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文献一:
CommentaryonEarningsManagement
Thiscommentaryisintendedtoprovideaframeworkforthinkingabouttheimplicationsofresearchdesignchoicesinearningsmanagementresearch,todemonstratesometradeoffsinvolvedinmakingthosechoices,andtodescribetheconnectionbetweenearningsmanagementresearchandsomeotherareasofaccountingresearch.Understandingearningsmanagementhasimplicationsforoneofthecentralquestionsconfrontedbypracticingprofessionalaccountantsandacademicaccountants.Thatquestionconcernstheinfluenceandimportanceofaccountingaccrualsinarrivingatasummarymeasureoffirmperformance.AlthoughthevarietyofaccrualoptionsavailableunderGenerallyAcceptedAccountingPrinciplesandthesusceptibilityofaccrualstomanipulationmeanthattheresultingaccountingnumberscouldinprinciplebemanagedtothepointofuninformativeness,availableempiricalevidenceindicatesthataccrualsdoinfacthaveinformationcontent.^Thatis,theopportunitiesforearningsmanagementinherentinthecurrentreportingsystemdonoteliminatetheusefulnessofaccountingearningsforvaluingshares.Ofcourse,researchresultstodatehavenotshedanylightontheissueofwhethersomechangeintheamountofmanagerialdiscretionmightevenaddtotheinformativenessofaccountingearnings.
Framingquestionsoffinancialdisclosureintermsoftheexistenceandpotentialeffectsofearningsmanagementhelpsusthinkaboutthefollowingpolicyproposal:
shouldaccountingrulesbepromulgatedinsuchawaythatopportunitiesforearningsmanagementareeliminated?
Thisisanotherwayofaskingwhetherthereareadverseconsequencesofearningsmanagement,andifthereare,whetheraccountingpolicymakersshouldattempttoeliminatethem.Byfocussingonthecostsandbenefitsofallowingformanagerialdiscretioninthechoiceandapplicationofaccountingmethods,researchersprovideaframeworkforconsideringwhatwewouldhavetogiveuptoeliminateearningsmanagement—forexample,compensation-basedincentivestomanageearningswouldbeeliminatedifmanagerialincentivecontractsneverincludedearnings.Butthisapproachrestrictscontractstoexcludeapotentiallyveryinformativesignalaboutmanagerialproductivity,anditignoresthepossibilitythatearningsmanagementhastheessentiallybeneficialroleofprovidingameansformanagerstorevealtheirprivateinformation.
Theremainderofthiscommentarywillfocusonthreeissues:
definingtheobjectofearningsmanagement;
exploringconditionsgivingrisetoearningsmanagement;
anddesigningempiricaltestsofearningsmanagement.Afinalsectioncontainssomeconclusionsandofferssomespeculationsabouttheconnectionsbet'
weenearningsmanagementresearchandotherareasofaccountingresearch..
By"
earningsmanagement"
Ireallymean"
disclosuremanagement"
inthesenseofapurposefulinterventionintheexternalfinancialreportingprocess,withtheintentofobtainingsomeprivategain(asopposedto,say,merelyfacilitatingtheneutraloperationoftheprocess).Thisdefinitionlimitsthediscussion,inthatitincludesonlytheexternalreportingfunctionandnot,forexample,managerialaccountingreportsoractivities(suchaslobbyingtheFinancialAccountingStandardsBoard)designedtoinfluenceorchangeGenerallyAcceptedAccountingPrinciples.
Thedefinitionofearningsmanagementadoptedheredoesnotrelyonanyparticularconceptofearnings;
itisbasedonaviewofaccountingnumbersasinformation.Italsosubsumesmanagementofthecomponentsofearningsorofsupplementarydisclosures.Underthisdefinition,earningsmanagementcouldoccurinanypartoftheexternaldisclosureprocess,andcouldtakeanumberofforms.^Aminorextensiontothedefinitionwouldencompass"
real"
earningsmanagement,accomplishedbytiminginvestmentorfinancingdecisionstoalterreportedearnings
orsomesubsetofit.Theresultingaccountingnumberscouldbe"
smoothed"
inthesensethattheirover-timevariabilityisreduced,buttheyneednotbe.
Differentformsofaccruals-basedand"
earningsmanagementarenotequallyeasytodiscern.Forexample,itmightbedifficulttodistinguishempiricallybetweeninvestmentorproductiondecisions(suchaschoosingthelevelofexpendituresonresearchanddevelopmentoronadvertising,addingordroppingaproductline,oracquiringanotherfirm)thatareundertakenpurelytomaximizesharevaluesandthoseundertakenpurelytomanageearnings.Withintheopportunitiesofferedbytheaccountingsystem,managerscouldmanageearningsbyselectingaccountingmethodswithinGAAPorbyapplyinggivenmethodsinparticularways(forexample,theycouldchangeestimatesofservicelivesofdepreciableassets).Theformerisrelativelydramaticandtransparentintheyearofthechange;
itmaybeflaggedbytheauditorinapublicwayandwilllikelyreceivefootnotediscussion.Thelatter,whichmerelycontributestotheapplicationofagivenmethod,maybeharderforanoutsidertoobserve.Givencurrentdisclosurerequirements,theeffectsofbothaccountingmethodchangesandchangesinthewaysgivenmethodsareappliedareveryhardtoestimateintheyearsaftertheinitialchange.^
Throughout,Iconsiderearningsmanagementfromaninformationalperspective,asdistinguishedfromaneconomicincome(sometimescalleda"
tmeincome"
)perspective.Thisdistinctionmattersbecauseithasimplicationsforinterpretingresultsofearningsmanagementresearch.Underatrueincomeperspective,thereissomenumber(suchaseconomicincome)whichispurposefullydistortedbyearningsmanagement.Butthereisanothersourceofdistortionaswell:
therulesofaccrualaccountingandGAAPleadtoaccountingnumberswhichmeasuretrueincomewitherror,wherethebenchmarkusedtoevaluatethedegreeofsuchmeasurementerrorisatrueincomemetric.^Therefore,thetrueincomeperspectiveimpliesthatunmanagedearningsarenoisymeasuresofabenchmark,andthatmanagingearningschangesthepropertiesofthenoise(suchasitsamount,bias,orvariance).
Underaninformationalperspective,earningsareoneofmanysignalswhichmaybeusedtomakecertaindecisionsandjudgments.Oneexampleisthevaluationofsecurities.Theinformationalperspectiveimpliesthattheimportantattributeofaccountingnumbersisthereforetheir"
informationcontent,"
astatisticalproperty,sothequestionofmeasurementerrorornoiserelativetoatrueincomebenchmarkdoesnotarise.Theactualvaluesofthenumbers—whichareofessentialimportanceunderatrueincomeperspective—arenotanimportantattribute.Taseethisdistinction,supposeeveryfirmadded$1milliontoincome,andthispracticewaspublicknowledge.Nostatisticalrelationexcepttheratiooftwofirms*incomeswouldbealteredbythislineartransformation,butthevaluewouldbe"
distorted."
Theinformationalperspectiveonearningsmanagementassumesmanagershaveprivateinformationwhichtheycanusewhentheychooseelementsfromafeasiblesetofreportingrules,underagivensetofcontractsthatdetermine(forexample)compensationandothersharingrulesamongstakeholders.Theirchoicesincludenotonlyaccountingproceduresbutalsoestimatesrequiredbythoseprocedures,suchasestimatesofuncollectibleaccountsorwarrantycosts.'
'
Noconceptofearningsasatruevalueisneeded,althoughtheresearchermightwellbeinterestedinconsideringwhatthefinancialprocesswouldproduceintheabsenceofpurposefulintervention.
Mostearningsmanagementresearchassumesthatboththefeasiblereportingsetandthecontractsetarepredetermined—theyarefixedandcanbetakenasgivenbyonewhowishestomanageearnings.Infact,ofcourse,bothcontractsandthefeasiblereportingsetchangeovertimeinresponsetoeconomicandinstitutionalpressures.Thesepressurescouldincludeeitherearningsmanagementortheperceptionthatearningsarebeingmanaged;
insomesense,therefore,contractsandreportingrulesareendogenoustotheearningsmanagementproblem.^Butthereportingsetorcontractsetmaywellbetakenasfixedforagivenreportingperiod,suchasayear.Indesigningaresearchstudy,theadvantageoftakingthecontract/reportingsetasfixedisthatthefixedsetsimplyrigiditiesorfrictionswhichintumimplyanincentiveforearningsmanagement.Thisassumptionpermitsafocusonearningsmanagementasaresponsetoenvironmentalconditions,butitprecludesadynamicanalysisoftheevolutionofcontractualchangesandotherresponsesthatmightoccurasaresultoftheperceptionthatearningsarebeingmanaged.^
Researchersadoptingtheassumptionoffixedcontractingandfixedfeasiblereportingsetsconfrontthequestion:
howdothesefixedsetscreateincentivesforearningsmanagementandwhatinstitutionalfeaturesofthereportingenvironmentmakeearningsmanagementpossible?
Thisquestionhasbeenaddressedusinganalyticmodels.Suchmodelsareusuallybasedonstrong,perhapsunrealistic,assumptionsabouthumanbehavior.Theyarethereforesometimespejoratively
labeledstarkandstylizedrepresentations.Butthislabeloverlookstheadvantagesofsuchrepresentations;
theyimposedisciplinonourintuition,sothatwecanseewhereintuitioncananddoesleadusastray.Theirspareness—^whichhasbeenlabeledbysomeasalackofrealism—Exposeswhatmustbeassumedtoallowearningsmanagementtoariseinaneconomicsetting.Inotherwords,awell-constructedanalyticalmodelofferstheadvantageofstrippingawaysecond-ordereffectsandextra