文献翻译模板汪萍Word文档格式.docx

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文献一:

CommentaryonEarningsManagement

Thiscommentaryisintendedtoprovideaframeworkforthinkingabouttheimplicationsofresearchdesignchoicesinearningsmanagementresearch,todemonstratesometradeoffsinvolvedinmakingthosechoices,andtodescribetheconnectionbetweenearningsmanagementresearchandsomeotherareasofaccountingresearch.Understandingearningsmanagementhasimplicationsforoneofthecentralquestionsconfrontedbypracticingprofessionalaccountantsandacademicaccountants.Thatquestionconcernstheinfluenceandimportanceofaccountingaccrualsinarrivingatasummarymeasureoffirmperformance.AlthoughthevarietyofaccrualoptionsavailableunderGenerallyAcceptedAccountingPrinciplesandthesusceptibilityofaccrualstomanipulationmeanthattheresultingaccountingnumberscouldinprinciplebemanagedtothepointofuninformativeness,availableempiricalevidenceindicatesthataccrualsdoinfacthaveinformationcontent.^Thatis,theopportunitiesforearningsmanagementinherentinthecurrentreportingsystemdonoteliminatetheusefulnessofaccountingearningsforvaluingshares.Ofcourse,researchresultstodatehavenotshedanylightontheissueofwhethersomechangeintheamountofmanagerialdiscretionmightevenaddtotheinformativenessofaccountingearnings.

Framingquestionsoffinancialdisclosureintermsoftheexistenceandpotentialeffectsofearningsmanagementhelpsusthinkaboutthefollowingpolicyproposal:

shouldaccountingrulesbepromulgatedinsuchawaythatopportunitiesforearningsmanagementareeliminated?

Thisisanotherwayofaskingwhetherthereareadverseconsequencesofearningsmanagement,andifthereare,whetheraccountingpolicymakersshouldattempttoeliminatethem.Byfocussingonthecostsandbenefitsofallowingformanagerialdiscretioninthechoiceandapplicationofaccountingmethods,researchersprovideaframeworkforconsideringwhatwewouldhavetogiveuptoeliminateearningsmanagement—forexample,compensation-basedincentivestomanageearningswouldbeeliminatedifmanagerialincentivecontractsneverincludedearnings.Butthisapproachrestrictscontractstoexcludeapotentiallyveryinformativesignalaboutmanagerialproductivity,anditignoresthepossibilitythatearningsmanagementhastheessentiallybeneficialroleofprovidingameansformanagerstorevealtheirprivateinformation.

Theremainderofthiscommentarywillfocusonthreeissues:

definingtheobjectofearningsmanagement;

exploringconditionsgivingrisetoearningsmanagement;

anddesigningempiricaltestsofearningsmanagement.Afinalsectioncontainssomeconclusionsandofferssomespeculationsabouttheconnectionsbet'

weenearningsmanagementresearchandotherareasofaccountingresearch..

By"

earningsmanagement"

Ireallymean"

disclosuremanagement"

inthesenseofapurposefulinterventionintheexternalfinancialreportingprocess,withtheintentofobtainingsomeprivategain(asopposedto,say,merelyfacilitatingtheneutraloperationoftheprocess).Thisdefinitionlimitsthediscussion,inthatitincludesonlytheexternalreportingfunctionandnot,forexample,managerialaccountingreportsoractivities(suchaslobbyingtheFinancialAccountingStandardsBoard)designedtoinfluenceorchangeGenerallyAcceptedAccountingPrinciples.

Thedefinitionofearningsmanagementadoptedheredoesnotrelyonanyparticularconceptofearnings;

itisbasedonaviewofaccountingnumbersasinformation.Italsosubsumesmanagementofthecomponentsofearningsorofsupplementarydisclosures.Underthisdefinition,earningsmanagementcouldoccurinanypartoftheexternaldisclosureprocess,andcouldtakeanumberofforms.^Aminorextensiontothedefinitionwouldencompass"

real"

earningsmanagement,accomplishedbytiminginvestmentorfinancingdecisionstoalterreportedearnings

orsomesubsetofit.Theresultingaccountingnumberscouldbe"

smoothed"

inthesensethattheirover-timevariabilityisreduced,buttheyneednotbe.

Differentformsofaccruals-basedand"

earningsmanagementarenotequallyeasytodiscern.Forexample,itmightbedifficulttodistinguishempiricallybetweeninvestmentorproductiondecisions(suchaschoosingthelevelofexpendituresonresearchanddevelopmentoronadvertising,addingordroppingaproductline,oracquiringanotherfirm)thatareundertakenpurelytomaximizesharevaluesandthoseundertakenpurelytomanageearnings.Withintheopportunitiesofferedbytheaccountingsystem,managerscouldmanageearningsbyselectingaccountingmethodswithinGAAPorbyapplyinggivenmethodsinparticularways(forexample,theycouldchangeestimatesofservicelivesofdepreciableassets).Theformerisrelativelydramaticandtransparentintheyearofthechange;

itmaybeflaggedbytheauditorinapublicwayandwilllikelyreceivefootnotediscussion.Thelatter,whichmerelycontributestotheapplicationofagivenmethod,maybeharderforanoutsidertoobserve.Givencurrentdisclosurerequirements,theeffectsofbothaccountingmethodchangesandchangesinthewaysgivenmethodsareappliedareveryhardtoestimateintheyearsaftertheinitialchange.^

Throughout,Iconsiderearningsmanagementfromaninformationalperspective,asdistinguishedfromaneconomicincome(sometimescalleda"

tmeincome"

)perspective.Thisdistinctionmattersbecauseithasimplicationsforinterpretingresultsofearningsmanagementresearch.Underatrueincomeperspective,thereissomenumber(suchaseconomicincome)whichispurposefullydistortedbyearningsmanagement.Butthereisanothersourceofdistortionaswell:

therulesofaccrualaccountingandGAAPleadtoaccountingnumberswhichmeasuretrueincomewitherror,wherethebenchmarkusedtoevaluatethedegreeofsuchmeasurementerrorisatrueincomemetric.^Therefore,thetrueincomeperspectiveimpliesthatunmanagedearningsarenoisymeasuresofabenchmark,andthatmanagingearningschangesthepropertiesofthenoise(suchasitsamount,bias,orvariance).

Underaninformationalperspective,earningsareoneofmanysignalswhichmaybeusedtomakecertaindecisionsandjudgments.Oneexampleisthevaluationofsecurities.Theinformationalperspectiveimpliesthattheimportantattributeofaccountingnumbersisthereforetheir"

informationcontent,"

astatisticalproperty,sothequestionofmeasurementerrorornoiserelativetoatrueincomebenchmarkdoesnotarise.Theactualvaluesofthenumbers—whichareofessentialimportanceunderatrueincomeperspective—arenotanimportantattribute.Taseethisdistinction,supposeeveryfirmadded$1milliontoincome,andthispracticewaspublicknowledge.Nostatisticalrelationexcepttheratiooftwofirms*incomeswouldbealteredbythislineartransformation,butthevaluewouldbe"

distorted."

Theinformationalperspectiveonearningsmanagementassumesmanagershaveprivateinformationwhichtheycanusewhentheychooseelementsfromafeasiblesetofreportingrules,underagivensetofcontractsthatdetermine(forexample)compensationandothersharingrulesamongstakeholders.Theirchoicesincludenotonlyaccountingproceduresbutalsoestimatesrequiredbythoseprocedures,suchasestimatesofuncollectibleaccountsorwarrantycosts.'

'

Noconceptofearningsasatruevalueisneeded,althoughtheresearchermightwellbeinterestedinconsideringwhatthefinancialprocesswouldproduceintheabsenceofpurposefulintervention.

Mostearningsmanagementresearchassumesthatboththefeasiblereportingsetandthecontractsetarepredetermined—theyarefixedandcanbetakenasgivenbyonewhowishestomanageearnings.Infact,ofcourse,bothcontractsandthefeasiblereportingsetchangeovertimeinresponsetoeconomicandinstitutionalpressures.Thesepressurescouldincludeeitherearningsmanagementortheperceptionthatearningsarebeingmanaged;

insomesense,therefore,contractsandreportingrulesareendogenoustotheearningsmanagementproblem.^Butthereportingsetorcontractsetmaywellbetakenasfixedforagivenreportingperiod,suchasayear.Indesigningaresearchstudy,theadvantageoftakingthecontract/reportingsetasfixedisthatthefixedsetsimplyrigiditiesorfrictionswhichintumimplyanincentiveforearningsmanagement.Thisassumptionpermitsafocusonearningsmanagementasaresponsetoenvironmentalconditions,butitprecludesadynamicanalysisoftheevolutionofcontractualchangesandotherresponsesthatmightoccurasaresultoftheperceptionthatearningsarebeingmanaged.^

Researchersadoptingtheassumptionoffixedcontractingandfixedfeasiblereportingsetsconfrontthequestion:

howdothesefixedsetscreateincentivesforearningsmanagementandwhatinstitutionalfeaturesofthereportingenvironmentmakeearningsmanagementpossible?

Thisquestionhasbeenaddressedusinganalyticmodels.Suchmodelsareusuallybasedonstrong,perhapsunrealistic,assumptionsabouthumanbehavior.Theyarethereforesometimespejoratively

labeledstarkandstylizedrepresentations.Butthislabeloverlookstheadvantagesofsuchrepresentations;

theyimposedisciplinonourintuition,sothatwecanseewhereintuitioncananddoesleadusastray.Theirspareness—^whichhasbeenlabeledbysomeasalackofrealism—Exposeswhatmustbeassumedtoallowearningsmanagementtoariseinaneconomicsetting.Inotherwords,awell-constructedanalyticalmodelofferstheadvantageofstrippingawaysecond-ordereffectsandextra

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