Prahalad and Hamel The Core Competence of the CorpWord格式.docx
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1.Themostpowerfulwaytoprevailinglobalcompetitionisstillinvisibletomanycompanies.Duringthe1980s,topexecutiveswerejudgedontheirabilitytorestructure,declutter,anddelayertheircorporations.Inthe1990s,they'
llbejudgedontheirabilitytoidentify,cultivate,andexploitthecorecompetenciesthatmakegrowthpossible—indeed,they'
llhavetorethinktheconceptofthecorporationitself.
2.ConsiderthelasttenyearsofGTEandNEC.Intheearly1980s,GTEwaswellpositionedtobecomeamajorplayerintheevolvinginformationtechnologyindustry.Itwasactiveintelecommunications.Itsoperationsspannedavarietyofbusinessesincludingtelephones,switchingandtransmissionsystems,digitalPABX,semiconductors,packetswitching,satellites,defensesystems,andlightingproducts.AndGTE'
sEntertainmentProductsGroup,whichproducedSylvaniacolorTVs,hadapositioninrelateddisplaytechnologies.In1980,GTE'
ssaleswere$9.98billion,andnetcashflowwas$1.73billion.NEC,incontrast,wasmuchsmaller,at$3.8billioninsales.Ithadacomparabletechnologicalbaseandcomputerbusinesses,butithadnoexperienceasanoperatingtelecommunicationscompany
3.YetlookatthepositionsofGTEandNECin1988.GTE'
s1988saleswere$16.46billion,andNEC'
ssaleswereconsiderablyhigherat$21.89billion.GTEhas,ineffect,becomeatelephoneoperatingcompanywithapositionindefenseandlightingproducts.GTE'
sotherbusinessesaresmallinglobalterms.GTEhasdivestedSylvaniaTVandTelenet,putswitching,transmission,anddigitalPABXintojointventures,andcloseddownsemiconductors.Asaresult,theinternationalpositionofGTEhaserodedNon-U.S.revenueasapercentoftotalrevenuedroppedfrom20%to15%between1980and1988.
4.NEChasemergedastheworldleaderinsemiconductorsandasafirst-tierplayerintelecommunicationsproductsandcomputers.Ithasconsolidateditspositioninmainframecomputers.Ithasmovedbeyondpublicswitchingandtransmissiontoincludesuchlifestyleproductsasmobiletelephones,facsimilemachines,andlaptopcomputers—bridgingthegapbetweentelecommunicationsandofficeautomation.NECistheonlycompanyintheworldtobeinthetopfiveinrevenueintelecommunications,semiconductors,andmainframes.Whydidthesetwocompanies,startingwithcomparablebusinessportfolios,performsodifferently?
LargelybecauseNECconceivedofitselfintermsof"
corecompetencies,"
andGTEdidnot.
RethinkingtheCorporation
1.Once,thediversifiedcorporationcouldsimplypointitsbusinessunitsatparticularendproductmarketsandadmonishthemtobecomeworldleaders.Butwithmarketboundarieschangingevermorequickly,targetsareelusiveandcaptureisatbesttemporary.Afewcompanieshaveproventhemselvesadeptatinventingnewmarkets,quicklyenteringemergingmarkets,anddramaticallyshiftingpatternsofcustomerchoiceinestablishedmarkets.Thesearetheonestoemulate.Thecriticaltaskformanagementistocreateanorganizationcapableofinfusingproductswithirresistiblefunctionalityor,betteryet,creatingproductsthatcustomersneedbuthavenotyetevenimagined.
2.Thisisadeceptivelydifficulttask.Ultimatelyitrequiresradicalchangeinthemanagementofmajorcompanies.Itmeans,firstofall,thattopmanagementofWesterncompaniesmustassumeresponsibilityforcompetitivedecline.Everyoneknowsabouthighinterestrates,Japaneseprotectionism,outdatedantitrustlaws,obstreperousunions,andimpatientinvestors.Whatishardertosee,orhardertoacknowledge,ishowlittleaddedmomentumcompaniesactuallygetfrompoliticalormacroeconomic"
relief."
BoththetheoryandpracticeofWesternmanagementhavecreatedadragonourforwardmotion.Itistheprinciplesofmanagementthatareinneedofreform.
3.NECversusGTE,again,isinstructiveandonlyoneofmanysuchcomparativecasesweanalyzedtounderstandthechangingbasisforgloballeadership.Earlyinthe1970’s,NECarticulatedastrategicintenttoexploittheconvergenceofcomputingandcommunications,whatitcalled"
C&
C."
Success,topmanagementreckoned,wouldhingeonacquiringcompetencies,particularlyinsemiconductors.Managementadoptedanappropriate"
strategicarchitecture,summarizedbyC&
C,andthencommunicateditsintenttothewholeorganizationandtheoutsideworldduringthemid-1970s.
4.NECconstituteda"
CSCCommittee"
oftopmanagerstooverseethedevelopmentofcoreproductsandcorecompetencies.NECputinplacecoordinationgroupsandcommitteesthatcutacrosstheinterestsofindividualbusinesses.Consistentwithitsstrategicarchitecture,NECshiftedenormousresourcestostrengthenitspositionincomponentsandcentralprocessors.Byusingcollaborativearrangementtomultiplyinternalresources,NECwasabletoaccumulateabroadarrayofcorecompetencies.
5.NECcarefullyidentifiedthreeinterrelatedstreamsoftechnologicalandmarketevolution.Topmanagementdeterminedthatcomputingwouldevolvefromlargemainframestodistributedprocessing,componentsfromsimpleICstoVLSI,andcommunicationsfrommechanicalcross-barexchangetocomplexdigitalsystemswenowcallISDN.Asthingsevolvedfurther,NECreasoned,thecomputing,communications,andcomponentsbusinesseswouldsooverlapthatitwouldbeveryhardtodistinguishamongthem,andthattherewouldbeenormousopportunitiesforanycompanythathadbuiltthecompetenciesneededtoserveallthreemarkets.
6.NECtopmanagementdeterminedthatsemiconductorswouldbethecompany'
smostimportant"
coreproduct."
Itenteredintomyriadstrategicalliances—over100asof1987—aimedatbuildingcompetenciesrapidlyandatlowcost.Inmainframecomputers,itsmostnotedrelationshipwaswithHoneywellandBull.Almostallthecollaborativearrangementsinthesemiconductor-componentfieldwereorientedtowardtechnologyaccess.Astheyenteredcollaborativearrangements,NEC'
soperatingmanagersunderstoodthe.rationaleforthesealliancesandthegoalofinternalizingpartnerskills.NEC'
sdirectorofresearchsummedupitscompetenceacquisitionduringthe1970sand1980sthisway:
"
Fromaninvestmentstandpoint,itwasmuchquickerandcheapertouseforeigntechnology.Therewasn'
taneedforustodevelopnewideas."
7.NosuchclarityofstrategicintentandstrategicarchitectureappearedtoexistatGTE.Althoughseniorexecutivesdiscussedtheimplicationsoftheevolvinginformationtechnologyindustry,nocommonlyacceptedviewofwhichcompetencieswouldberequiredtocompeteinthatindustrywerecommunicatedwidely.Whilesignificantstaffworkwasdonetoidentifykeytechnologies,seniorlinemanagerscontinuedtoactasiftheyweremanagingindependentbusinessunits.Decentralizationmadeitdifficulttofocusoncorecompetencies.Instead,individualbusinessesbecameincreasinglydependent’onoutsidersforcriticalskills,andcollaborationbecamearoutetostagedexits.Today,withanewmanagementteaminplace,GTEhasrepositioneditselftoapplyitscompetenciestoemergingmarketsintelecommunicationsservices
TheRootsofCompetitiveAdvantage
1.ThedistinctionweobservedinthewayNECandGTEconceivedofthemselves—aportfolioofcompetenciesversusaportfolioofbusinesses—wasrepeatedacrossmanyindustries.From1980to1988,Canongrewby264%,Hondaby200%.ComparethatwithXeroxandChrysler.AndifWesternmanagerswereonceanxiousaboutthelowcostandhighqualityofJapaneseimports,theyarenowoverwhelmedbythepaceatwhichJapaneserivalsareinventingnewmarkets,creatingnewproducts,andenhancingthem.Canonhasgivenuspersonalcopiers;
Hondahasmovedfrommotorcyclestofour-wheeloff-roadbuggies.Sonydevelopedthe8mmcamcorder,Yamaha,thedigitalpiano.Komatsudevelopedanunderwaterremote—controlledbulldozer,whileCasio'
slatestgambitisasmall-screencolorLCDtelevision.Whowouldhaveanticipatedtheevolutionofthesevanguardmarkets?
2.Inmoreestablishedmarkets,theJapanesechallengehasbeenjustasdisquieting.Japanesecompaniesaregeneratingablizzardoffeaturesandfunctionalenhancementsthatbringtechnologicalsophisticationtoeverydayproducts.Japanesecarproducershavebeenpioneeringfour-wheelsteering,four-valveper-cylinderengines,in-carnavigationsystems,andsophisticatedelectronicengine-managementsystems.Onthestrengthofitsproductfeatures,Canonisnowaplayerinfacsimiletransmissionmachines,desktoplaserprinters,evensemiconductormanufacturingequipment.
3.Intheshortrun,acompany'
scompetitivenessderivesfromtheprice/performanceattributesofcurrentproducts.Butthesurvivorsofthefirstwaveofglobalcompetition,WesternandJapanesealike,areallconvergingonsimilarandformidablestandardsforproductcostandquality—minimumhurdlesforcontinuedcompetition,butlessandlessimportantassourcesofdifferentialadvantage.Inthelongrun,competitivenessderivesfromanabilitytobuild,atlowercostandmorespeedilythancompetitors,thecorecompetenciesthatspawnunanticipatedproducts.Therealsourcesofadvantagearetobefoundinmanagement'
sabilitytoconsolidatecorporatewidetechnologiesandproductionskillsintocompetenciesthatempowerindividualbusinessestoadaptquicklytochangingopportunities.
4.Seniorexecutiveswhoclaimthattheycannotbuildcorecompetencieseitherbecausetheyfeeltheautonomyofbusinessunitsissacrosanctorbecausetheirfeetareheldtothequarterlybudgetfireshouldthinkagai