付够了不付太多或者根本不付奖金强度对工作满意度的影响外文翻译.docx

1、付够了不付太多或者根本不付奖金强度对工作满意度的影响外文翻译原文二：Pay Enough, Dont Pay Too Much or Dont Pay at All? The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction.Pouliakas, Konstantinos The principal-agent model, with its convincing illustration of the trade-off that arises between risk and incentive provision when attempting

2、to align the conflicting interests of two contracting parties, remains central for our understanding of the compensation strategies employed by firms (Mirlees, 1976;Holmstrom, 1979). According to the standard model of agency theory, the introduction of financial incentives as part of an agents remun

3、eration package will increase his/her productivity, as it is assumed that individuals derive utility from income whilst the exertion of effort entails a utility cost. Importantly, if the additional disutility of higher effort is compensated by an adequate wage premium, an implication of the theory i

4、s that the marginal utilities of workers under fixed and variable compensation schemes should be equalized in the long-run. What this implies is that there should be no difference between the job satisfaction of employees receiving monetary incentives and those on non-contingent payment arrangements

5、, other things equal. The above conclusion has been disputed by a psychological (and, increasingly, economics) literature, which has stressed that the incorporation of non-pecuniary motives into the economic paradigm, such as the desire for reciprocation or for engaging in interesting tasks, has imp

6、ortant implications for an individuals motivation and job satisfaction (Deci, 1971; Lepper et al., 1973; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1986, 1997; Kreps, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). In addition, it has been argued that wrong monetary incentives may incite dysfunctional behavioural responses by employe

7、es (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992; Prendergast, 1999), or have a detrimental effect on employee morale and job security via the inequitable and risky pay distributions that arise as a consequence (Baker et al., 1988). Once these mechanisms are taken into consideration, it becomes clear th

8、at the theoretical impact of monetary incentives on worker effort and job satisfaction can be ambiguous. As corroborated in a number of economic experiments (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008), the incentive effects of monetary rewards are likely to be compromised in a world of imp

9、erfect labour mobility populated by heterogeneous agents with varying psychological dispositions. To the extent that incentive schemes allow for optimization of effort, facilitate worker autonomy and enhance self-determination they should increase job satisfaction, other things equal. Yet increasing

10、 earnings risk, crowding out of the inherent pleasantness in performing ones job and lower morale can lead to disgruntled employees. Work on the productivity of the knowledge workers has barely begun. In the terms of actual work on knowledge worker productivity we are. In 2000, roughly where we were

11、 in the year 1900, a century ago, in terms of the productivity of manual worker. But we already know infinitely more about the productivity of the knowledge workers than we did then about that of the manual worker. We even know a good many of the answers. But we also know the challenges to which we

12、do not yet know the answers, and on which we need to go to work. Managements duty is to preserve the assets of the institution in its care. What does this mean when the knowledge of the individual knowledge worker becomes an asset and, in more and more cases, the main assets of an institution. What

13、is needed to attract and to hold the highest-producing knowledge workers? What is needed to increase their productivity and to convert their increased productivity into performance capacity for the organization?How to improve productivity?Making knowledge workers productive requires changes in basic

14、 attitude-whereas making the manual worker more productivity only required telling the worker how to do the job. And making knowledge workers productivity require changes in attitude, not only on the part of the individual knowledge worker but on the part of the whole organization. It therefore has

15、to be pilot as any major change should be.The growing economics literature on subjective well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; EPICURUS, 2007; Frey, 2008) has emphasized that measures of job satisfaction are significant predictors

16、of employee behaviour e.g. quits (Freeman,1978), absenteeism (Clegg, 1983) or worker productivity (Judge et al.,2001). It follows that understanding the influence of monetary incentives on job satisfaction is important given that the composition of an employees remuneration package is an integral el

17、ement of his/her overall working conditions. Other aspects of PRP may, nonetheless, diminish productivity and worker satisfaction. It has been illustrated that wrongly devised compensation schemes can have counterproductive consequences, as they may encourage workers togame the compensation system t

18、o their advantage by multitasking (Baker, 1992) or by engaging in rent-seeking behaviour aimed at influencing the subjective evaluations of line managers (Prendergast, 1999). Holmstroms (1982) seminal paper has also showed that utilizing team production incentive schemes (such as profit-sharing) may

19、 dilute individual performance as a result of free-riding. In the face of evidence suggesting that the job satisfaction of employees is intrinsically linked to their relative pay status (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1999; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 2008a), the demoralizing dispersion

20、and variability in wages that ensues from PRP schemes is also likely to affect attitudes to work in a negative fashion. Furthermore, it has often been claimed that financial incentives undermine collaboration and teamwork, emphasize the power asymmetry between management and the workforce, and reduc

21、e employee risk-taking and innovation (Kohn, 1993). An important common element of the above experiments is that small incentives are likely to exert a negative effect on behaviour (with discontinuity close to zero), while for high powered rewards (or punishments) the standard price effect is expect

22、ed to prevail.4 This prediction has been corroborated in the proposer-respondent game experiment of Gneezy (2004), which ultimately gives rise to a (V)W-shaped relationship between effort and the intensity of (positive) incentives. In contrast, the IQ and counting tasks experiments performed by Poko

23、rny (2008) on undergraduate German students indicate an inverse U-shaped relationship between effort levels and the strength of monetary payoffs. The author attributes her contradicting findings to the existence of reference dependent preferences among subjects, which imply decreasing effort choices

24、 with stronger incentives once a reference income level is exceeded. Another example of the non-monotonic motivation effect of incentives can be found in the field study of Marsden et al. (2001), who highlight that although a large number of workers in their sample experienced a deterioration of wor

25、kplace relations and cooperation following the introduction of incentive pay, PRP motivated those who received above average payments. Then, there is a need to work consistently, patiently, and for a considerable length of uninterrupted time, in this small area or whit this small group. For the firs

26、t attemrts, even if greeted whit great enthusiasm, will almost certainly run into all kinds of unexpected problems. It is only after the productivity of this small group knowledge workers has been substantially increased that the new ways of doing the work can be extended to a larger area if not to

27、the entire organization. And by thn we will also have learned where the main problems are. We try to jump the pilot stage-and there is always pressyre to do so-only means discrediting the entire enterprise. But if properly pilothed, we can already do a great deal to improve and drastically knowledge

28、 worker productivity. Knowledge worker productivity is the biggest of 21st-century management challenges. In the developed countries it is their first survival requirement. In no other way can be the developed countries hope to maintain themselves, let alone to maintain their leadership and their st

29、andards of living. The study uses data from waves 8 to 17 (19982007) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), as readily available information on individual-based PRP is only available for those years, while the survey question clarifying the amount of bonus pay was asked from 1997 onwards. The

30、 BHPS is a nationally representative survey that each year interviews a random sample of nearly 10,000 individuals in approximately 5,500 British households. It has been conducted annually since late 1991 and contains a wealth of information on employees personal and employment characteristics. The

31、sample used in the paper is restricted to individuals between 18 and 65 years of age who are paid employees at the survey date. For 10 waves of the BHPS this yields an unbalanced panel of 67,535 observations on 14,479 unique individuals. Following the rating of various partial job satisfactions (e.g

32、. promotion prospects, total pay, relations with supervisors, job security, ability to work on own initiative, the actual work itself and hours of work), individuals in the BHPS are asked a question regarding their overall job satisfaction, worded as follows: All things considered, how satisfied or

33、dissatisfied are you with your present job overall using the same 17 scale?.7Answers are evaluated on a seven point scale, where a value of one corresponds to not satisfied at all and seven reflects complete satisfaction. These job satisfaction responses are employed in this study to identify the determinants of the utility of em