesofindependentdirectors.

Inpractice,athomeandabroadinlistedcompaniespayforindependentdirectorsistotakedirectpaysystem,butthepaysystemdirectlytothepracticeeffectinChinaisnotsatisfactoryinsolvingtheproblemofinternalcontroltosafeguardtherightsandinterestsofminorityshareholdersshouldnotplayfunctions.Withthedrawbacksofdirectpaysystemisshowing,andsomescholarshavesuggestedtheimplementationofindirectcompensationsystem.Thisarticleonthecomparison,especiallyfromtheperspectiveofincentivesandconstraintstoanalyzetheIndependentDirectorSystemdirection.

Keywords:

IndependentDirectors,DirectCompensation,IndirectCompensation,IncentivesandConstraints

1OverviewofDirectRemunerationSystemandIndirectRemunerationSystem

Thedirectremunerationsystemmeansthatindependentdirectorsareinvolvedincompanyaffairsasoutsiders,buttheydirectlyreceiveremunerationfromthecompanytogetherwithcompanyinsiders.Intheindirectremunerationsystem,althoughindependentdirectorsareinvolvedincompanyaffairsasoutsiders,theyperformdutiessuchassupervisingtheinsider’sbusinessdecisions,improvingthescientificnatureofdecision-making,protectingtherightsandinterestsofsmallandmediumshareholders,andotherstakeholders’interests,buttheirlaborremunerationdoesnotcomefromthecompany.Itiscollecteddirectly,andisissuedbyanon-profitself-disciplinedindustryorganizationaccordingtocertainregulations.

Thedesignersoftheindirectremunerationsystembelievethatindependentdirectorsactuallybecomethecompany's“outsidedirectors”undertheindirectremunerationsystem,andtheydonotreceiveremunerationdirectlyfromthecompany.Thissystemcutsoffthepsychologicalattachmentofindependentdirectorstolistedcompaniesandtheircloseeconomictieswiththem.Thiseffectivelyprotectstheindependenceofindependentdirectorsandsupportstheworkofindependentdirectors.

2Comparisonofincentiveandrestrainteffectsbetweenthetwotypesofcompensationsystem

2.1SelectionofIndependentJelloPersonnel

Underthedirectremunerationsystem,theselectionofindependentdirectorsfromthenominationtotheselectionisgenerallydeterminedbythecompany'sinsiders.Eachcompanyhasitsownchoice,andthereisnosingleunifiedrule,resultinginunevenqualityofindependentdirectors.Undertheindirectremunerationsystem,theintroductionofindustryorganizationshasmadetheappointmentofindependentdirectorsnotonlyhaveuniformentrybarriers,butalsohasstricterselectionconditions.Theindustryorganizationisresponsiblefortheidentificationofprofessionalqualificationsofindependentdirectors,subsequentvocationaltrainingandtherecommendationofindependentdirectorstolistedcompanies.Candidateschangedthepracticeofthecompany'sdecisionontheselectionofindependentdirectorsunderthedirectremunerationsystem.Thiscanalsopromotetheformationofanindependentdirectormarketandacceleratetheimprovementoftheindependentdirectormarket.Incontrast,theproceduresfortheselectionofindependentdirectorsundertheindirectremunerationsystemareopenandtransparent,andtheindependentdirectorscanworksafelyafterenteringthecompanywithoutanyworries.However,independentdirectorsunderthedirectremunerationsystemmaybehinderedbythecompany'smajorshareholder'saffection,andtheyareboundbytheirhandsandfeet.

2.2Developmentofremuneration

（1）Comparisonofremunerationmakers

Undertheindirectremunerationsystem,theindustryorganizationsareresponsibleforformulatingtheremunerationstandardsofthelistedcompany'sindependentdirectorsaccordingtothespecificconditionsofthelistedcompanies.Theindicatorsareunifiedandthereisnolackofflexibility.Theremunerationofindependentdirectorsunderthedirectremunerationsystemwillnolongerbedecidedbythecompany’sinsidersorevennotpaid.Remuneration,theunbalancedpaymentandremunerationofindependentdirectorswillalsobeimproved.Overall,indirectremunerationisanaffirmationoftheworkofindependentdirectors,andithasagoodmaterialincentiveforindependentdirectors,whichcangreatlymobilizetheenthusiasmofindependentdirectors.Thistypeofperformanceisrelativelyconcealedintermsofconstraints.Themainreasonisthatiftheindependentdirectorsdonotperformtheirdutiesdiligently,throughthesupervisionoftheindustryorganizationorfeedbackfromtheworkoftheindependentdirectors,hemaynotbeabletoobtainthemostbasicmaterialcompensation.

（2）Comparisonofremunerationdevelopmentprocedures

Itisgenerallybelievedthatthefairnessoftheprocedureisbetterthanthefairnessoftheresult.Theindirectsalarysystemisbetterthanthedirectsalarysysteminthisrespect.Thelistedcompanyreportstheindependentdirectors'reportonthecompany'sattendanceandparticipationindecision-makingtotheindustryorganization.Theindustrialorganizationthendeterminestheremunerationoftheindependentdirectorsofeachcompany.Inthisway,intheeventoffinalcashing,comparedwiththearbitrarinessofremunerationdeterminedbymajorshareholdersunderthedirectremunerationsystem,objectivityisenhanced,andtheremunerationavailabletoindependentdirectorsisdeterminedentirelybytheirperformance.

2.3PerformanceEvaluation

Inthisregard,theindirectremunerationsystempaysmoreattentiontotheparticipationofsmallandmedium-sizedshareholders.Thisismainlyduetothefactthatindependentdirectorsaredesignedtoprotecttheinterestsofsmallandmediumshareholders.Theymustbejudgedbythepeopleherepresents.Atpresent,thereislittlediscussionaboutperformanceevaluationofindependentdirectors.Oneviewisthattheinformationplatformforindependentdirectorscanbeopenedthroughthewebsitesoflistedcompanies,andtheinformationdisclosuresystemoflistedcompaniescanbeusedtodisclosetherelevantworkofindependentdirectorstoallshareholdersandthegeneralpublic.Theopinionsofsmallandmediumshareholdersandsocialreactionsareusedtojudge.However,thequestionhereiswhethertheinformationobtainedbysmallandmediumshareholdersissufficientandwhethertheycanproperlyanalyzetheinformation.Therefore,thepracticaleffectofthismethodwillnotbebetterthanthatofthedirectremunerationsystem.However,itcanbeaffirmedthattheassessmentundertheindirectremunerationsystemwillbemoreopenthantheassessmentunderthedirectremunerationsystem,allowingsmallandmedium-sizedshareholderstounderstandthesituationoftheirrightsprotection,andtoremindindependentdirectorstopayattentiontotheirownmissionandresponsibilities.Inaddition,themorecommonperformanceappraisalmethodistoplaytheroleofreputationmechanism,whichisatypicalmethodofequalemphasisonincentivesandconstraints.Thisisbecauseiftheindependentdirectorsshowtheirobjectiveandindependenceinthecompany,theyhavedemonstratedexcellentcontrolanddecision-makingcapabilities,whichwillinevitablyincreasetheirreputationandincreasethevalueoftheirhumancapital.Independentdirectors,takingintoaccounttheirownreputation,donotcollaboratewithmanagers,butwillusetheirownindependentstatustoperformtheiraffairsinanobjectiveandfairmannerinordertocommunicatesignalstotheoutsideworldthatareconducivetotheirownvalue.Thismeansthatagoodindependentdirectorwillinevitablyworkhardtomaintainhisreputationasasupervisorofbusinessoperations.Andifitdoesnotdoitsjob,reputationwillsufferhugeopportunitycosts.

2.4PayoutofPayroll

Inrespectofpaycompensation,undertheindirectcompensationsystem,theindustryorganizationsandthelistedcompanieshavetheirowndivisionoflabor,thatis,thecompensationispaidbytheindustrialorganization,butisbornebythelistedcompany.Thisisobviouslydifferentfromthedirectremunerationsystem.Underthedirectremunerationsystem,independentdirectorsreceivebenefitsfromthecompanyandoperateinaclosedbox.Aftertheimplementationoftheindirectremunerationsystem,thepaymentsbetweenindependentdirectorsandthecompanyareregulatedbythetransparencyoftheneutralthirdparties,whichcanpreventthegrayincomefromarising.Thistransparentindirectremunerationsystemsafeguardsthethreemajorprinciplesof“openness,fairness,andfairness”inthesecuritiesmarket.Thiskindofincentiveandrestrainteffectonsalarypaymentandtheformulationofcompensationaresimilartoeachother.Itseemstobeaclearincentivetoindependentdirectors,anditalsoconcealstheconstraintsonthem.However,theresultofthisrestrictionislaggingbehind.Thisisbecauseincentivesandconstrainsareinthemselvesanorganicwholethatcannotbedealtwithintermsofcorporategovernance.Thisappliestotheindependentdirectorsystem.Ontheonehand,thedistinctionbetweenmotivationandrestraintisverysubtle.Takingthefixedallowancegiven