一篇经济类英文论文含中文翻译.docx

1、一篇经济类英文论文含中文翻译The Problem of Social Cost社会成本问题RONALD COASE罗纳德科斯Ronald Coase is Professor Emeritus at University of Chicago LawSchool and a Nobel Laureate in Economics. This article is fromThe Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960). Several passages devoted to extended discussions of legal decis

2、ions have been omitted.罗纳德科斯在芝加哥大学法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。本文是其外法学与经济学杂志1960年10月。专门的法律问题的决定的延伸讨论的几个段落已被省略。I.THE PROBLEM TO BE EXAMINEDThis paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harm-ful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmfu

3、l effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economies of Welfare. The conc

4、lusion to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory li-able for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equi

5、valent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that

6、 they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable. 一、要检查的问题本文关注的是这些行动的企业有伤害他人有用的影响。标准的例子是，一个工厂的烟雾从那些占领邻近物业的有害影响。在这种情况下的经济分析，通常已在工厂的私人和社会产品之间的分歧方面着手，在经济学家们基本上遵循治疗庇古福利经济。这种分析的结论，似乎使大多数经济学家是工厂里的烟雾，或者受伤的人造成的损害能够使雇主，这将是可取的，上放置一个税在金钱方面的损害，或最后，它会导致排除住宅区大概是从其他地区排放的烟雾将有对他人有害影响工厂厂主不同

7、的金额产生的烟雾，相当于。行动的建议的课程是不合适的，因为它们导致的结果是不一定，甚至是通常情况下，可取的，它是我的论点。II.THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEMThe traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how

8、 should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to, B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.

9、 I instanced in my previous article the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery disturbed a doctor in his work. To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner. The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a result of r

10、estricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner, to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products. Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land. If it is inevitable that some catt

11、le will stray, all increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear: meat or crops. What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as well as the value of what

12、 is sacrificed to obtain it. To give another example, Professor George J. Stigler instances the contamination of a stream. If we assume that the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills the fish, the question to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the value of t

13、he product which the contamination of the stream makes possible. It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the margin.二、互惠性的问题传统的做法往往掩盖作出的选择，自然。这个问题通常被认为作为一个在B上一个敌人造成的伤害和什么要决定的是：我们应该如何抑制一个？但这是错误的。我们正在处理的互惠性质的问题。为了防止伤害，B将A上造成的危害，真正的问题，必须决定是：应该允许A损害B或应允许B伤害吗？问

14、题是要防止更严重的伤害。我在我以前的文章中实例化一个糕点师的噪音和振动机械不安医生在他的工作情况。为了防止伤及医生会造成伤害的糕点。基本上这种情况下所造成的问题是它是否值得，作为一种限制方法可以用于糕点生产的结果，以争取更多的糖果产品的供给减少，成本篡改。另一个例子是给予由偏离破坏邻近土地上的农作物的牛的问题。如果这是不可防止的，一些牛会偏离，只能获得所有的肉类供给增加作物供给减少开支。选择的性质是明确的：肉类或农作物。应给予什么样的答案是，当然，不明确的，除非我们知道得到什么价值，以及什么牺牲得到它的价值。给另一个例如，教授乔治J.斯蒂格勒实例流的污染。如果我们假定污染的有害影响是，它杀死的

15、鱼，将要决定的问题是：是鱼的价值损失大于或小于流的污染，使产品的价值。当然，几乎没有说，这个问题要看着总保证金。III.THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH LIABILITY FOR DAMAGEI propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a compeletely satisfactory manner: when the damaging business

16、 has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly (strictly this means that the operation of a pricing system is without cost).A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring land. Let us sup-

17、pose that a farmer and cattle-raiser are operating on neighbouring properties. Let us further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an increase in the size of the cattle-raisers herd increases the total damage to the farmers crops. What happens to the marginal damage as the size

18、of the herd increases is another matter. This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another or to roam side by side, on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the size of the herd increases and on other similar factors. For my immediate purpose, it is immaterial what assumption

19、is made about marginal damage as the size of the herd increases.Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from, say, 2 to 3 steers is $3 and in deciding on the size of the herd, he will take this int

20、o account along with his other costs. That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced (assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle) is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops de

21、stroyed. Of course, if, by the employment of dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile radio and other means, the amount of damage can be reduced, these means will be adopted when their cost is less than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost. Given that the annual cost of fencing is $9, the c

22、attle-raiser who wished to have a herd with 4 steers or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained, assuming that other means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply. When the fence is erected, the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero, except to the

23、extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it at the same time. But, of course, it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to fence and to pay for the damaged crops, as in my arithmetical

24、example, with 3 or fewer steers.It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to occupy the neighbouring property. But this is not so. If the crop was previously sold in conditions of pe

25、rfect competition, marginal cost was equal to price for the amount of planting undertaken and any expansion would have reduced the profits of the farmer. In the new situation, the existence of crop damage would mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market but his receipts for a given prod

26、uction would remain the same, since the cattle-raiser would pay the market price for any crop damaged. Of course, if cattle-raising commonly involved the destruction of crops, the coming into existence of a cattle-raising industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then ex

27、tend their planting. But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer.I have said that the occupation of a neighbouring property by a cattle-raiser would not cause the amount of production, or perhaps more exactly the amount of planting, by the farmer to increase. In fact, if the cattle-r

28、aising has any effect, it will be to decrease the amount of planting. The reason for this is that, for any given tract of land, if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating that tract of land, it will

29、be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to make a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated. This can be made clear by means of an arithmetical example. Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incur

30、red in cultivating this tract of land is $10, the net gain from cultivating the land being $2. I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land. Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighbouring property and that the value of the crops damaged is $1.In this cas

31、e $11 is obtained by the farmer from sale on the market and $1 is obtained from the cattle-raiser for damage suffered and the net gain remains $2. Now suppose that the cattle-raiser finds it profitable to increase the size of his herd, even though the amount of damage rises to $3; which means that t

32、he value of the additional meat production is greater than the additional costs, including the additional $2 payment for damage. But the total payment for damage is now $3. The net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still $2. The cattle-raiser would be better off if the farmer would agr

33、ee not to cultivate his land for any payment less than $3. The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater than $2. There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which would lead to the abandonment of cultivation. * But the same argument applies not only to the whole tract cultivated by the fanner bu