付够了不付太多或者根本不付奖金强度对工作满意度的影响外文翻译.docx

付够了不付太多或者根本不付奖金强度对工作满意度的影响外文翻译.docx

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付够了不付太多或者根本不付奖金强度对工作满意度的影响外文翻译

原文二：

PayEnough,Don'tPayTooMuchorDon'tPayatAll?

TheImpactofBonusIntensityonJobSatisfaction.

Pouliakas,Konstantinos

Theprincipal-agentmodel,withitsconvincingillustrationofthetrade-offthatarisesbetweenriskandincentiveprovisionwhenattemptingtoaligntheconflictinginterestsoftwocontractingparties,remainscentralforourunderstandingofthecompensationstrategiesemployedbyfirms（Mirlees,1976;Holmstrom,1979）.Accordingtothestandardmodelofagencytheory,theintroductionoffinancialincentivesaspartofanagent’sremunerationpackagewillincreasehis/herproductivity,asitisassumedthatindividualsderiveutilityfromincomewhilsttheexertionofeffortentailsautilitycost.Importantly,iftheadditionaldisutilityofhighereffortiscompensatedbyanadequatewagepremium,animplicationofthetheoryisthatthemarginalutilitiesofworkersunderfixedandvariablecompensationschemesshouldbeequalizedinthelong-run.Whatthisimpliesisthatthereshouldbenodifferencebetweenthejobsatisfactionofemployeesreceivingmonetaryincentivesandthoseonnon-contingentpaymentarrangements,otherthingsequal.

Theaboveconclusionhasbeendisputedbyapsychological（and,increasingly,economics）literature,whichhasstressedthattheincorporationofnon-pecuniarymotivesintotheeconomicparadigm,suchasthedesireforreciprocationorforengagingininterestingtasks,hasimportantimplicationsforanindividual’smotivationandjobsatisfaction（Deci,1971;Lepperetal.,1973;DeciandRyan,1985;Frey,1986,1997;Kreps,1997;FreyandJegen,2001）.Inaddition,ithasbeenarguedthat‘wrong’monetaryincentivesmayincitedysfunctionalbehaviouralresponsesbyemployees（HolmstromandMilgrom,1991;Baker,1992;Prendergast,1999）,orhaveadetrimentaleffectonemployeemoraleandjobsecurityviatheinequitableandriskypaydistributionsthatariseasaconsequence（Bakeretal.,1988）.

Oncethesemechanismsaretakenintoconsideration,itbecomesclearthatthetheoreticalimpactofmonetaryincentivesonworkereffortandjobsatisfactioncanbeambiguous.Ascorroboratedinanumberofeconomicexperiments（FalkandKosfeld,2006;ErikssonandVilleval,2008）,theincentiveeffectsofmonetaryrewardsarelikelytobecompromisedinaworldofimperfectlabourmobilitypopulatedbyheterogeneousagentswithvaryingpsychologicaldispositions.Totheextentthatincentiveschemesallowforoptimizationofeffort,facilitateworkerautonomyandenhanceself-determinationtheyshouldincreasejobsatisfaction,otherthingsequal.Yetincreasingearningsrisk,crowdingoutoftheinherentpleasantnessinperformingone’sjobandlowermoralecanleadtodisgruntledemployees.

Workontheproductivityoftheknowledgeworkershasbarelybegun.Inthetermsofactualworkonknowledgeworkerproductivityweare.In2000,roughlywherewewereintheyear1900,acenturyago,intermsoftheproductivityofmanualworker.Butwealreadyknowinfinitelymoreabouttheproductivityoftheknowledgeworkersthanwedidthenaboutthatofthemanualworker.Weevenknowagoodmanyoftheanswers.Butwealsoknowthechallengestowhichwedonotyetknowtheanswers,andonwhichweneedtogotowork..

Managementˊsdutyistopreservetheassetsoftheinstitutioninitscare.Whatdoesthismeanwhentheknowledgeoftheindividualknowledgeworkerbecomesanassetand,inmoreandmorecases,themainassetsofaninstitution.Whatisneededtoattractandtoholdthehighest-producingknowledgeworkers?

Whatisneededtoincreasetheirproductivityandtoconverttheirincreasedproductivityintoperformancecapacityfortheorganization?

Howtoimproveproductivity?

Makingknowledgeworkersproductiverequireschangesinbasicattitude-whereasmakingthemanualworkermoreproductivityonlyrequiredtellingtheworkerhowtodothejob.Andmakingknowledgeworkersproductivityrequirechangesinattitude,notonlyonthepartoftheindividualknowledgeworkerbutonthepartofthewholeorganization.Itthereforehastobe"pilot"–asanymajorchangeshouldbe.

Thegrowingeconomicsliteratureonsubjectivewell-being（FreyandStutzer,2002;BlanchflowerandOswald,2004;VanPraagandFerrer-i-Carbonell,2004;EPICURUS,2007;Frey,2008）hasemphasizedthatmeasuresofjobsatisfactionaresignificantpredictorsofemployeebehaviour[e.g.quits（Freeman,1978）,absenteeism（Clegg,1983）orworkerproductivity（Judgeetal.,2001）].Itfollowsthatunderstandingtheinfluenceofmonetaryincentivesonjobsatisfactionisimportantgiventhatthecompositionofanemployee’sremunerationpackageisanintegralelementofhis/heroverallworkingconditions.

OtheraspectsofPRPmay,nonetheless,diminishproductivityandworkersatisfaction.Ithasbeenillustratedthatwronglydevisedcompensationschemescanhavecounterproductiveconsequences,astheymayencourageworkersto‘game’thecompensationsystemtotheiradvantagebymultitasking（Baker,1992）orbyengaginginrent-seekingbehaviouraimedatinfluencingthesubjectiveevaluationsoflinemanagers（Prendergast,1999）.Holmstrom’s（1982）seminalpaperhasalsoshowedthatutilizingteamproductionincentiveschemes（suchasprofit-sharing）maydiluteindividualperformanceasaresultoffree-riding.Inthefaceofevidencesuggestingthatthejobsatisfactionofemployeesisintrinsicallylinkedtotheirrelativepaystatus（ClarkandOswald,1996;Clark,1999;Ferrer-i-Carbonell,2005;Clarketal.,2008[a]）,thedemoralizingdispersionandvariabilityinwagesthatensuesfromPRPschemesisalsolikelytoaffectattitudestoworkinanegativefashion.Furthermore,ithasoftenbeenclaimedthatfinancialincentivesunderminecollaborationandteamwork,emphasizethepowerasymmetrybetweenmanagementandtheworkforce,andreduceemployeerisk-takingandinnovation（Kohn,1993）.

Animportantcommonelementoftheaboveexperimentsisthat‘‘small’’incentivesarelikelytoexertanegativeeffectonbehaviour（withdiscontinuityclosetozero）,whileforhighpoweredrewards（orpunishments）thestandardpriceeffectisexpectedtoprevail.4Thispredictionhasbeencorroboratedintheproposer-respondentgameexperimentofGneezy（2004）,whichultimatelygivesrisetoa（V）W-shapedrelationshipbetweeneffortandtheintensityof（positive）incentives.Incontrast,theIQandcountingtasksexperimentsperformedbyPokorny（2008）onundergraduateGermanstudentsindicateaninverseU-shapedrelationshipbetweeneffortlevelsandthestrengthofmonetarypayoffs.Theauthorattributeshercontradictingfindingstotheexistenceofreferencedependentpreferencesamongsubjects,whichimplydecreasingeffortchoiceswithstrongerincentivesonceareferenceincomelevelisexceeded.Anotherexampleofthenon-monotonicmotivationeffectofincentivescanbefoundinthefieldstudyofMarsdenetal.（2001）,whohighlightthatalthoughalargenumberofworkersintheirsampleexperiencedadeteriorationofworkplacerelationsandcooperationfollowingtheintroductionofincentivepay,PRPmotivatedthosewhoreceivedaboveaveragepayments.

Then,thereisaneedtoworkconsistently,patiently,andforaconsiderablelengthofuninterruptedtime,inthissmallareaorwhitthissmallgroup.Forthefirstattemrts,evenifgreetedwhitgreatenthusiasm,willalmostcertainlyrunintoallkindsofunexpectedproblems.Itisonlyaftertheproductivityofthissmallgroupknowledgeworkershasbeensubstantiallyincreasedthatthenewwaysofdoingtheworkcanbeextendedtoalargerareaifnottotheentireorganization.Andbythnwewillalsohavelearnedwherethemainproblemsare.Wetrytojumpthepilotstage-andthereisalwayspressyretodoso-onlymeansdiscreditingtheentireenterprise.Butifproperlypilothed,wecanalreadydoagreatdealtoimproveanddrasticallyknowledgeworkerproductivity.Knowledgeworkerproductivityisthebiggestof21st-centurymanagementchallenges.Inthedevelopedcountriesitistheirfirstsurvivalrequirement.Innootherwaycanbethedevelopedcountrieshopetomaintainthemselves,letalonetomaintaintheirleadershipandtheirstandardsofliving.

Thestudyusesdatafromwaves8to17（1998–2007）oftheBritishHouseholdPanelSurvey（BHPS）,asreadilyavailableinformationonindividual-basedPRPisonlyavailableforthoseyears,whilethesurveyquestionclarifyingtheamountofbonuspaywasaskedfrom1997onwards.TheBHPSisanationallyrepresentativesurveythateachyearinterviewsarandomsampleofnearly10,000individualsinapproximately5,500Britishhouseholds.Ithasbeenconductedannuallysincelate1991andcontainsawealthofinformationonemployees’personalandemploymentcharacteristics.Thesampleusedinthepaperisrestrictedtoindividualsbetween18and65yearsofagewhoarepaidemployeesatthesurveydate.For10wavesoftheBHPSthisyieldsanunbalancedpanelof67,535observationson14,479uniqueindividuals.

Followingtheratingofvariouspartialjobsatisfactions（e.g.promotionprospects,totalpay,relationswithsupervisors,jobsecurity,abilitytoworkonowninitiative,theactualworkitselfandhoursofwork）,individualsintheBHPSareaskedaquestionregardingtheiroveralljobsatisfaction,wordedasfollows:

‘‘Allthingsconsidered,howsatisfiedordissatisfiedareyouwithyourpresentjoboverallusingthesame1–7scale?

’’.7Answersareevaluatedonasevenpointscale,whereavalueofonecorrespondsto‘notsatisfiedatall’andsevenreflects‘completesatisfaction’.Thesejobsatisfactionresponsesareemployedinthisstudytoidentifythedeterminantsoftheutilityofem