一篇经济类英文论文含中文翻译.docx

一篇经济类英文论文含中文翻译.docx

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一篇经济类英文论文含中文翻译

TheProblemofSocialCost

社会成本问题

RONALDCOASE

罗纳德·科斯

RonaldCoaseisProfessorEmeritusatUniversityofChicagoLawSchoolandaNobelLaureateinEconomics.ThisarticleisfromTheJournalofLawandEconomics（October1960）.Severalpassagesdevotedtoextendeddiscussionsoflegaldecisionshavebeenomitted.

罗纳德·科斯在芝加哥大学法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。

本文是其外法学与经济学杂志〔1960年10月〕。

专门的法律问题的决定的延伸讨论的几个段落已被省略。

I.THEPROBLEMTOBEEXAMINED

Thispaperisconcernedwiththoseactionsofbusinessfirmswhichhaveharm-fuleffectsonothers.Thestandardexampleisthatofafactorythesmokefromwhichhasharmfuleffectsonthoseoccupyingneighbouringproperties.Theeconomicanalysisofsuchasituationhasusuallyproceededintermsofadivergencebetweentheprivateandsocialproductofthefactory,inwhicheconomistshavelargelyfollowedthetreatmentofPigouinTheEconomiesofWelfare.Theconclusiontowhichthiskindofanalysisseemstohaveledmosteconomistsisthatitwouldbedesirabletomaketheownerofthefactoryli-ableforthedamagecausedtothoseinjuredbythesmoke,oralternatively,toplaceataxonthefactoryownervaryingwiththeamountofsmokeproducedandequivalentinmoneytermstothedamageitwouldcause,orfinally,toexcludethefactoryfromresidentialdistricts（andpresumablyfromotherareasinwhichtheemissionofsmokewouldhaveharmfuleffectsonothers）.Itismycontentionthatthesuggestedcoursesofactionareinappropriate,inthattheyleadtoresultswhicharenotnecessarily,orevenusually,desirable.

一、要检查的问题

本文关注的是这些行动的企业有伤害他人有用的影响。

标准的例子是，一个工厂的烟雾从那些占领邻近物业的有害影响。

在这种情况下的经济分析，通常已在工厂的私人和社会产品之间的分歧方面着手，在经济学家们基本上遵循治疗庇古福利经济。

这种分析的结论，似乎使大多数经济学家是工厂里的烟雾，或者受伤的人造成的损害能够使雇主，这将是可取的，上放置一个税在金钱方面的损害，或最后，它会导致排除住宅区〔大概是从其他地区排放的烟雾将有对他人有害影响〕工厂厂主不同的金额产生的烟雾，相当于。

行动的建议的课程是不合适的，因为它们导致的结果是不一定，甚至是通常情况下，可取的，它是我的论点。

II.THERECIPROCALNATUREOFTHEPROBLEM

Thetraditionalapproachhastendedtoobscurethenatureofthechoicethathastobemade.ThequestioniscommonlythoughtofasoneinwhichAinflictsharmonBandwhathastobedecidedis:

howshouldwerestrainA?

Butthisiswrong.Wearedealingwithaproblemofareciprocalnature.Toavoidtheharmto,BwouldinflictharmonA.Therealquestionthathastobedecidedis:

shouldAbeallowedtoharmBorshouldBbeallowedtoharmA?

Theproblemistoavoidthemoreseriousharm.Iinstancedinmypreviousarticlethecaseofaconfectionerthenoiseandvibrationsfromwhosemachinerydisturbedadoctorinhiswork.Toavoidharmingthedoctorwouldinflictharmontheconfectioner.Theproblemposedbythiscasewasessentiallywhetheritwasworthwhile,asaresultofrestrictingthemethodsofproductionwhichcouldbeusedbytheconfectioner,tosecuremoredoctoringatthecostofareducedsupplyofconfectioneryproducts.Anotherexampleisaffordedbytheproblemofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsonneighbouringland.Ifitisinevitablethatsomecattlewillstray,allincreaseinthesupplyofmeatcanonlybeobtainedattheexpenseofadecreaseinthesupplyofcrops.Thenatureofthechoiceisclear:

meatorcrops.Whatanswershouldbegivenis,ofcourse,notclearunlessweknowthevalueofwhatisobtainedaswellasthevalueofwhatissacrificedtoobtainit.Togiveanotherexample,ProfessorGeorgeJ.Stiglerinstancesthecontaminationofastream.Ifweassumethattheharmfuleffectofthepollutionisthatitkillsthefish,thequestiontobedecidedis:

isthevalueofthefishlostgreaterorlessthanthevalueoftheproductwhichthecontaminationofthestreammakespossible.Itgoesalmostwithoutsayingthatthisproblemhastobelookedatintotalandatthemargin.

二、互惠性的问题

传统的做法往往掩盖作出的选择，自然。

这个问题通常被认为作为一个在B上一个敌人造成的伤害和什么要决定的是：

我们应该如何抑制一个？

但这是错误的。

我们正在处理的互惠性质的问题。

为了防止伤害，B将A上造成的危害，真正的问题，必须决定是：

应该允许A损害B或应允许B伤害吗？

问题是要防止更严重的伤害。

我在我以前的文章中实例化一个糕点师的噪音和振动机械不安医生在他的工作情况。

为了防止伤及医生会造成伤害的糕点。

基本上这种情况下所造成的问题是它是否值得，作为一种限制方法可以用于糕点生产的结果，以争取更多的糖果产品的供给减少，成本篡改。

另一个例子是给予由偏离破坏邻近土地上的农作物的牛的问题。

如果这是不可防止的，一些牛会偏离，只能获得所有的肉类供给增加作物供给减少开支。

选择的性质是明确的：

肉类或农作物。

应给予什么样的答案是，当然，不明确的，除非我们知道得到什么价值，以及什么牺牲得到它的价值。

给另一个例如，教授乔治·J.斯蒂格勒实例流的污染。

如果我们假定污染的有害影响是，它杀死的鱼，将要决定的问题是：

是鱼的价值损失大于或小于流的污染，使产品的价值。

当然，几乎没有说，这个问题要看着总保证金。

III.THEPRICINGSYSTEMWITHLIABILITYFORDAMAGE

Iproposetostartmyanalysisbyexaminingacaseinwhichmosteconomistswouldpresumablyagreethattheproblemwouldbesolvedinacompeletelysatisfactorymanner:

whenthedamagingbusinesshastopayforalldamagecausedandthepricingsystemworkssmoothly（strictlythismeansthattheoperationofapricingsystemiswithoutcost）.

Agoodexampleoftheproblemunderdiscussionisaffordedbythecaseofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsgrowingonneighbouringland.Letussup-posethatafarmerandcattle-raiserareoperatingonneighbouringproperties.Letusfurthersupposethat,withoutanyfencingbetweentheproperties,anincreaseinthesizeofthecattle-raiser’sherdincreasesthetotaldamagetothefarmer’scrops.Whathappenstothemarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreasesisanothermatter.Thisdependsonwhetherthecattletendtofollowoneanotherortoroamsidebyside,onwhethertheytendtobemoreorlessrestlessasthesizeoftheherdincreasesandonothersimilarfactors.Formyimmediatepurpose,itisimmaterialwhatassumptionismadeaboutmarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreases.

Giventhatthecattle-raiserisliableforthedamagecaused,theadditionalannualcostimposedonthecattle-raiserifheincreasedhisherdfrom,say,2to3steersis$3andindecidingonthesizeoftheherd,hewilltakethisintoaccountalongwithhisothercosts.Thatis,hewillnotincreasethesizeoftheherdunlessthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproduced（assumingthatthecattle-raiserslaughtersthecattle）isgreaterthantheadditionalcoststhatthiswillentail,includingthevalueoftheadditionalcropsdestroyed.Ofcourse,if,bytheemploymentofdogs,herdsmen,aeroplanes,mobileradioandothermeans,theamountofdamagecanbereduced,thesemeanswillbeadoptedwhentheircostislessthanthevalueofthecropwhichtheypreventbeinglost.Giventhattheannualcostoffencingis$9,thecattle-raiserwhowishedtohaveaherdwith4steersormorewouldpayforfencingtobeerectedandmaintained,assumingthatothermeansofattainingthesameendwouldnotdosomorecheaply.Whenthefenceiserected,themarginalcostduetotheliabilityfordamagebecomeszero,excepttotheextentthatanincreaseinthesizeoftheherdnecessitatesastrongerandthereforemoreexpensivefencebecausemoresteersareliabletoleanagainstitatthesametime.But,ofcourse,itmaybecheaperforthecattle-raisernottofenceandtopayforthedamagedcrops,asinmyarithmeticalexample,with3orfewersteers.

Itmightbethoughtthatthefactthatthecattle-raiserwouldpayforallcropsdamagedwouldleadthefarmertoincreasehisplantingifacattle-raisercametooccupytheneighbouringproperty.Butthisisnotso.Ifthecropwaspreviouslysoldinconditionsofperfectcompetition,marginalcostwasequaltopricefortheamountofplantingundertakenandanyexpansionwouldhavereducedtheprofitsofthefarmer.Inthenewsituation,theexistenceofcropdamagewouldmeanthatthefarmerwouldselllessontheopenmarketbuthisreceiptsforagivenproductionwouldremainthesame,sincethecattle-raiserwouldpaythemarketpriceforanycropdamaged.Ofcourse,ifcattle-raisingcommonlyinvolvedthedestructionofcrops,thecomingintoexistenceofacattle-raisingindustrymightraisethepriceofthecropsinvolvedandfarmerswouldthenextendtheirplanting.ButIwishtoconfinemyattentiontotheindividualfarmer.

Ihavesaidthattheoccupationofaneighbouringpropertybyacattle-raiserwouldnotcausetheamountofproduction,orperhapsmoreexactlytheamountofplanting,bythefarmertoincrease.Infact,ifthecattle-raisinghasanyeffect,itwillbetodecreasetheamountofplanting.Thereasonforthisisthat,foranygiventractofland,ifthevalueofthecropdamagedissogreatthatthereceiptsfromthesaleoftheundamagedcroparelessthanthetotalcostsofcultivatingthattractofland,itwillbeprofitableforthefarmerandthecattle-raisertomakeabargainwherebythattractoflandisleftuncultivated.Thiscanbemadeclearbymeansofanarithmeticalexample.Assumeinitiallythatthevalueofthecropobtainedfromcultivatingagiventractoflandis$12andthatthecostincurredincultivatingthistractoflandis$10,thenetgainfromcultivatingthelandbeing$2.Iassumeforpurposesofsimplicitythatthefarmerownstheland.Nowassumethatthecattle-raiserstartsoperationsontheneighbouringpropertyandthatthevalueofthecropsdamagedis$1.Inthiscase$11isobtainedbythefarmerfromsaleonthemarketand$1isobtainedfromthecattle-raiserfordamagesufferedandthenetgainremains$2.Nowsupposethatthecattle-raiserfindsitprofitabletoincreasethesizeofhisherd,eventhoughtheamountofdamagerisesto$3;whichmeansthatthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproductionisgreaterthantheadditionalcosts,includingtheadditional$2paymentfordamage.Butthetotalpaymentfordamageisnow$3.Thenetgaintothefarmerfromcultivatingthelandisstill$2.Thecattle-raiserwouldbebetteroffifthefarmerwouldagreenottocultivatehislandforanypaymentlessthan$3.Thefarmerwouldbeagreeabletonotcultivatingthelandforanypaymentgreaterthan$2.Thereisclearlyroomforamutuallysatisfactorybargainwhichwouldleadtotheabandonmentofcultivation.*Butthesameargumentappliesnotonlytothewholetractcultivatedbythefannerbu