农产品贸易绿色壁垒中英文对照外文翻译文献.docx

农产品贸易绿色壁垒中英文对照外文翻译文献.docx

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农产品贸易绿色壁垒中英文对照外文翻译文献

农产品贸易绿色壁垒中英文对照外文翻译文献

（文档含英文原文和中文翻译）

Thegreenbarriertofreetrade

C.P.Chandrasekhar

JayatiGhosh

AstheMarch31deadlineforcompletingthe"modalities"stageoftheproposednewroundofnegotiationsonglobalagriculturaltradenears,hopesofanagreementareincreasinglywaning.InthiseditionofMacroscan,C.P.ChandrasekharandJayatiGhoshexaminethefactorsandtheplayersconstrainingtherealisationofsuchanagreement.

ATTHEENDofthelatestroundofmeetingsoftheagriculturalnegotiationscommitteeoftheWTO,theoptimismthatnegotiatorswouldmeettheMarch31deadlineforworkingoutnumericaltargets,formulasandother"modalities"throughwhichcountriescanframetheirliberalisationcommitmentsinanewfull-fledgedroundoftradenegotiationshasalmostdisappeared.Thattargetwasimportantfortworeasons.

First,itisnowbecomingclear,thatevenmorethanwastrueduringtheUruguayRound,forginganagreementintheagriculturalareaisboundtoproveextremelydifficult.

Progressintheagriculturalnegotiationswaskeytopersuadingtheunconvincedthatanew`DohaRound'oftradenegotiationsisusefulandfeasible.

Second,theDohadeclarationmadeagriculturalnegotiationsonepartofa`singleundertaking'tobecompletedbyJanuary1,2005.Thatis,inatake`all-or-nothing'scheme,countrieshadtoarriveat,andbeboundby,agreementsinallareasinwhichnegotiationsweretobeinitiatedinthenewround.Thismeansthatifagreementisnotworkedoutwithregardtoagriculture,therewouldbenochangeinthemultilateraltraderegimegoverningindustry,servicesorrelatedareasandnoprogressinnewareas,suchascompetitionpolicy,foreigninvestmentandpublicprocurement,allofwhicharecrucialtotheeconomicagendaofthedevelopedcountries.

Thefactorsmakingagriculturethestickingpointonthisoccasionarenumerous.AsinthelastRound,thereislittleagreementamongthedevelopedcountriesthemselvesontheappropriateshapeoftheglobalagriculturaltraderegime.

TherearesubstantialdifferencesintheagendaoftheUS,theEUandthedevelopedcountrieswithintheCairnsgroupofagriculturalexporters.Whentherichandthepowerfuldisagree,aglobalconsensusisnoteasytocomeby.

Butthatisnotall.Evenifanagreementisstitchedupbetweentherichnations,throughmanoeuvressuchastheBlairHouseaccord,gettingtherestoftheworldtogoalongwouldbemoredifficultthistime.

ThisisbecausetheoutcomesintheagriculturaltradeareasincetheimplementationoftheUruguayRound（UR）AgreementonAgriculture（AoA）beganhavefallenfarshortofexpectations.InthecourseofRound,advocatesoftheURregimehadpromisedglobalproductionadjustmentsthatwouldincreasethevalueofworldagriculturaltradeandanincreaseindevelopingcountryshareofsuchtrade.

AsChart1shows,globalproductionvolumescontinuedtoriseafter1994whentheimplementationoftheUruguayRoundbegan,withsignsoftaperingoffonlyin2000and2001.Asiswidelyknown,thisincreaseinproductionoccurredinthedevelopedcountriesaswell.

Notsurprisingly,therefore,thevolumeofworldtradecontinuedtoriseaswellafter1994（Chart2）.Therealshiftoccurredinagriculturalpriceswhich,aftersomebuoyancybetween1993and1995,havedeclinedthereafter,andparticularlysharplyafter1997.Itisthisdeclineinunitvaluesthatresultedinasituationwherethevalueofworldtradestagnatedandthendeclinedafter1995,whentheimplementationoftheUruguayRoundbegan.

AsTable1shows,therewasasharpfallintherateofgrowthofglobalagriculturaltradebetweenthesecondhalfofthe1980sandthe1990s,withthedeclineingrowthinthe1990sbeingduetotheparticularlypoorperformanceduringthe1998to2001period.

PricedeclinesandstagnationinagriculturaltradevaluesinthewakeoftheURAgreementonAgriculturewereaccompaniedandpartlyinfluencedbythepersistingregionalisationofworldagriculturaltrade.

ThefociofsuchregionalisationwereWesternEuropeandAsia,with32and11percentofglobalagriculturaltradebeingintra-WesternEuropeanandintra-Asiantraderespectively（Chart3）.Whatisnoteworthy,however,isthatagriculturalexportsaccountedforamuchhighershareofbothmerchandiseandprimaryproductstradeinNorthAmericaandWesternEurope（besidesLatinAmericaandAfrica）thanitdidforAsia.

Thus,despitebeingthedevelopedregionsoftheworld,agriculturalproductionandexportswereimportantinfluencesontheeconomicperformanceofNorthAmericaandWesternEurope.

Itis,therefore,notsurprisingthatEuropeiskeenonmaintainingitsagriculturalsectorthroughprotection,whiletheUSiskeenonexpandingitsroleinworldagriculturalmarketsbysubsidisingitsownfarmersandforcingothercountriestoopenuptheirmarkets.TheproblemisthattheUShasbeenmoresuccessfulinprisingopendevelopingcountrymarketsthanthelargeEUmarket.

Thus,outof$104billionworthofexportsfromNorthAmericain2001,$34billionwenttoAsiaand$15billiontoLatinAmerica,whereasexportstoEuropeamountedto$14billion.

TheCairnsgroupofexportingcountries（Argentina,Australia,Bolivia,Brazil,Canada,Chile,Colombia,CostaRica,Guatemala,Indonesia,Malaysia,NewZealand,Paraguay,thePhilippines,SouthAfrica,ThailandandUruguay）,forsomeofwhomatleastagriculturalexportsareextremelyimportant,wantworldmarkettobefreedofprotectionaswellasthesurplusesthatresultfromhugedomesticsupportintheUSandtheEC.

Wemustnotethat$35billionofthe$63billionofexportsfromLatinAmericawenttotheUSandtheEU.Moreopenmarketsandlessdomesticsupportinthosedestinationsis,therefore,crucialfortheregion.

ThefactthatEuropehasbeensuccessfulinitseffortatretainingitsagriculturalspacewiththehelpofaCommonAgriculturalPolicythatbothsupportsandsubsidisesitsagriculturalproducersisclearfromChart4,whichshowsthatintra-ECtradewhichaccountedfor74percentofEUexportsin1990,continuedtoaccountfor73percentoftotalEUexportsin1995and2001.

ButNorthAmerica,withfarfewercountriesinitsfold,hasalsobeenquiteinsular.ClosetoathirdofNorthAmericanexportsareinter-regional.LittlehaschangedsincetheUruguayRoundAgreementonAgriculture.

ItiswidelyacceptedthatthreesetsofactorsaccountforthisfailureoftheAoA:

First,inordertopushthroughanagreementwhenthereweresignsthattheUruguayRoundwasfaltering,theliberalisationofagriculturaltradeinthedevelopedcountrieswasnotpushedfarenough;

Second,istheabilitytouse"loopholes",especiallythoseintheformofinadequatelywell-definedGreenandBlueBoxmeasures,intheAoA,tocontinuetosupportandprotectfarmersonthegroundsthatsuchsupportwasnon-tradedistorting;and

Finally,thereareviolationsofeventhelaxURrulesinthecourseofimplementation,whichhavebeenaidedbythefailureoftheagreementtoensuretransparencyinimplementation.

Notsurprisingly,somecountries,especiallytheCairnsgroupofexportingcountries,haveproposedanambitiousagendaofliberalisationintheagriculturalarea.

Tariffsaretobereducedsharply,usingthe"Swissformula",whichwouldensurethattheproportionatereductioninthetariffsimposedbyacountrywouldbelarger,thehigheristheprevailingboundorappliedtariffinthatcountry.

翻译：

题目：

自由贸易中的绿色壁垒

作者：

C.P.Chandrasekhar、JayatiGhosh

ATTHEENDofthelatestroundofmeetingsoftheagriculturalnegotiationscommitteeoftheWTO,theoptimismthatnegotiatorswouldmeettheMarch31deadlineforworkingoutnumericaltargets,formulasandother"modalities"throughwhichcountriescanframetheirliberalisationcommitmentsinanewfull-fledgedroundoftradenegotiationshasalmostdisappeared.

随着对全球农产品贸易“模式”阶段新一轮谈判完成的截止时间3月31日的临近，要想达成一致的希望越来越弱。

在这个版本中Macroscan，CP钱德拉塞卡和Jayati戈什诊查出限制协议实现的因素和人物。

在世界贸易组织农业谈判委员会最新一轮会议的尾声，乐观派认为谈判代表将在3月31日截止时间到来之前制定出数字目标，公式和其他“模式”。

通过这些，国家能在几乎快要消失的新一轮全面贸易谈判回合中实现他们的自由化承诺。

这一目标之所以重要原因有二。

第一，在农业领域达成一致是相当困难的，这点变得越来越清楚。

在乌拉圭回合谈判中已得到充分证明。

农业谈判进程对于证明新多哈回合谈判对贸易是有益的，可行的这一论断的不可信性具有关键的作用。

第二，多哈宣言使农业判成为‘单一承诺’一部分的事项必须在2005年1月1日完成。

也就是说，必须制定一个“全有或全无”的方案，在这个方案中所有国家都必须在新一轮谈判达成所有领域的协议中达到要求并受约束。

这意味着，如果协议没有制定出关于农业的方面，将无法改变多边贸易体制管理行业，服务或相关领域并且不能在新领域取得进步，如竞争政策，外国投资和公共采购。

所有这些对于发达国家的经济议程都是至关重要的。

使农业在这种场合成为症结的因素很多。

比如说在最后一轮中，发达国家之间就形成适当规模的全球农业贸易体制这点几乎很难达成一致。

美国、欧盟和农产品出口国凯恩斯集团内的发达国家在议程上有很大的差异。

当富有的国家和强大的国家反对时，一个全球性的共识是不容易达成的。

但是，这还不是全部。

即使协议是富国之间促成的，通过策略让世界其他国家赞同，这时候还是比较困难的，比如布莱尔宫协定。

这是因为自乌拉圭回合农业协议（UR）（AOA）实施以来在农业贸易领域的结果远不及预期。

在本回合过程中，乌拉圭回合谈判的倡议者承诺进行全球生产调整。

这将增加世界农业贸易价值和提高发展中国家分享这一贸易的规模。

正如图1所示，全球产量自1994年乌拉圭回合开始实施以来持续上升。

只有在2000和2001年出现逐渐减少的迹象。

众所周知，这种产量增加的现象同样出现在发达国家。

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